

in case their services were needed by the Soviet intelligence agencies, whether in a year or ten years. The need for them arose in 1941-1942, when these people unexpectedly found themselves close to the communist-minded members of the family of Robert Oppenheimer, the main creator of the American atomic bomb. There is

a perception that the intelligence and operational groups of the network of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff (then called the GRU) and the Foreign Department (INO) of the NKVD had reliable agents who had access to the highest **echelons** of the Wehrmacht command and the political leadership of Germany, and that the Soviet leadership ignored the materials coming from these sources about the preparation and immediate plans for Hitler to unleash a war against the Soviet Union. How was it in reality?

The intelligence department of the General Staff and the INO NKVD had important sources of information that had access only to the leading circles of the German military command and political leadership, but did not have access to the documents of the Wehrmacht high command. In addition, the information received from circles close to Hitler reflected the hesitation in the German leadership on the issue of making the final decision to attack the Soviet Union.

In the early and mid-1930s, the Intelligence Agency, as well as the OGPU-NKVD, managed to create a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus in Western Europe and the Far East - in China, Japan, which had more than 300 sources of information. A special role in the creation of this apparatus was played by the so-called illegal special agents: the Austrian Stefan Deutsch (Lang), who attracted the well-known "five" K. Philby and others in England, T. Mally (Hungarian, former Catholic priest), who worked in England and in France, K. A. Boguslavsky (Pole, former intelligence officer of the Polish General Staff), S. Rado, L. Trepper, R. Sorge, E. Wollweber, I. R. Grigulevich (Lithuanian, who became the ambassador of Costa Rica in Italy, Yugoslavia and the Vatican).

The mass repressions of 1937-1938 dealt a severe blow to the intelligence services of the USSR. However, intelligence activities continued, despite painful interruptions in maintaining contact with agents previously in contact with operational

workers who fell victims of repression or refused to return to the country. Although

the Soviet intelligence agencies temporarily lost contact with a number of valuable agents, our agent networks in Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux countries were lucky. Sources of information in Germany (the Schul-ze-Boysen group - the headquarters of the Air Force, Harnack - the Ministry of Economics, Kuckhoff, Stebbe - in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leiman - a Gestapo officer) were attracted to cooperation by illegal spouses E. Yu. and V. M. Zarubin, a resident Belkin, agent Girshfeld, who escaped repression. Communication with them was maintained regularly. In addition to these sources, in 1940 they were supplemented by the famous actress Olga Chekhova and Prince Janusz Radziwill, who collaborated with the Soviet authorities on the basis of trust and recruitment obligations, and had direct access to Goering. The NKVD resident Gudimovich in Warsaw, together with his wife E. D. Modrzhinskaya, managed to create a powerful group that carefully monitored the German transportation of troops and equipment to Poland in 1940-1941.

There were also serious undercover positions in Italy. Resident G. I. Rogatnev managed to attract the nephew of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, to cooperation. And **in** exile

among the former tsarist officers **VI** in the OUN, Soviet agent positions were also strong. **In addition**, by decision of the government of the USSR, in connection **with the threat** of an escalation of the war, the leaders of the white **emigration** - Generals A.P. Kutepov and E.K. Miller - **were** abducted and liquidated. The OUN was also **beheaded**. After the death of its leader Yevgeny **Konovalets** in Rotterdam, there was a fierce struggle for power between the leaders of the OUN Melnik and **Bayadera**, as a result **of which**, without any participation of the NKVD, Bandera **liquidated** prominent members of the OUN Wire Stsiborsky, **Sushko**, Baranovsky, Gribovsky and others. **The political** authority of the OUN in the eyes of the Germans was undermined, and **instead of** plans to create a "government of the Carpathian **Ukraine**", **the chief of** the Abwehr V. Kanaris recommended **using it** as a purely police and punitive force.

Back in 1937, our intelligence under the leadership of Shpigelglas obtained important documentary information about the operational

strategic games held by the command of the Reichswehr, and later the Wehrmacht, including the war with Russia. These documents were destined to play a significant role in the development of events and the formation of the mentality of our leadership on the eve of the German-Soviet war. The

operational-strategic games conducted by H. von Seckg, and later by W. von Blomberg, who reported the testament of the Sect to Hitler, at that time convinced the German leadership that Germany had no real opportunities to win the war with Russia if hostilities dragged on for more than two months if during the first month of the war the Germans fail to capture Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow and defeat the main forces of the Red Army, simultaneously occupying the main centers of the military industry and the extraction of raw materials in the European part of the USSR.

In August 1938, my father worked in the INO NKVD, the Foreign Department of the GUGB, reorganized in 1941 **into** the First (Intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. His responsibilities included supervising the German direction of our intelligence, headed in 1938-1942 directly by Major of State Security P. M. Zhuravlev. The leadership has always attached particular importance to the German direction. In 1940-1941, our residency in Berlin,

although it was headed by an inexperienced worker A. Kobulov, nevertheless worked extremely actively and with initiative. Intelligence materials from Berlin, Rome, Tokyo, as can be seen from the archival documents now published, were regularly reported to the government. However, the intelligence leadership (both Golikov and Fitin) was not aware that I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, after the November (1940) visit of Molotov to Berlin, embarked on the path of secret negotiations with Hitler on the actual division of spheres influence in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Meanwhile, according to the memoirs of Berezhkov (Stalin's translator), Molotov and F. von Schulenburg (German Ambassador to the USSR), certainly with the knowledge of Stalin and Hitler, in February-March 1941, they negotiated taking into account Russia's interests in entering the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Thus, the obvious inevitability of a military clash with Germany in the long term, at the same time, was combined with quite

serious consideration of Hitler's proposals on the delimitation of the spheres of geopolitical interests of Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR.

Only now it became clear that the probing conversations about the division of spheres of influence between Molotov and Schulenburg in February-March 1941 reflected not only Hitler's attempt to mislead Stalin and take him by surprise with a surprise attack, but also the hesitations of the German elite on the issue of war with USSR before the victory over England. The information received by the INO NKVD and disinformation from Lettysh, a Gestapo agent, reflected these fluctuations. That is why even our sources, reporting on Hitler's decision to attack the USSR, at the same time, as can be seen from the reports of A. Harnack, H. Schulze-Boysen, and also the wife of a prominent German diplomat close to Ribbentrop, nicknamed Yuna, in September 1940 - In May 1941, "they did not vouch for the reliability of the data received" and with references to Goering they linked to one degree or another Hitler's upcoming aggression against the USSR with an agreement with the British on reconciliation.

Concerned about the incoming information about Germany's preparations for a war with the Soviet Union, the NKVD intelligence leadership back in February 1941 opened the so-called "Zateya" letter case, which **concentrated** all the information about the threat of a German **attack**. However, this attack, according to the overwhelming majority of incoming data, was predicted for the end of the spring of 1941. The forecast did not come true partly due to the German attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941 **and** partly due to miscalculations in completing the deadlines for transporting troops and equipment to the borders of the USSR. This, however, gave rise to the illusion that the war could still be avoided, because the information about the German attack in the spring was not confirmed.

Unfortunately, the correct conclusion about the obvious preparations for war on the basis of the information received was linked in the reporting materials with the hypothetical results of the supposedly upcoming German-Soviet negotiations at the highest level on territorial issues. It is difficult to judge how seriously Hitler actually thought to negotiate with Stalin. But the NKVD had information that Ribbentrop consistently, right up to Hitler's final decision, opposed the war with

Russia, in any case, until the settlement of the Anglo-German military confrontation. In order to delay the

war, it was decided to create for Hitler a real prospect of the Balkan front. The intelligence department of the General Staff (Golikov and Milshtein) and the INO NKVD (Zarubin and Alakhverdov) organized a coup d'état in Belgrade, where a Russian-oriented government came to power. Our agent, Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR in 1941, Milan Gavrilovich, played a prominent role in organizing the coup.

Unfortunately, our intelligence, both military and

political, having intercepted data on the timing of the attack and correctly determined the inevitability of an imminent war, did not reveal the calculations of the Nazi command for the "blitzkrieg" strategy in this war. This was a fatal mistake, because the bet on the "blitzkrieg" indicated that the Germans were planning their attack regardless of the end of the war with England. A major shortcoming of our intelligence work

was also the poor analysis of the information received by agents. It is significant that only during the war, both in the Intelligence Agency and the NKVD, departments were created in the system of intelligence departments for the constant evaluation and processing of intelligence information coming from foreign sources. Not to mention one more episode. We are talking about the

imaginary involvement of German intelligence in the Stalinist massacre of M. N. Tukhachevsky and other prominent military leaders in 1937. Despite the obvious damage to the Red Army of this Stalinist action, my father asserted with all responsibility that the involvement of German intelligence in compromising Tukhachevsky was based only on rumors and Schellenberg's ambitious claims. Father, as you know, was the direct curator of the German direction of our intelligence agencies in 1939-1945, and he knew that the NKVD did not have any materials about Tukhachevsky's suspicious connections with the German command, with the exception of the testimony knocked out during the investigation. Nobody sent materials about Tukhachevsky to Stalin through foreign intelligence of the NKVD. The NKVD intelligence resident in Prague in 1937-1938 P. Zubov, together with the ambassador S. S. Aleksandrovsky, informed Stalin, the Foreign Ministry and the NKVD

E. Beneš's approval of the "liquidation of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy" after his execution. At the same time, Beneš expressed regret that he did not bring to Stalin's attention in time the rumors from Czech intelligence in Berlin about Tukhachevsky's allegedly pro-German sympathies, when he was still head of the Red Army

headquarters in 1925-1928. The Stalin archive also found, but not particularly popularized, data that the so-called compromising materials about Tukhachevsky's ambitions, received from abroad, were nothing more than excerpts from foreign press materials. They were sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks by Soviet embassies and TASS correspondents. The myth of the involvement of German intelligence in the massacre of Stalin over Tukhachevsky was launched for the first time in 1939 by the defector V. Krivitsky, a former officer of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, in the book "I was Stalin's agent." At the same time, Krivitsky refers to the white general N. V. Skoblin, a prominent agent of the INO NKVD among the white emigration. Skoblin, according to Krivitsky, was allegedly a double who worked **for** German intelligence. In reality, Skoblin was not a double. His intelligence work completely **refutes** this version. Skoblin's wife, the famous **singer** Nadezhda Plevitskaya, who helped him, died in **a prison in** Strasbourg, when France was already **occupied** by the Germans. It was not the Germans who helped **Skoblin** disappear from France in 1937. The head of **the Russian** military organization in exile, Miller, was **indeed** captured at his apartment **in** Paris and **taken to** the USSR in September 1937. Skoblin was **taken** by us by plane to Barcelona, where he died during **the German** bombardment.

The myth that Krivitsky, who became a mentally unstable person in exile, allowed to roam the world, was later used by Schellenberg in his memoirs, attributing to himself the merit in the case of Tukhachevsky, who, however, became, first of all, according to my father's deep conviction, a victim of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union. military leadership. As L.P. Beria and V.S. Abakumov told their father during the war years, Tukhachevsky "became an enemy" primarily because he dared to raise the question of changing the military leadership, namely K.E. Voroshilov, a member of the Politburo, which testified to that "he could create a potentially independent government

military force", which could become a threat to the then ruling regime. The

repressions of 1937-1938 in the army and the NKVD taught the Soviet high command not to come up with radical initiatives that affected the political interests of the state or the alignment of forces in the leadership. The task was extremely simple - only to report information.

On June 16, 1941, while receiving Merkulov, People's Commissar of State Security, and Fitin, head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD, Stalin rudely cut them off, imposing an obscene resolution on a report about an imminent war. However, on the same day, Beria, Merkulov's immediate superior, referring to Stalin's instructions, gave my father an order to form a Special Group under the People's Commissar as a special body for reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the event of a war.

Stalin and the Soviet military leadership, unfortunately, underestimated the capabilities of Germany, the combat strength of the strike groups concentrated near the borders of the USSR. The scouts are to blame for not analyzing (and indeed they could not do this without the General Staff operators) the real balance of forces at the borders. The NKVD and the military counterintelligence agencies, I think, are also to blame for the fact that the government was not informed about the low level of combat readiness of our troops in the border districts, about the lack of order in the installation of fire weapons on duty at airfields, bases, weapons depots, and places of deployment of troops, about the unpreparedness of the tank fleet

for combat operations, etc. As a result, not understanding the fleeting nature of military operations at the beginning of the war, Stalin and Molotov sincerely believed that two hours were enough to bring the army to combat readiness. Significant here is the fault of military counterintelligence, which did not fully report on these omissions. According to my father, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov, who led the army, were unable to restore proper order in the districts and partially concealed from the government a low readiness for war.

Serious mistakes were made, as I think, in the preparation of our residencies for operational activities in Western Europe in the conditions of hostilities and the transition to illegal

position. The spy network of Trepper, Gurevich and Rado in Belgium, Holland, France, Switzerland was too strongly connected with sources of Jewish nationality, which made it vulnerable to the operations of the German special services. The leadership of the Intelligence Agency, like the INO NKVD, neglected the proper training of radio operators to maintain communications in a war.

Although back in April 1941, a warning was sent to the residencies of Western Europe about preparing for work in the conditions of an imminent war, the Soviet intelligence services were late in providing radio operators with reliable equipment and their training, as well as in creating duplicating radio apartments. The leadership of the NKVD residency in Berlin (Kobulov and Korotkov) did not instill the proper conspiracy skills in the group of Schulze-Boysen, Harnack, Cookhoff. In violation of all rules of secrecy, valuable sources of information maintained a linear connection with each other. The Gestapo did not have much

difficulty in 1942, after a brief development, to arrest **the leaders** of the "Red Chapel" in Berlin and other countries **of Western Europe**. Our inconsistent preparation for operations under war conditions was one of the important **reasons** for the heroic death of valuable agents in 1942. It

has already been noted above that the information about the protracted war, which was unbearable for the Germans, received by Spiegelglas in 1937, was reported to the government.

In 1940, we received information that V. **Keitel** warned Hitler about underestimating the factor of **shortage** of raw materials for conducting combat operations in the vast Russian military theater. Our military-strategic games in January 1941, conducted **by the General Staff** of the Red Army, as it is now clear, did not **take into account** all Hitler's calculations for a "blitzkrieg". Intelligence

information became one of the reasons Stalin set to protect our raw material areas in Ukraine from the German invasion. The government has drawn the wrong conclusion that the Germans will primarily seek to seize our rich economic regions in the Ukraine in order to provide themselves with raw materials for the conduct of the war. Zhukov recognizes these erroneous considerations of Stalin. To this we can only add that Stalin probably

relied on our intelligence about Seeckt's will and reliable information about Hitler's lack of raw materials to conduct large-scale hostilities in a long war on two fronts. The information received by the INO NKVD in the last

days (June 17-20) before the war, coming from the brother of the Prime Minister of Finland J. Rangel about the German attack, as well as from Italy, along with data on the activity of German troops on the border, eventually inclined on the evening of June 21, the country's leadership to adopt a directive for the command of the army and navy on the upcoming attack. Since Fitin was outside Moscow, the belated order to use our foreign agents in Poland to prevent a major provocation at the border was given to my father only at six o'clock in the evening that day. Due to the lack of time, the NKVD did not have real opportunities to fulfill this erroneous directive. I have already said that in May 1937, Tukhachevsky's group of eight people, who made up the Soviet military elite, was

arrested, they were accused of high treason, espionage and a secret military conspiracy to overthrow the government. Only two weeks passed, and by the verdict of a closed military court, they were all shot. Thus began mass repressions in the army, as a result of which 35,000 commanders suffered. It is known from archival materials now being published that the accusations against Tukhachevsky and other military leaders of the country were fabricated at the direction of Stalin and Voroshilov. Currently, there are three versions of why Stalin went to this massacre. In accordance with the first, the fate of these people was decided by the disinformation of the German and Czechoslovak special services, which convinced the suspicious Stalin and his People's Commissar for Defense Voroshilov that Tukhachevsky and a number of other military leaders maintained secret contacts with German military circles. It was this version that Khrushchev repeated in his speech criticizing Stalin at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.

But contacts with the Germans must be seen against the backdrop of close German-Soviet military cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s. The long period of military cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union was abruptly interrupted in 1933 by Stalin under a clear

fabricated pretext that the Germans are secretly sharing information with the French about their connections with us. Meanwhile, a group of Soviet military figures led by Marshal Tukhachevsky noted the usefulness of these contacts with the Germans and hoped to use their technological military innovations with us. On the part of Germany, there was also a certain interest in continuing ties with the USSR, although for completely different reasons.

High-ranking military men, immigrants from East Prussia, were followers of the founder of the Wehrmacht, General Hans von Seeckt. After the defeat in the First World War, General von Seeckt spent many years recreating the German military machine and developing a new strategic doctrine. It was he who spoke to the German leadership for improving relations with the USSR, pointing out that the main goal of German policy in the event of war was to prevent military operations on two fronts.

In accordance with the second version, the victims were those military men who, in terms of their intellectual level, significantly exceeded Voroshilov and had their own opinion on issues of military development. Tukhachevsky and his group allegedly did not agree with Stalin and Voroshilov on the question of the strategy of military reforms, and therefore Stalin, fearing rivals who could claim power, decided to deal with them. According to the third version, the military was eliminated due

to a long-standing enmity between Tukhachevsky and Stalin, who had different points of view on who was responsible for the mistakes made in the war with the White Poles in 1920. Tukhachevsky believed that the Red Army was defeated on the outskirts of Warsaw, because Stalin and Voroshilov allegedly refused to transfer cavalry units to help Tukhachevsky.

My father's view of this tragedy, as far as I know, differed from other versions. He wrote about this in his
memories:

“I remember how in August 1939 I was pleasantly surprised by reports from Germany, from which it was clear that the German military leadership highly appreciated the potential of the Red Army. In one of the documents of the higher Germanic

command, intercepted by us, the cause of the death of Marshal Tukhachevsky was called his exorbitant ambitions and disagreements with Marshal Voroshilov, who unquestioningly shared all the views of Stalin.

Approving a summary of intelligence materials for Stalin, Beria included a phrase from this document: "The elimination of Tukhachevsky clearly shows that Stalin is in complete control of the state of affairs in the Red Army *, perhaps in order to flatter the leader, thereby emphasizing his far-sightedness in the timely elimination Tukhachevsky.

I also remember the commentary of Beria and Abakumov, during the war years the head of the SMERSH military counterintelligence, who was also responsible for the political reliability of the Armed Forces. Both spoke about the arrogance of Tukhachevsky and his entourage, who dared to think that Stalin, at their suggestion, would remove Voroshilov. According to Beria, this fact alone clearly showed that the military, grossly violating the established order, put forward proposals that went beyond their competence. Didn't they know, he said, that only the Politburo, and no one else, had the right to raise the question of replacing the people's commissar for defense? It was then that they remembered, Abakumov emphasized, that Tukhachevsky and people close to him allowed themselves to call military bands to their

dachas for private concerts. That "above" one should behave strictly according to the rules, I learned from Marshal Shaposhnikov, who replaced Tukhachevsky. There was a war going on, in a very difficult period of fighting near Moscow, given the urgency of reports from the German rear, I reported materials directly to him a couple of times, bypassing the usual channels. And every time he politely pointed out to me: "My dear, you must definitely reflect important intelligence in the reports of the NKVD and the political leadership of the country. Stalin, Beria and at the same time the People's Commissar of Defense must

be fully aware of our joint work. Father also pointed to another circumstance that played a role in the fate of Tukhachevsky. He was on bad terms with Shaposhnikov. In the late 1920s, Tukhachevsky, as his father writes further, led an intrigue against Shaposhnikov in order to take his post.

Chief of the General Staff. By the way, Shaposhnikov was one of the members of the special presence of the Supreme Court, which pronounced the death sentence on Tukhachevsky. He, Budyonny and the chairman of the court, Ulrich, were the only ones out of its entire composition who escaped

repression and died of natural causes. Father also said that Tukhachevsky and his group, in the struggle for influence over Stalin, fell for his bait. During frequent meetings with Stalin, Tukhachevsky constantly found a reason to criticize Voroshilov. Stalin encouraged this criticism, calling it "constructive", and liked to discuss options for new appointments and removals. He also liked to consider different approaches to military doctrines. Tukhachevsky allowed himself to freely discuss all this not only behind closed doors, but also to spread rumors about supposedly upcoming changes and reshuffles in the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In a word, he and his colleagues went, in Stalin's opinion, too far. After the NKVD reported to the government about the rumors circulating in the capital, this began to worry the country's leadership. Even those historians who are eager to expose Stalin's crimes cannot but admit that the materials of the Tukhachevsky case contain various kinds of documentary evidence regarding plans to reshuffle the country's military leadership ... In the published archives of

the Red Army, one can, for example, read a letter to Voroshilov dated 5 June 1937, signed by the head of the secretariat of the People's Commissariat of Defense Smorodinov. It contains a request to send copies of Tukhachevsky's letters to the military leadership to the NKVD. And although there is no resolution on the document, it is clear that during the "investigation" Tukhachevsky strongly objected to the accusations, referring to documents confirming that there were no disagreements between him, Voroshilov and Stalin on military issues. Tukhachevsky claimed that he maintained contacts with German military representatives solely on instructions from the government. He did his best to prove that he always saw his duty in the unquestioning execution of orders on all matters of military development. In a word, the myth of Walter Krivitsky, picked up by Nikita Khrushchev,

remains a myth. Documents for this case were never found in the archives of the KGB or the archives of Stalin

himself. But if you restore the sequence of events, then, for example, you can see that Skoblin, as an agent of the Gestapo, was first written by the Pravda newspaper in 1937. The article was agreed with the intelligence leadership and published in order to divert attention from accusations of Soviet intelligence involvement in the kidnapping of General Miller. The criminal case against Tukhachevsky was entirely based on his own confessions, and there were absolutely no references to specific incriminating facts received from abroad. If such documents existed, then the father, as the deputy head of intelligence, who oversaw the German direction on the eve of the war, would certainly have seen them or knew about their existence. The only mention of the "German trace" in the Skoblin case is a reference to his deceptive maneuver, which managed to lure General Miller to a safe house in Paris. Skoblin spoke to Mille-RU about "German contacts" that are important for the secret work of the white emigration. Miller met not with the Germans, but with the NKVD resident in Paris, Kislov (code name Finn) and Shpigelglas (code name Douglas). By the way, contrary to the versions of events in the books popular in the West by Christopher Andrew and Gordievsky, John

Dzhizyak and Krivitsky, Skoblin did not take part in the elimination of Miller's predecessor, General Kutepov. This operation in 1930 was carried out by the intelligence service of Serebryansky. Kutepov was detained in the center of Paris by three of our agents dressed as French gendarmerie officers. They stopped Kutepov on the street under the pretext of checking documents and forcibly put him into a car. Kutepov, suspecting something was wrong, resisted. During the fight he suffered a heart attack and died. He was buried in the suburbs of Paris, in the courtyard of the house of one of the agents of Soviet intelligence. So, in reality, there is no evidence of unauthorized contacts between Tukhachevsky and the Germans. But in the archives there are many materials containing

reviews of the foreign press and responses from the leaders of Western countries about the Tukhachevsky conspiracy.

In July 1937, Aleksandrovsky, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Czechoslovakia, reported to Moscow about the reaction of President Beneš to Tukhachevsky.

execution There are the most contradictory interpretations of the remarks of Benes, who is portrayed by Soviet historians as a man who "sincerely and with the best intentions betrayed Tukhachevsky to Stalin, not realizing that he was handing over materials falsified by the Germans to the Soviets." The documents, however, tell a very different story. According to Aleksandrovsky, Beneš did not believe that Tukhachevsky was a spy and saboteur. According to Benes, Tukhachevsky "could count on the overthrow of Stalin, only relying on Yagoda, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR." Based on information from the Czech ambassador in Berlin, Benes noted: Tukhachevsky simply advocated the continuation of Soviet-German cooperation, which was interrupted with Hitler's rise to power. It is clear that Benes did not take Tukhachevsky's accusations of espionage seriously, but he felt that for one reason or another the marshal was in disgrace, and he contributed to the discrediting of Tukhachevsky, since he needed Stalin's support. He, like Beria, wanted to show his full **approval** of Moscow's decision to liquidate Tukhachevsky. Aleksandrovsky's **diary** contains a statement **by Beneš in** which he speaks of Tukhachevsky **as** an adventurer and unreliable person. By and large, **Benes** supported the massacre of Tukhachevsky, but **did not play** any role in his removal **and** arrest.

"As far as I remember," my father wrote, "in the letter file "Khutor" there are references to the fact that Beneš in April 1937, Tukhachevsky, removal of hinted to the plenipotentiary on the eve of the Aleksandrovsky and our resident in Prague, Petr Zubov, which does not exclude the possibility of a military agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, despite their current differences, partly due to the good ties between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht established by Tukhachevsky in the 20s and 30s. However, only on July 4, 1937, after the execution of Tukhachevsky, Beneš told Aleksandrovsky about "certain" contacts of the Czech ambassador in Berlin with German military representatives, which allegedly took place in January 1937. According to him, Benes did not tell us that the Czechs have

information about the presence in Germany of an influential group among the military who advocated the continuation of secret German-Soviet military ties established back in

the 1920s. From his ambassador in Berlin, Beneš received a report containing vague hints from the German generals about their confidential relationship with the leadership of the Red Army. The purpose of this German disinformation was to frighten the Czechs into believing that they could not count on the support of the Red Army in their confrontation with Germany over the fate of the Sudetenland. This was in July 1937 - a year before Hitler's ultimatum to Benes, demanding that the Sudetenland with their ethnic German population go to Germany. In his diary, the ambassador writes that Benes apologized to him for not sharing with the Soviet leadership information about possible secret contacts between the top of the Wehrmacht and the headquarters of the Red Army ... "

From the materials of the case mentioned above, the real purpose of the July meeting between Plenipotentiary Aleksandrovsky, NKVD resident Zubov and Beneš becomes clear. Now the content of the conversation between Beneš and Aleksandrovsky is denied. Another important circumstance is also hushed up: in 1935 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed a secret agreement on cooperation between intelligence services. To resolve this issue, my father mentioned, the head of Czech intelligence, Colonel Moravec, visited Moscow at that time. The cooperation of Soviet and Czech intelligence, the exchange of information was initially coordinated by the Intelligence Agency of the Red Army, and since 1937 - by the

NKVD. In 1938, Benes turned to Stalin with a request to support his actions to overthrow the Stojadinovic government in Belgrade, which pursued a policy hostile to the Czech leadership. By special order of Stalin, in order to support the coup in Belgrade in 1938, the NKVD was entrusted with the financing of Serbian militant officers - the organizers of this coup. Our resident Zubov, having left for Belgrade to transfer money to the conspirators, made sure that the people selected by the Czech intelligence for this action - adventurers, do not rely on real power, and did not give them 200 thousand dollars. This failed operation sheds light on

hitherto unknown connections between Beneš and Stalin. Beneš's goal was to obtain full support for Czech policy from Stalin, both in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole. That is why, unlike the British and French, he did not express his disapproval of the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and the wave of repression among the Soviet military command.

By the way, my father mentioned that he once heard about the existence of highly secret materials of the Tukhachevsky case, allegedly kept in the archives of the Stalinist secretariat and containing information received from abroad. It seems that it was about the same materials from the foreign press, reports from TASS correspondents, diplomats, heads of trade missions, as well as NKVD and GRU residencies about how the massacre of Tukhachevsky was assessed abroad.

These were indeed materials of a special folder of closed foreign correspondence, in which reviews of foreign public opinion and comments of Soviet ambassadors and heads of government delegations were collected. This archive contains German, French and English records of conversations with high-ranking Soviet representatives obtained through intelligence channels. They were valuable because they helped to understand the mindset of the people with whom the negotiations were being conducted. The tragedy, however, was that Stalin, and

later Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, used **classified** foreign correspondence to **compromise** their rivals at a time of intense **power struggles**. In ordinary times, reviews of the foreign press were not given any serious importance, but **during the period of** mass repressions, it became the rule to resort to these materials, which assessed Soviet **leaders**, in order to incriminate them with various kinds of "**deviations**" from the party line. Moreover, this rule was **even** enshrined in a special resolution of the Central Committee. **In 1989**, Boris Yeltsin, during his first **visit to** the United States, was accused, referring to **the foreign** press, of addiction

to alcohol. In **1990**, these materials played a role in the conflict **between** Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, the ex-Minister

foreign affairs. The use of clippings from the foreign **press was** stopped only in November 1991, **just before the** end of the "Gorbachev era". And **Ignatenko**, the general director of TASS, did this by banning special reviews **of the foreign press from being sent to the government through** TASS that contained compromising information on our **leaders**. "In the **1930s,**"

my father said, "it seemed to us: anyone who opposes the government or the party leadership, primarily against Stalin himself, as well as his comrade-in-arms Commissar Voroshilov, is an "enemy of the people." Only much later did the full cynicism of Beria's and Abakumov's remarks about Tukhachevsky reach me . The top leadership knew perfectly well that all the charges against him were fictitious. They preferred the version of an imaginary conspiracy , because otherwise they would have to admit that rivals in the struggle for power actually become victims of repression. Such recognition would harm the prestige of the ruling party.

What in 1937 was considered a serious crime - I mean the accusation of Voroshilov's incompetence, which Tukhachevsky allowed himself - twenty years later, when he was posthumously rehabilitated, was no longer such. And no one explained the real reasons for the crime. In official reports, only very vague references to "mistakes" in the punitive policy appeared, only Yezhov and his henchmen were named as the culprits.

In April 1938, Rybkin, the NKVD resident in Finland, was summoned to the Kremlin, where Stalin and other members of the Politburo entrusted him with a top secret mission... He was instructed to informally propose a secret agreement to the Finnish government. The Finns were guaranteed economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, taking into account their interests in Scandinavia and Europe, in exchange for the signing of a non-aggression pact, economic and military cooperation in the event of aggression by a third party. The pact promised economic benefits for both sides. Stalin's proposal also included the division of the spheres of military and economic influence in the Baltic region between Finland and the Soviet Union. At the direction of Stalin Rybkin

also donated \$100,000 to create a party of petty proprietors that would advocate a neutral Finland. Rybkin, during a conversation in the Kremlin,

expressed doubt that the Finns, who were then hostile to their eastern neighbor, would agree to signing such an agreement, but Stalin stressed that this was a sounding, so proposals should be made orally, without participation in the negotiations of our envoy, that is, unofficially. Rybkin did as he was ordered, but the offer was rejected. However, it initiated a split in the Finnish leadership, which the Kremlin later exploited by signing a separate peace treaty with Finland in 1944. By the way, this was done through the mediation of the Swedish Wallenberg family. At that time, the attempts of the Soviet intelligence services to find secret approaches to Mannerheim through his former colleague in the tsarist army, Count Ignatiev, who joined the Red Army in the 1920s, were not crowned with success either.

years.

My father, apparently, was not aware of such informal proposals to the German side, but he believed that the President of Finland, Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, informed Hitler about our proposals, so the Führer, sending his Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Moscow in August 1939 for negotiations on the signing of a non-aggression pact, relied not only on the spontaneous reaction of Molotov and Stalin. He was **aware** that we were ready to accept an offer **of this** kind, since we ourselves had already tried to conclude **a similar** agreement with neighboring Finland.

Finland's **refusal** followed in the same month **of 1938**. It was much more important **for the Finns** to remain **allies of England**, Sweden **and** Germany. In addition, they **did not see** any benefits for themselves in the role of a buffer zone **between** East **and** West. Later, however, this role **was still** imposed on them. For the fact that Finland attacked **the** Soviet Union along with the Germans, she had to **pay** a heavy price. As a result, the Finns received **much less** favorable conditions for themselves than those that Stalin **originally** offered them through Rybkin in **1938**. In **August** 1939, the volume of intelligence **information increased dramatically**. The NKVD received a reliable report **that**

the French and British governments **are not** eager to support the Soviet Union **in** the event of a war with Germany. This was in complete agreement **with** the data received by the Soviet intelligence services **three** or four years earlier from the Cambridge **group**. According to this information, the British Cabinet , more precisely Neville Chamberlain and Sir John **Simon**, considered the possibility of a secret agreement with **Hitler** to support him in a military **confrontation with** the Soviet Union. Particularly noteworthy **was** the information of three reliable sources from **Germany**: the leadership of the Wehrmacht strongly objected **to a war** on two fronts. The directives received obligated the Soviet leadership to quickly consider possible options for

cooperation with countries ready to sign agreements on countering the outbreak of war. It was not only about England and France, with which consultations had been held since the beginning of 1939, but also about Germany. In Germany , only people from East Prussia advocated for a peaceful settlement of relations with the Soviet Union among the influential military .

My father recalled that, considering alternative **options** in accordance with the directives received (either an agreement with the British and French, **or** a peace settlement with Germany), he could **not** even imagine at that time that the economic negotiations would end with a Cooperation Pact between Berlin and Moscow:

“When I was informed of the imminent arrival of the German Foreign Minister in Moscow on August 23, 1939 - just a few hours before it happened - I was surprised. However, after the arrival of Ribbentrop and the signing of the non-aggression pact that followed thirteen hours later (this event took place in the Kremlin at two in the morning on August 24), it became clear that the decision was not sudden. The strategic goal of the Soviet leadership was to avoid at any cost a war on two fronts - in the Far East and in Europe. This line of diplomatic relations, not tied to ideological considerations, has been established since the 1920s, when the Soviet Union carried out economic cooperation and maintained normal relations with Italy after the fascist regime of Benito came to power in 1922.

Mussolini. The Kremlin leadership was ready to compromise with any regime, provided that it guaranteed the stability of the Soviet Union. For Stalin and his entourage, the realization of their geopolitical aspirations to transform the Soviet Union into the most powerful power in the world has always been a priority*.

Indeed, our country was able to develop

more or less steadily only after the completion of collectivization in 1934. Prior to this, the people had to go through successively the Civil War, famine, devastation. And only by the mid-1930s did industrialization begin to bear fruit. The growing power of the state was demonstrated in the successful military operations against Japan in Mongolia and Manchuria. Although the country established diplomatic relations with all the leading powers of the world, we were nevertheless kept in isolation, which was clearly manifested when the world powers did not allow us to participate in solving cardinal world issues on which their interests depended. All agreements on Europe and Asia were accepted by Western countries and Japan to the detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-German agreement of 1935, which recognized the rearmament of the German naval forces, and subsequent agreements between the leading powers of the world to equip their fleets with modern weapons did not even mention the Soviet Union. **the French** and British delegations that arrived in **Moscow** in the summer of 1939 to probe the ground **for a** possible

alliance against Hitler consisted **of** secondary figures. Thus, **Stalin's** policy towards Hitler was based on **the correct** idea that the hostility of the Western **world** and Japan to the Soviet system would make the isolation of the USSR **from** the international community a permanent **factor**.

In retrospect, one cannot help but conclude that all three future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, Britain and France - were to blame for allowing Hitler to unleash the Second World War. Mutual hostility and contradictions - that's what **prevented** the achievement of a compromise between England and **France** on the one hand and the Soviet Union - on **the other**. A compromise that would make it possible to jointly **stop** Hitler's aggression against

Poland. For some reason, historians of the Second World War lose sight of the fact that the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in 1939 were actually **initiated** by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Donald MacLean reported that **Roosevelt** sent a representative to British Prime Minister Chamberlain with a warning that German dominance in Western Europe would be detrimental to both American and British interests. Roosevelt **urged** Chamberlain, in order to contain Hitler, to enter into negotiations with Britain's European allies, including the Soviet Union. Our sources said that the British government was obviously **reluctant** to the American initiative, so **Roosevelt** had to put pressure on the British to get them to still negotiate with the Soviets to **work out** military measures to resist Hitler. In the notes **of my** father's memoirs, it was underlined **in his hand** : "... nevertheless, the speed with which the non-aggression pact **with Hitler was signed struck**

me: after all , just two days before it was signed, I received an order to look for **possible way for a peaceful settlement of our relations with Germany. We still continued to send our strategic proposals to Stalin and Molotov, and the treaty had already been signed: Stalin conducted the negotiations himself in the strictest secrecy.** I knew nothing about the protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but in general such secret protocols are the most common thing in diplomatic relations involving particularly complex issues. On the eve of the war,

the British government signed secret protocols with Poland - they dealt with the provision of military assistance to Poland in the event of a war with Germany. In 1993, for example, a German weekly published secret minutes and recordings of confidential conversations between Gorbachev and Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the eve of German reunification. And now, when I read the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, I do not find anything secret in them. The directives based on the signed agreements were very clear and definite: they were known not only to intelligence leaders, but also to military leaders and diplomats. Actually famous map

partition of Poland, attached to the protocols on September 28, 1939, appeared on the pages of Pravda, of course, without the signatures of Stalin and Ribbentrop, and the whole world could see it. By that time, however, Poland was

occupied." **Further,**

the father wrote: "In October 1939, together with Fitin, the head of intelligence, and Merkulov, Beria's deputy, I took part in a meeting with Molotov in his Kremlin office. There were also the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General Vasilevsky (in the 1950s, the Minister of Defense), Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Potemkin, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Borisov, Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Isakov, Chief of the Border Troops General Maslennikov and Chief of Military Intelligence, I think, General Major

Panfilov. There was one issue on the agenda - the protection of strategic interests in the Baltics. Molotov wanted to hear our thoughts. Soviet troops were already there in accordance with treaties signed with the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Opening the meeting, Molotov said: - We have an agreement

with Germany that the Baltic is considered as a region of the most important interests of the Soviet Union. It is clear, however, continued Molotov, that although the German authorities recognize this in principle, they will never agree to any "cardinal social transformations" that would change the status of these states, their entry into the Soviet Union.

Moreover, **the Soviet leadership believes that the best way to protect the interests of the USSR in the Baltics and create a reliable border there is to help the labor movement to overthrow the puppet regimes.**

From this statement it became clear exactly how we interpreted the terms of the agreement with Hitler. However, in the late autumn of 1939, a new impetus appeared to intensify our political, economic, military and intelligence operations in the Baltic. From our residencies in Sweden and Berlin, we received verified and reliable information that the Germans are planning to send high-ranking economic delegations to Riga and Tallinn to conclude

long term agreements. Thus, the Baltic states would be under the political and economic umbrella of Germany. Telegrams from Berlin and Sweden were sent with two signatures - the ambassador and the resident, which was extremely rare and meant that the information was of great political importance. Received in Moscow, they with visas of Molotov and Beria were forwarded to Fitin and me through the NKVD with the order of Beria to immediately submit proposals on this issue. Telegrams of this level, signed by ambassadors and residents, were usually sent to several members of the government.

Fitin introduced the telegram to Gukasov, the head of the department for work with nationalist and émigré organizations in the areas adjacent to our borders. By the way, it was Gukasov who a year ago demanded that the party bureau investigate my personal case. Now, still suspicious of my loyalty and, perhaps, still holding a grudge against me, he did not convey Beria's order to me and independently prepared proposals for confronting the German special services in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and sent them to Fitin bypassing me. His plan was to use only an agent network in the three Baltic republics, consisting of Russian and Jewish emigrants.

A scandal erupted.

Having called Fitin and his father and after listening to the message on Gukasov's note, Beria asked my father's opinion on this matter. My father honestly answered that he did not have one, he did not receive any instructions and was not aware of the German intentions in Riga, at that time he was engaged in completely different matters. Beria exploded with rage and ordered the telegrams to be urgently brought again. Then he saw that they did not have his father's signature, and then there was an obligatory rule to endorse any secret document that passed through the hands of one or another official in intelligence and sent for study. Gukasov was immediately called to the carpet, and Beria threatened to cut off his head for not following his order. Gukasov in response, lowering his voice, in a confidential tone (he was a native of Tbilisi) said literally the following. Indeed, he did not show the telegrams to his father, as he received information from the head of the investigative unit, Sergienko, about

the presence of materials that talk about his allegedly suspicious contacts with "enemies of the people" - the former intelligence leadership. Beria abruptly interrupted Gukasov: we must give up the idiotic habit of interfering with our proposals and once and for all cut ourselves on the nose that orders must be carried out unquestioningly and immediately.

"Europe is now in the fire of war, and the tasks of intelligence in the current conditions," Beria emphasized, "have become completely different. - And then he quoted Stalin, who demanded the active involvement of intelligence officers in political probing operations using any conflicts in the ruling circles of foreign states. "This," Beria summed up, "is the key to success in overthrowing the current governments of the puppet states that declared their so-called independence in 1918 under the protection of German bayonets. - From this tirade, we immediately understood that he meant the Baltic states. "The Germans before and now," continued Beria, "consider them as their provinces, considering them colonies of the German Empire. Our task is to play on the contradictions between England and Sweden in this region. "At these words, he turned," writes the father, "in my direction. "Think everything over and call Chichaev to Moscow immediately. Then report your considerations, taking into account the necessary material resources. The term is three days.

The self-confident, bold presentation of the question reflected the new thinking that Stalin, Molotov and Beria demonstrated after the signing of the pact, which clearly gave them confidence in their own abilities. In the regions that are now officially included in the sphere of our interests, we began a radically new active policy in order to influence the internal course of the governments of these states. Urgently summoned to Moscow, Chichaev, the NKVD resident

in Riga, reported sharp divisions and strained relations within the Latvian government, primarily between President Ulmanis and War Minister Balodis. This conflict undermined the stability of the existing regime, which was already under double pressure - ours and the Germans. The Germans leaned there

on our loyal supporters in the economic management structures and business circles, at that time we relied on influence among the "left" groups associated with both the Communist Party and the labor unions. Be that as it may, my father said, Latvia, as well as other Baltic states, was essentially a buffer zone between us and Germany. The plan to create a broad coalition, when both German and Soviet interests should be represented in the government, was also discussed at a meeting in Molotov's Kremlin office. Upon learning of this option, Latvian President Ulmanis naturally strongly objected, while Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters unexpectedly approved the idea. The situation in the republic was tense also because the strike movement supported by us was also expanding there. The economic crisis caused by the outbreak of war also deepened: the region's traditional trade ties with Britain and Western Europe were cut off.

“Chichaev and Vetrov, an adviser to our embassy in Riga,” writes my father, “came to me, and Vetrov offered to play on the cash ambitions of Munters, whose reputation in Berlin was quite stable due to his frequent meetings with Ribbentrop. As for Ulmanis, his government was not particularly popular as a result of mistakes in the economic field, on the one hand, and the conciliatory position taken by him in relation to the chauvinistic German businessmen in Riga, on the other. These merchants bought up all the most valuable that was in the republic, widely using the advantages that opened up to them due to the termination of Latvia's trade ties with Western Europe. By the way, about seventy percent of all Latvian exports went to Germany, essentially at dumping prices. I informed Beria and Molotov that the Latvian government relies not so much on the support of regular military formations as on auxiliary police units, composed mainly of the sons of farmers and small merchants. In our opinion, Foreign Minister Munters was the ideal figure to head the government,

acceptable to both German and Soviet interests. When he ordered the leading Latvian newspapers to publish a photo of Molotov (in honor of his 50th birthday), we took this as a sign of his willingness to establish personal contacts with Molotov. **Our** reaction was immediate: I was immediately issued a diplomatic passport in the name of Matveev, and Munters was informed that Matveev, Molotov's special adviser, would like to meet with him so that the Latvian minister could convey through him everything important that he could be outside the protocol. These unofficial messages will then be delivered to the Soviet leadership. **It was June 1940 - and it was necessary to act**

urgently. That is why I did not get to Riga by train, but on board a high-speed Soviet bomber. In Riga, together with Vetrov, I paid a secret visit to Munters, expressing during our meeting the desire of the Soviet government to reshuffle the cabinet of ministers of the republic as soon as possible so that he, Munters, could head the new coalition government.

My visit was part of a complex operation to seize control of the Latvian government. It was led by Merkulov, Beria's first deputy, who secretly flew to Riga before me to coordinate the action plan on the spot. Being in Riga under the guise of adviser to Molotov, I reported everything to Merkulov, who had direct telephone access to Molotov and Beria. Meanwhile, an ultimatum was presented to the government in Riga. As a result, President Ulmanis was forced to resign, our troops occupied Latvia and the ex-president was arrested. The situation has changed the rules of the game. The Germans were too deeply involved in military operations in the West to be interested in the events taking place in Latvia. In this regard, Molotov and Stalin decided to put at the head of the Baltic states not those who would suit both sides (like, for example, the same Munters), but reliable people close to the Communist Party. True, some of the original conditions that implied the creation of coalition governments still remained. So, let's say, Latvian and Estonian generals were awarded ranks similar to those in

of the Red Army, and although Munters was arrested, they did not do it right away.

Together with Vetrov, I went to the residence of Munters, where we took all measures to pack his property and quietly take all family members to Moscow. From there they were transported to Voronezh, where Munters was appointed to the position of professor at Voronezh University. We have officially notified the German side that we still consider Munters a politically significant figure. Under our control, he met in Moscow at dinner with German diplomatic representatives, but his fate was already sealed, and he did not even succeed in becoming a puppet head of government. In 1941, when the war with Germany began, Munters was arrested and sentenced to a long prison term for activities hostile to the Soviet government. By a strange coincidence, I met Munters in Vladimir Prison in late 1958 or early 1959. When he was released, he remained to live in Vladimir. After retiring, he published articles in Izvestia, proving the inevitability of the union of Latvia with the USSR.

The fate of the Baltic states, which was originally determined in the Kremlin and in Berlin, is in many ways similar to the fate of the Eastern European states, which was decided at one time in Yalta. The similarity here is striking: in both cases, coalition governments friendly to both sides were provisionally envisaged. The Soviet Union agreement needed a buffer zone separating us from the spheres of influence of other world powers, and we showed a willingness to go for a tough confrontation in those areas where the Red Army troops were located by the end of the war. Naturally, the Kremlin saw the task of building communism mainly in strengthening the might of the Soviet state in every possible way. We could play the role of a world power only if the state possessed

sufficient military force and was able to subjugate the countries located near our borders to its influence. The idea of propaganda from above for the communist revolution around the world was an ideological smokescreen,

designed to establish the USSR as a superpower influencing all events in the world. Although initially this concept was ideological, it gradually became a real political course. Such an opportunity opened up before the Soviet state for the first time

after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. After all, from now on, as the secret protocols confirmed, one of the leading powers of the world recognized the international interests of the Soviet Union and its natural desire to expand its borders.

In his memoirs, my father describes, in particular, such episode:

“Even before Latvia was occupied by our troops, Beria unexpectedly summoned me to his place and offered to accompany him to a football match at the Dynamo stadium. He did not give any explanation - it was an order. Spartak, a team of trade unions, and Dynamo, a team of the NKVD, played: in those years, each meeting of these teams was an event in itself.

At first, I decided that Beria wanted me to be present during his conversation with the agent in the restaurant. The restaurant was located at the stadium and was an ideal place for meetings with agents, since the offices there were equipped with listening devices. When we arrived at the stadium and got out of the car, I followed Beria at a respectful distance, since Kobulov, Tsanava, Maslennikov and other deputies immediately approached him, immediately surrounding their boss. Turning around, however, he made me a sign to come closer and walk side by side - so I found myself in the government box. Beria will introduce me to Malenkov and other party and state leaders. I must say that I felt extremely uncomfortable. All this time I sat in silence, but the very fact of my presence on the government podium made it clear to Kruglov, Serov, Tsanava and others that it was time to stop spreading rumors about my suspicious contacts, compromising me materials available in the investigative unit. They had to make sure that from now on I belong to the category of trusted people in the eyes of the country's connections and some leadership.

I was lucky that all my meetings with Beria - both at his apartment and at the dacha - were invariably of a purely business nature. This even applies to the occasion when I attended with him the wedding of his protégé Vardo Maxim-Lishvili, an attractive Georgian woman who was trained in the basics of intelligence under the guidance of my wife. It was rumored that she became Beria's mistress while still in Tbilisi, being a student at the medical faculty, and after moving to the capital, he took her to work in his secretariat, then arranged for her to marry an ordinary employee of the NKVD, also a Georgian. I was invited to the wedding to

take a closer look at her and her husband and evaluate their demeanor (for example, whether they drink too much). Such a need was caused by the fact that the newlyweds were going to be sent to Paris to work in the local community of Georgian emigrants. After one or two years of work in Paris, Vardo

returned to Moscow, where she served in intelligence until 1952. In 1952, she was arrested, accusing that, while in Paris, she participated in a conspiracy against the Soviet state, prepared by Georgian emigrants, under the leadership of an influential anti-Soviet Mingrelian organization - here Beria, who was a Mingrelian, was clearly meant. She was thrown into prison on a direct order from Stalin, and she remained there until his death in 1953. She was immediately released by order of Beria, but after his overthrow, she was arrested again and kept in prison for two years. After leaving prison, she returned to her former medical profession. One more must be added to the list of troubles that have befallen her head. In 1939 or 1940, the Moscow City Council issued them and her husband a warrant for an apartment that

previously belonged to our famous Meyerhold, the theater repressed by Stalin's order. By the way, this apartment was used as a safe director Vsevolod by the NKVD house. During the new de-Stalinization campaign under Gorbachev, they began to put pressure on Vardo in every possible way, demanding that she vacate the apartment. It was very difficult for the Moscow City Council to evict her legally, since she had documents

confirming that Vardo herself is a victim of political repression. After a story about the situation with Meyerhold's apartment was shown on television, though without indicating the name of Vardo, this case began to gain publicity. Then the KGB, wanting to avoid a high-profile scandal, managed to find an equivalent living space for her and her family." The

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had **another** consequence for us - the annexation of Western Ukraine. After the occupation of Poland by German troops, our army occupied Galicia and Eastern Poland. Galicia has **always** been a stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, supported by such leaders as Hitler and Canaris in Germany, Beneš in Czechoslovakia, and Austrian Federal Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. The capital of Galicia, Lvov, became the center where refugees from Poland fled from the German occupation troops flocked. Polish intelligence and counterintelligence sent to Lvov all their most important prisoners - those who were suspected of playing a double game during the German-Polish confrontation in the 1930s. The Soviet leadership learned about what was happening in Galicia

only in October 1939, when the Red Army occupied Lvov. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Khrushchev and his People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Serov went there to carry out a campaign of Sovietization of Western Ukraine on the spot. My mother, Emma Kaganova, was sent to Lvov along with Pavel Zhuravlev, head of the German branch of foreign intelligence. Her division dealt with German agents and underground organizations of Ukrainian nationalists. In Lvov the atmosphere was very tense and strikingly different from the state of affairs in the Soviet part of Ukraine. The Western capitalist way of life flourished there: wholesale and retail trade was in the hands of private traders, who were soon to be liquidated during the course of Sovietization. The Ukrainian Uniate Church enjoyed great influence, the local population supported the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, headed by Bandera's people.

According to Soviet intelligence, the OUN was very active and had significant forces. In addition, she had a wealth of experience in underground activities. Counterintelligence Service

Ukrainian nationalists managed to quickly track down some safe houses of the NKVD in Lvov. The method of their surveillance was extremely simple: they started it near the building of the NKVD City Department and accompanied everyone who came out of there in civilian clothes and ... in boots, which betrayed him as a military man: Ukrainian Chekists, hiding their uniforms under their coats, forgot such a "trifle", like shoes. They apparently did not take into account that in Western Ukraine only the military wore boots. However, how could they know about this, when in the Soviet part of Ukraine everyone wore boots, since it was simply impossible to get other shoes.

The failure of the safe houses was reported to the Center, and my mother moved to the Tsentralnaya Hotel, first disguised as a refugee from Warsaw, and then began to pretend to be a journalist from Izvestia. She made extensive use of her experience of working with Polish refugees in Belarus in the 1920s. She spoke Polish fluently, and soon she managed to establish friendly relations with a family of Polish Jews from Warsaw. While in Lvov, my mother helped them to leave for Moscow, where, upon arrival, I met them with my father. After some time, having provided them with everything necessary, my parents sent this family to the USA to stay with their relatives. They then agreed that "friendly relations" would be continued, which meant that, if necessary, the Soviet intelligence service would be able to count on them. They did not know that my parents, and for them the Sudoplatovs, were benefactors, in fact, operatives of the Soviet intelligence, and agreed to further communication. Later, after the arrest of my father, a tourist from the USA, one of the relatives of this family, arrived in Moscow in 1960, tried to find my mother at the Izvestia publishing house, where, as Emma once said, she works as a translator .. They met very cordially, but for intelligence purposes this person was not developed. Meanwhile, Serov and Khrushchev ignored Zhuravlev's warnings that local Ukrainian leaders and cultural figures should be treated with the utmost patience. Many of them were quite

widely known in Prague, Vienna and Berlin. Thus, Serov arrested Kost-Levitsky, who at one time was the head of the former independent Ukrainian People's Republic. Khrushchev immediately reported this arrest to Stalin,

emphasizing his merits in neutralizing the potential prime minister of the Ukrainian government in exile. Kost-Levitsky was transferred from Lvov to Moscow and imprisoned. By that time he was already over eighty, and the arrest of this old man greatly damaged our prestige in the eyes of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put an end to the plans of Ukrainian nationalists to create an independent republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, actively supported in

1938 by England and France . This idea was torpedoed by Benes, who agreed with Stalin that the Carpathian Ukraine, which also included part of the territory that belonged to Czechoslovakia, would be completely transferred to the Soviet Union. Konovalets, the only

Ukrainian leader who had access to Hitler and Goering, was reportedly liquidated in 1938 (he had once served as a colonel in the Austrian army and enjoyed some respect in German "Nazi" circles). Other nationalist leaders in Ukraine did not have such high connections with the Germans - they were mostly operatives from the Abwehr or the Gestapo, and the British or French authorities did not attach any serious importance to them and did not stake on them when the war broke out. Therefore, Khrushchev's claims that he allegedly thwarted Western plans for a Ukrainian

interim government-in-exile by arresting Kost-Levitsky were simply untrue, and when my father was ordered to assess the importance of Kost-Levitsky's detention in Moscow, he in his Beria's report, which was then sent to Molotov, emphasized that this detention was not justified from any point of view. On the contrary, Galicia should be granted a special status in order to neutralize the widespread anti-Soviet propaganda, and, of course, Kost-Levitsky should be immediately released, apologized to him and sent back alive and unharmed to Lvov, giving him the opportunity to live there with maximum comfort. Of course, this should be done on the condition that he, in turn, will support

our idea of sending an influential and representative delegation from Western Ukraine to Kyiv and Moscow to negotiate a special status for Galicia within the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. Thus, due respect would be given to local traditions. Molotov agreed. Kost-Levitsky was released and went back to Lvov with all conveniences, in a special wagon.

This proposal, adopted at the government level, was, one might say, the beginning of an open confrontation between the vindictive Khrushchev and his slander Serov with my father.

In accordance with the secret protocol between Molotov and Ribbentrop, the USSR was not supposed to prevent German citizens and persons of German nationality living in territories within the sphere of Soviet interests from resettling at their request in Germany or in territories that were within the sphere of German interests. **The foreign** department of the

NKVD decided to take advantage of these conditions. A group of **Captain** Adamovich was sent to Chernivtsi . It included William Fisher, who had just been re **-engaged** after his dismissal in 1938 for his connection **with the defector** Orlov. He later **took** the name Rudolf Abel. **Chernivtsi** is located near the border -

between **Bukovina** (Galicia) on the one hand and Polish **territory**, **at** that time occupied by the Germans, on **the other**. **As** my father recalled, the group had to **establish** contacts with agents recruited at one **time** by our special services, from among ethnic **Germans**, Poles and Ukrainians. They had to **settle in** these places as refugees from the communist **regime**, seeking protection in the territories **controlled** by the Germans. Captain Adamovich left **Moscow for** Chernivtsi, taking with him photographs of our **agents in** Poland and Germany, which he was to **show to** four agents who were to recognize **these** people at prearranged rendezvous in **Warsaw**, Danzig (Gdansk), Berlin and Krakow. The **photographs** showed our employees **operating** under the cover of diplomatic services, **trade** missions or journalistic activities **in** these cities. Fisher's (Abel's) task **was** to teach four agents the basics of radio communications. **However**, after Adamovich was accepted by Serov,

perhaps in Chernivtsi, and agreed with him on the material and technical base necessary for the training **of agents**, **he** suddenly disappeared. Not finding him, Serov **scolded** Fischer and reported the disappearance of Adamovich to Khrushchev. Fischer, although he was an employee of the group, was **not** aware of bureaucratic intrigues and believed that if he reported **Adamovich's** two-day absence to the head of the local NKVD, then he did not need **to report** to Moscow either.

"You can imagine my state," my father recalled, "when I was summoned to Beria's office, who ordered me to report on how Adamovich's operation was going. He was furious when I couldn't provide anything new, except for information from a week ago. The phone rang. It was Khrushchev. He began to indignantly reproach Beria with the fact that incompetent people and traitors were sent to him in Ukraine, interfering in the work of the Ukrainian NKVD. According to him, local personnel are able to carry out all the necessary work themselves. "That Adamovich of yours

is a scoundrel!" he shouted into the phone. - He, according to our information, fled to the Germans. The

government line made it possible for me to hear his angry words. Beria obviously did not want to answer in my presence in the same rude manner, and he, if possible,

softly said:

- Nikita Sergeevich, here I have Major Sudoplatov, deputy head of our intelligence. He is personally responsible for Adamovich's operation. For any of your questions, you can get an answer from him.

Picking up the phone, I began to explain that Adamowicz is a competent worker and knows Poland well. But Khrushchev did not listen to my explanations and cut me off. He was convinced that Adamovich was with the Germans and should be immediately found and stolen. He went on to say that he would ruin my career if I continued to persist in covering up bandits and scoundrels like Kost-Levitsky and Adamovich. In his hearts, he hung up the phone without waiting for my answer.

Beria's reaction to this emotional outburst of Nikita Khrushchev was discreetly official.

"In two days," he said, "Adamovich must be found, dead or alive. If he is alive, he should be immediately delivered to Moscow. In case of non-compliance with the indication of a member

Politburo, you will bear full responsibility for the consequences, taking into account your past connections with the "enemies of the people" in the former leadership of the

intelligence agencies. I left the office with a heavy feeling. Ten minutes later, my phone started ringing incessantly. Counterintelligence, border guards, heads of regional departments of the Ukrainian and Belarusian NKVD ... - everyone demanded a photograph of Adamovich. On the personal instructions of Beria, an all-Union search began. Two days passed, but no trace of Adamovich could be found. I knew that I was in big trouble.

At the last moment, however, I decided to call Adamovich's **wife**, who lived **in** Moscow . According to the information I had, nothing suspicious had been noticed **in her** behavior in recent days. As if by the way , I **inquired** when she **last** spoke to her **husband**. To my surprise, she thanked me for this **call and** said that her husband was two

has been at **home** for the past few days - **he has** a concussion and doctors from the NKVD polyclinic **forbade** him to get out of bed for at least **a few** days. I immediately called General Novikov, **the head of** the medical service of the NKVD, and he confirmed that everything
so it really is .

Do I need to describe the relief I experienced? **Reporting to** Beria, as usual, at the end of the day, I said that **Adamovich** was in Moscow.

- Under arrest? Beria asked. "No," I replied, and began to explain the situation. **We were** alone in the office. He rudely cut me off, **using words** that I did not expect from a member of the Politburo. **Enraged**, he described circles around his huge **office**, shouting curses at me and Adamovich, **calling** us blockheads, irresponsible suckers, compromising the NKVD in the eyes of the party **leadership**. - Why are you silent? he stared at me, **suddenly** breaking off his tirade. I replied that I had
a terrible headache. "Then immediately, now," Beria threw in, "go home."

Before I left, I filled out an arrest warrant for Adamovich and **went** to see Merkulov, who was supposed to sign it. **However**, when I explained to him what the matter was, he laughed in my **face and** tore the paper in front of my eyes. At this point, the headache **became** unbearable, and the medical officer took **me** home. The next morning, Beria's secretary called, **he was** extremely brief and businesslike - the people's commissar ordered **me to stay** at home for three days and be treated, adding that the Boss was sending me lemons received from Georgia. The investigation **showed that** Adamovich, having got drunk in a restaurant at the railway station in **Chernivtsi**, got into a fight in the toilet room and received a strong blow to the head, which caused a concussion. In this **state**, he managed to board the Moscow train, forgetting to inform Fischer (Abel) of his departure. During the fight, the photos he was supposed to show to our four agents were lost. Later, however, they were discovered at the station by the Ukrainian NKVD, who believed that Abwehr agents deliberately started the fight, trying to kidnap Adamovich. The case ended with the fact that Adamovich was fired from the NKVD and appointed first as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, and then as a minister. I saw him one more time at the theatrical premiere in Moscow in the early 50s, but we didn't say hello to each other.

Unfortunately, my conflict with Serov and Khrushchev did not end there. Serov was involved in a love story with the famous Polish opera singer Bandrowska-Turska. In Moscow, he announced that he had personally recruited her. Everyone was delighted - after all, the singer enjoyed European fame and often toured Moscow and other European capitals before the war. The euphoria, however, soon passed: with the consent of Serov, she left for Romania, where she flatly refused to meet in Bucharest with our resident, an adviser to the embassy. Both Khrushchev and Beria then received a letter from employees of the Ukrainian NKVD, who accused Serov of inciting tricks under the guise of fulfilling his operational duties.

Serov was urgently summoned to Moscow. I happened to be in Beria's office at the moment when he invited Serov to explain his actions and answer the accusations against him. Serov said that he had received permission for an affair with Bandrowska-Tursk from

Khrushchev, and this was due to operational requirements. Beria allowed him to call Khrushchev from his office, but as soon as he heard where Serov was calling from, he immediately began to swear.

"You son of a bitch," he shouted into the phone, "wanted to drag me into your love affairs to get off?! Pass the phone to Comrade Beria! I could hear Khrushchev turning to Beria with

the words: - Lavrenty Pavlovich! Do whatever you want with this yellow-mouthed chick fresh out of the Military Academy. He has no experience in serious cases. If you think it possible, leave it at the same job. No, punish them properly. Just don't involve me in this business and in your games with Ukrainian emigrants.

Beria began to scold Serov how much in vain, threatening to dismiss him from the organs in disgrace, calling him a petty womanizer, **insulting** and humiliating him in every possible way. Frankly, I was extremely embarrassed **to be** in the office during this angry tirade. Then **Beria** unexpectedly invited Serov to discuss with me how to get out of this unpleasant story. We have come to the conclusion that Serov should not make any attempt **to contact** Bandrovska-Turska, whether on operational or **any** other grounds. Her departure to Romania was a very unfortunate fact, since the singer's performances in Lvov **or** Moscow could have made a favorable **impression** on public opinion in Poland and Western Europe. At the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, it was important to demonstrate that the situation in Galicia was normal and that the situation was quite healthy. In this regard, the singer's flight to Romania was a blow to Khrushchev's reputation, who never ceased to assert that Moscow had nothing to worry about, since Western Ukraine is proceeding satisfactorily, as evidenced, they say, by the **support** given to this process by prominent figures of Ukrainian and Polish culture. Khrushchev's prestige suffered in other incidents as one of the commanders of partisan formations, **for example**, in 1939, Pylyuk, returned from Spain. An experienced operative, he was quite suitable for appointment as head of the Ukrainian NKVD department, whose task was to train

employees to conduct partisan operations in case of war with Poland or Germany. Hearing about our proposal, Khrushchev immediately called Beria with strong objections. Beria summoned his deputy for personnel Kruglov and me, since it was I who signed the submission to Prokopyuk. Khrushchev's objections were caused, as it turned out, by the fact that in 1938 Prokopyuk's brother, a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Education of Ukraine, was shot as a "Polish spy." Khrushchev heard Beria scolding Kruglov and me for sending to Kyiv a person, albeit professionally and competent, but unacceptable to the local party leadership.

Here I would like to talk about who Khrushchev considered "acceptable." This is Ouspensky, whom Khrushchev had previously taken with him to Ukraine as head of the NKVD. In Moscow, he headed the NKVD department for the city and region and worked directly under Khrushchev. In Ukraine, Uspensky carried out repressions in 1938, as a result of which **only three of the members of the old composition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine - more than a hundred people - were not arrested.** Uspensky, as soon as he arrived in Kyiv, summoned the staff of the apparatus and declared that he would not allow liberalism, softness and long arguments, as in a synagogue. Those who do not want to work with him can apply. By the way, some of the wife's friends did just that, taking advantage of this offer. In the presence of a large audience, Ouspensky signed their applications for transfer to the reserve or appointment with demotion - outside of Ukraine. **Uspensky is responsible for mass torture and repression, and as for Khrushchev, he was one of the few members of the Politburo who personally participated with Uspensky in the interrogations of those arrested.**

During the repressions of 1938, when Yezhov lost Stalin's confidence and the hunt for "traitor" Chekists began, Uspensky tried to flee abroad. He took several clean passports with him and fled, staging suicide, but the body of the "drowned man" was not found. Khrushchev panicked and turned to Stalin and Beria with a request to announce the search for Ouspensky. The search was carried out very intensively, and soon the searchers realized: Ouspensky's wife knows that he did not drown, but is hiding somewhere. She is her

her behavior did not directly betray him, following her, it became clear to the operatives that her husband was hiding. In the end, he himself surrendered in Siberia after he noticed a surveillance team in Omsk. Since then, as soon as

it came to the use of any of the officers of the Ukrainian NKVD, the Moscow leadership immediately referred to the Uspensky case, recalling the words spoken in this connection by Khrushchev: "None of the Chekists who

worked with him can be trusted. Meanwhile, during the interrogation, Uspensky testified that he and Khrushchev were close, were friends at home, and tried in every possible way to convince everyone that he was just an obedient soldier of the party. Uspensky's behavior played a fatal role in the fate of his wife - she was arrested three days after he surrendered to the authorities. Sentenced to death for helping her husband arrange an escape, she petitioned for clemency when Khrushchev intervened, recommending that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet reject her request for clemency. **This story** made a

strong impression on my father: "Kruglov, who is well acquainted with the practice of the work of the Central Committee (before the NKVD, he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee), confirmed that members of the Politburo could personally interfere in deciding the fate of people, especially members of the families of "enemies of the people". I learned for the first time that the intervention in these cases is not intended to save the lives of innocent people, but is a way of getting rid of unwanted bystanders. In the archives, in the list of wives of prominent figures in the party, the Red Army and the NKVD who were sentenced to death, I also found the name of Uspensky's wife. Her death sentence, like the sentences of other wives of repressed leaders, was

first approved by the highest party authorities. After my appointment as deputy head of the intelligence service in March 1939," my father later recalled, "I reminded Beria of the fate of Zubov, who was still in prison for failing to comply with an order to finance a coup in Yugoslavia. This man, I said to Beria, is a dedicated and experienced intelligence officer. Beria, who had known Zubov for seventeen years, pretended not to have heard anything, although it was Zubov who played a significant role in the fact that Beria was able to reach the heights of power. In 1922

headed the intelligence department that monitored the secret connections of the Georgian Mensheviks and their agents in Turkey. Based on the Zubov information, Beria reported to Dzerzhinsky and Lenin about the impending uprising and about the successful suppression of it in the bud. This report was discussed at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the party and actually served as the basis for the appointment of Beria to the post of head of the Transcaucasian GPU. Zubov remained on friendly terms both with Beria himself and with his deputy Bogdan Kobulov: coming to Moscow from Georgia, Kobulov invariably

stayed at his apartment. In the autumn of 1939, after the capture of Poland by the Germans, Colonel Stanisław Sosnowski, the former head of Polish intelligence in Berlin, and Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, a wealthy Polish aristocrat with considerable political weight, fell into the hands of the Soviet secret services. Both were taken to the Lubyanka for active development as Soviet intelligence agents.

For the sake of saving his friend Zubov, the father suggested that Beria put him in the same cell with Colonel Sosnovsky. Zubov spoke French, German and Georgian fluently. Beria agreed, and Zubov was transferred from Lefortovo, where he was mercilessly beaten on the orders of the same Kobulov, who once, coming from Georgia, was a guest at his house. Zubov's tormentor was the infamous Rhodes, who tried to extract confessions from him under investigation by inhuman torture. Zubov's knees were crushed. As a result, he became disabled, but he never went to self-incrimination.

The head of the investigative unit, Sergienko, objected to the transfer of Zubov from Lefortovo to Lubyanka, although his father tried to explain to him that his interest in Zubov was caused by purely operational considerations and agreed with Beria. In response to this, Sergienko, refusing to translate Zubov,

said: - I will personally report this case to the People's Commissar. Trash Zubov refuses to admit his guilt for not following the direct order of the leadership! "In

turn," my father writes in his memoirs, "I reported to Beria that Sergienko was refusing to carry out the order given to him. Beria immediately picked up the phone, called Sergienko and began to scold him, in the end he said that if in fifteen minutes he

will not fulfill his order, he should not be blown off his head. Sergienko tried to object, but Beria did not listen to his explanations.

Beria was often very rude in dealing with high-ranking officials, but as a rule, he spoke politely with ordinary employees. Later, I had to make sure that the leaders of that time allowed themselves to be rude only in relation to the leadership, and with ordinary people, members of the Politburo behaved emphatically politely. Zubov, being in the same cell with Sosnovsky, contributed to his recruitment. He convinced

him that cooperation with the German or Polish intelligence services did not promise him any prospects for the future, therefore it makes direct sense to cooperate with Russian intelligence. In the 1930s, Sosnowski, being a Polish resident in Berlin, led a very effective network of agents. He acted under the guise of a Polish aristocrat, kept a stable. His agents, mostly attractive young women, he usually installed in the headquarters of the Nazi Party and the secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1935, the Gestapo managed to expose most of his agents, and Sosnovsky himself was arrested for espionage. He **showed** the investigators at the Lubyanka that the exposed agents were executed in the **Pletzensee** prison right in front of his eyes. The Poles exchanged him for **the head of** the German community in Poland, accused of spying for Germany.

In 1937, Sosnowski was convicted by a military court in Warsaw of embezzling funds allocated for agents, and he served time in Eastern Poland. Two years later, units of the Red Army released the prisoners from prisons. As for Sosnovsky, he was "transferred" from a Polish prison to an NKVD prison. From Sosnovsky, the Soviet secret services received

information that two of his agents were still active. In addition, he suggested the idea of using the connections of Prince Radziwill and making him an intermediary between our leadership and Hermann Goering, one of Hitler's deputies. Sosnovsky agreed to cooperate with the NKVD after he was presented with the available data on his agent network in Berlin and when he realized that everything about his past was known here.

About Sosnovsky, my father wrote the following:

“He was a man who knew too much, and it would simply be unwise to let him slip away and not get him to work for us. Control over him helped us to use two of his important sources of information located in Germany - they were useful to us in 1940 and in the first two years of the war.

According to his father, the dramatic fate of Zubov ended
So:

“After Zubov managed to cordon off Sosnovsky's potential for our intelligence and helped recruit him, I suggested using Zubov as a cellmate of Prince Radziwill. Beria agreed with my proposal. Zubov was transferred to Radziwill's cell and stayed there for a month. By this time, the conditions of Zubov's detention had changed: he was allowed to have lunch and dinner in my office, and we ordered food in our restaurant. While still in custody, he, accompanied by an escort, went to the NKVD polyclinic for medical procedures. In the end, he was released in 1941 shortly after the start of the war, and I took him to my staff as the head of the department. He worked in the authorities until the very end of the war, but in 1946, when Abakumov became the Minister of State Security, Zubov had to urgently resign. At one time, **it was Abakumov who was involved in the case of Zubov, like Kobulov, gave orders to severely beat him.**

Beria personally dealt with Prince Radziwill. He managed to convince Radziwill that he should act as an intermediary between the Soviet government and Goering to clarify delicate issues in the relationship between the two countries. Soviet intelligence kept Radziwill in sight since the mid-30s and knew that the prince received Goering on his estate near Vilnius, where he liked to hunt (later this part of the territory went to Lithuania, and at that time belonged to Poland). By the way, in his memoirs, Radziwill recalls meetings with Beria, who, when parting with him, once said: “We will always need people like you, prince.” Representatives of noble aristocratic families of Great Britain, Italy and Sweden petitioned the Soviet leadership for the release

of Radziwill. In 1940, after Beria recruited him as an agent of influence, my father arranged for the departure

Radziwill in Berlin. From Berlin, the NKVD received information about him from his residency: he was often seen at diplomatic receptions in Goering's company. In the same year, my father was ordered to develop options for getting in touch with him through our agent. It was decided in this case to contact the prince through open channels, since he was a prominent figure in society and could freely visit the Soviet embassy without arousing suspicion. He, in particular, could be interested in the fate of family property that ended up in the occupied territory. In 1940, Radziwill was twice received by the Moscow resident in Berlin, Amayak Kobulov, who reported on these meetings to the Center. However,

Kobulov was not given any instructions on the operational use of the Polish prince in contacts with the Germans. Intelligence did not have much faith in Radziwill's sincerity and therefore decided not to contact him, especially since his political contacts did not promise any immediate benefits. Before Germany unleashed a war against the USSR, in fact, there were no such problems where it could be used to probe the position of the Germans on this or that delicate issue, because all this time Molotov and our ambassador Dekanozov maintained confidential relations with Ribbentrop and the German **ambassador** Schulenburg . It was known that Radziwill had no access to information. The decision was of a military-strategic nature. leadership of the Foreign Department of the NKVD was to show maximum patience **and** simply **wait** until Radziwill went **to** Switzerland or **Sweden**, where he would be outside German control, and only there **to get** in touch with him. But, as far as is

known, he never went **there** . After Hitler's attack on the USSR, **Radziwill** to go into the shadows, but, according to intelligence information, he remained in Germany and, coming to Poland, enjoyed life as much as possible. IN

In 1942, for some time, his traces were lost. In the NKVD obviously overestimated both Radziwill's personal connections and his influence on Goering...

The famous actress Olga Chekhova, the ex-wife of the famous writer's nephew, was close to the Polish prince Radziwill, recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1940, and to Goering, and through her relatives in Transcaucasia she was connected with Beria. She maintained regular

contacts with the NKVD. Initially, it was supposed to be used precisely for communication with Radziwill.

The NKVD had a plan to assassinate Hitler, according to which Radziwill and Olga Chekhova, with the help of their friends among the German aristocracy, were to provide our people with access to Hitler. A group of agents abandoned in Germany and underground in Berlin was completely subordinate to the militant Igor Miklashevsky, who arrived in Germany at the beginning of 1942.

The former boxing champion Miklashevsky, acting as a Soviet defector, gained considerable popularity in Berlin after his fight with the German boxing champion Max Schmeling in 1942 or 1943, from which he emerged victorious.

Miklashevsky remained in Berlin until 1944. Miklashevsky's uncle fled the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war and became one of the active members of the German anti-Bolshevik committee for the liberation of the USSR. He proudly received his nephew, giving him every support as a political opponent of the Soviet regime. In 1942, Miklashevsky managed to meet Olga Chekhova at one of the receptions. He conveyed to Moscow that Goering could be removed easily, but the Kremlin showed little interest in this. In 1943, Stalin abandoned his original plan to assassinate Hitler because he was afraid that once Hitler was

eliminated, Nazi circles and the military would try to conclude a separate peace treaty with the Allies without the participation of the Soviet Union. Such fears were not unfounded. We had information that in the summer of 1942 the representative of the Vatican in Ankara, at the initiative of Pope Pius XII, spoke with the German ambassador Franz von Papen, urging him to use his influence to sign a separate peace between Great Britain, the United States and Germany. In addition to this report from our station in Ankara, the Soviet station in Rome reported that the pope met with Myron Taylor, Roosevelt's envoy to the Vatican, to discuss the conversation between Cardinal Roncalli (later Pope John XXIII) and von Papen. Such a separate agreement would also limit our influence in Europe, excluding the Soviet Union from the future European alliance. none of

Kremlin leaders did not want such an agreement to be concluded. Stalin ordered the elimination of von Papen, since he was a key figure around whom the plans of the Americans and the British revolved to create an alternative government if a separate peace was signed. However, as I mentioned earlier, the attempt failed, as the Bulgarian militant detonated a grenade ahead of time and only lightly wounded von Papen.

We also had information, although not very detailed, about direct American contacts with von Papen in Istanbul. Miklashevsky fled to France in 1944 after the liquidation of his

uncle. In France, he remained for two years after the end of the war, tracking down the Vlasovites who had fled to the West - the remnants of the army of the traitor Lieutenant General Vlasov. In 1947, Miklashevsky returned to the Soviet Union, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and resumed his boxing career, which he remained faithful to until

retirement. **Chapter 14**

ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR

Many pages have been written about what kind of intelligence data, testifying to the inevitable German attack on our country, the Soviet leadership had before the start of the Great Patriotic War. The position of Stalin, who calmly awaited the invasion, instead of alerting troops in time, is often declared one of the reasons for the defeats and heavy losses that the Red Army suffered in 1941. Now it is obvious that the country's leadership, along with other reasons, could not correctly assess the information received through intelligence channels. NKVD intelligence had been reporting the threat of war since November 1940. By this time, employees of the Foreign Department of

the NKVD Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev and Zoya Ivanovna Rybkina (Voskresenskaya) started a letter case under the operational name "Zateya", where the most important reports about the German military threat were collected. In this folder

there were very disturbing documents that worried the Soviet leadership, since they called into question the sincerity of the proposals for the division of the world between Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan, made by Hitler to Molotov in November 1940 in Berlin. Based on these materials, it was easier for the leadership of intelligence agencies to track developments and report to the Kremlin on the main trends in German policy. Materials from the letter case "Zateya" were often reported to Stalin and Molotov, and they used our information both to cooperate with Hitler and to counteract him. Although the intelligence received exposed

Hitler's intentions to attack the Soviet Union, many reports contradicted each other. They lacked assessments of the German military potential: tank formations and aircraft located on our borders and capable of breaking through the line of defense of the Red Army units. No one in the state security service seriously studied the real balance of forces on the Soviet-German border. That is why the strength of the Hitler strike was largely unexpected for our military leaders, including Marshal Zhukov, who at that time was Chief of the General Staff. In his memoirs, he admits that he did not imagine an enemy capable of such large-scale offensive operations, with tank formations operating simultaneously in several directions.

What was missing from the intelligence was a qualitative assessment of the German "blitzkrieg" tactics. We knew from the German military-strategy games that a long war would require additional economic resources, and we believed that if the war did start, the Germans would first of all try to seize Ukraine and regions rich in raw materials to replenish food supplies. This was a big mistake: military intelligence and the NKVD failed to correctly inform the General Staff that the goal of the German army in Poland and France was not to seize land, but to break and destroy the enemy's combat power. As soon as Stalin found out that the German General Staff

exercises are being conducted on operational-strategic and logistical supply in the event of a protracted war, he immediately

gave the order to acquaint the German military attache in Moscow with the industrial and military power of Siberia. In April 1941, he was allowed to tour the new military factories that produced tanks of the latest designs and aircraft. Through our residency in Berlin, we spread rumors in the ministries of aviation and economy that the war with the Soviet Union would turn out to be a tragedy for the Nazi leadership, especially if the war turned out to be long and fought on two fronts. In general, there were no stretches. So at the end eventually it came

out. On January 10, 1941, Molotov and the German ambassador to Moscow, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, signed a secret protocol on the settlement of territorial issues in Lithuania. Germany gave up its interests in some areas of Lithuania in exchange for seven and a half million US dollars in gold. At that time, almost no one knew about the existence of this protocol. The leadership of the NKVD was only briefly informed about the agreement reached with the Germans on territorial issues in the Baltic states and on economic cooperation for 1941.

Information about the date of the start of the war between Germany services, Soviet and the Soviet Union, intelligence were the most controversial. From the UK and the US, there were reports from reliable sources that the question of a German attack on the USSR depended on a secret agreement with the British government, since it would be too dangerous to wage a war on two fronts. deed.

There were reports from the Soviet plenipotentiary in Washington, Umansky, and the resident in New York, Ovakimyan, that British intelligence officer Montgomery Hyde, who worked for William Stevenson from the British Security Coordination Center in the Empire State Building, managed to plant a "canard" in the German embassy in Washington. The disinformation was excellent: if Hitler decides to attack England, the Russians will start a war against Hitler. When analyzing the information received by the Soviet

Union from the most reliable sources of military intelligence and the NKVD, it is clear that about half of the messages - until May and even June 1941 - confirmed: yes, war is inevitable. But the materials also showed

that the conflict with our country depended on whether Germany would regulate her relations with England. Thus, the Soviet agent Philby reported that the British Cabinet was developing plans to escalate tension and military conflicts between Germany and the USSR in order to provoke Germany. There is a reference in the Black Bertha letter file to information obtained from Philby or Cairncross that British agents are busy spreading rumors in the United States about the inevitability of war between Germany and the Soviet Union: we were supposed to start it, and the preemptive strike was going to inflict in southern Poland. Soviet intelligence received new information about how the British side was inciting fear among the German top leaders in connection with the preparation of the Soviets for war. There were also reports of intensified contacts of a probing nature between British representatives and German representatives in search of a peaceful solution to the European military conflict.

Meanwhile, according to Beria, Stalin and Molotov decided at least to delay the military conflict and try to improve the situation by applying the plan that was abandoned in 1938. This plan provided for the overthrow of the Yugoslav government, which signed a cooperation agreement with Hitler. And in March 1941, military intelligence and the NKVD, through their residencies, actively supported the conspiracy against the pro-German government in Belgrade. I have already spoken about how events developed in connection with this. By this action, Molotov and Stalin hoped to strengthen the strategic positions of the USSR in the Balkans. The new anti-German government, in their opinion, could delay the Italian and German operations in Greece. Major General

Milyntsin, deputy chief of military intelligence, was sent to Belgrade to assist in the military overthrow of the pro-German government. From the Soviet side, Alakhverdov, an employee of the INO NKVD, participated in this action. By this time, with the help of the Foreign Ministry, Moscow managed to recruit the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union Gavrilovich. It was jointly developed by Fedotov, the head of counterintelligence, and my father. However, the impression was that the ambassador was playing a double game, as he contacted British representatives in Moscow every week.

A week after the coup, the Soviet leadership signed a mutual assistance pact with the new government in Belgrade. Hitler's reaction to this coup was swift and highly effective. April 6, a day after the signing of the pact, Hitler invaded Yugoslavia - and two weeks later the Yugoslav army was defeated. Moreover, Bulgaria, through which German troops passed, although it was in the zone of Soviet interests, supported the Germans. Hitler made it clear that he did not consider himself bound by official and confidential agreements, since the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provided for preliminary consultations before taking any military steps. And although both sides were actively consulting on the division of spheres of influence from November 1940 to March 1941, an atmosphere of mutual distrust remained in their relations. Hitler was surprised by the events in

Belgrade, and in Moscow, for their part, were no less **surprised** by his quick invasion of Yugoslavia. My father later

admitted: "We did not expect such **a total and** such a quick defeat of Yugoslavia. During **all** these events, on April 18, 1941, I signed a special **directive in** which all our residencies **in** Europe **were ordered** to intensify the work of the agent **network and** communication lines in every possible way, bringing them into line with **wartime** conditions .

Military intelligence sent a similar directive along its own lines. In connection with this, the NKVD planned to send a group of experienced operatives to Switzerland, including the Bulgarian Afanasyev. They were supposed to be in contact with reliable sources using their cover in neutral Switzerland. **We** had no direct connection with Switzerland , and our agents had to travel by train through Germany, with a change in Berlin. At the same time, it was decided to strengthen our residencies in Germany and Poland. Some operatives had to be urgently transferred to Berlin from Italy and France. By this time, Belgium was already occupied. Our intelligence did not always keep up with such a rapid development of events: the agents working in Germany were unable to promptly deliver radio equipment, batteries, spare parts, and, worse,

these people were not sufficiently trained either in terms of the basics of intelligence work, or in terms of mastering the art of radio communication.

The time and the situation demanded that our leadership drastically change its attitude to all aspects of intelligence work. More attention began to be paid to political refugees who arrived in Moscow from countries occupied by the Germans. Prior to his flight to Britain, Beneš ordered the formation of the Czech Legion, which was sent to Poland under the command of the young Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda.

After preliminary contacts with our residence tour in Warsaw, Ludwig Svoboda moved with his unit to Western Ukraine. In fact, after the disarmament of his legion, having received the status of an unofficial envoy, he lived in a safe house and at my father's official dacha in the suburbs of Moscow. Maklyarsky maintained regular contact with him. Our government has kept Freedom in reserve. In May and June, just before the start of the war, he began discussing a plan for the formation of Czech units in the Soviet Union, in order to then transfer them to the German rear to conduct partisan operations in Czechoslovakia. I know from my father that he had excellent human relations with Ludwig Svoboda.

Here is how he speaks of him: “**I am** very

I well remember this man - invariably polite and invariably self-possessed, holding himself with great dignity.

Meanwhile, Stalin and Molotov ordered the redeployment of large army formations from Siberia to the borders with Germany. They arrived to protect the western borders during April, May and early June. In May, my father, still acting as head of intelligence, signed a directive to train Russians and other national émigré groups in Europe to participate in intelligence operations in a war.

Today we know that secret consultations between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Molotov on a possible strategic agreement between Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union gave Stalin and Molotov the illusory idea that it was possible to negotiate with Hitler. Until the very last moment, they believed that their authority and military power, demonstrated more than once to German experts, would postpone the war for at least a year until Hitler

trying to peacefully settle their disputes with the UK. Stalin and Molotov were annoyed by other points of view that ran counter to their strategic plans to prevent a military conflict. This explains Stalin's rude remarks on Merkulov's report of June 16, 1941, which spoke of clear signs of an impending war. The fact that Stalin appointed himself head of government in May 1941 made it clear that he would lead

the negotiations with Hitler and was confident that he could convince him not to go to war. The well-known TASS statement of June 14 confirmed that he was ready for negotiations and this time he would conduct them himself. Although large-scale preparations for war were in full swing in Germany, and for a long time, Stalin and Molotov believed that Hitler had not made a final decision to attack our country and that there were serious disagreements within the German military command on this issue. It is noteworthy that the TASS statement, as already mentioned, is the very day that Hitler set the final date for the invasion. I should also mention a few more little-known things in my father's notes.

came out
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First fact. In May 1941, a German Junkers-52 invaded Soviet airspace and, unnoticed, landed safely at the Central Airfield in Moscow near the Dynamo Stadium. This caused a commotion in the Kremlin and led to a wave of repression among the military command: it began with layoffs, then followed by arrests and execution of the Air Force high command. This enchanting landing in the center of Moscow showed Hitler how weak the air defense and the entire combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces were. Second fact. Stalin's military leadership and entourage nourished the illusion that the power of the Red Army was equal to

the power of the Wehrmacht forces concentrated on our western borders. Why such a miscalculation? Firstly, universal military service was introduced only in 1939, and although the Red Army tripled its strength, it was sorely lacking in people with a higher military education, since more than thirty thousand regular commanders, as we remember, were subjected in the 30s years of repression. The number of military schools and schools opened in 1939, although impressive, but they are all

was still not enough. True, half of the repressed top army officials were returned from prisons and Gulag camps to the army, but this did not solve the problem of training the entire mass of recruits.

Zhukov and Stalin overestimated the capabilities of our tank formations, ground and air forces. They did not quite clearly imagine what modern war is in terms of coordinating the actions of all branches of the armed forces - infantry, aviation, tanks and communications services. It seemed to them that the main thing was the number of divisions and they would be able to hold back any offensive and prevent the German advance into Soviet territory.

Contrary to the point of view of the leadership, the commander of the country's Navy, Kuznetsov, for example, did not follow the lead of the leaders. He soberly assessed the real possibilities of our naval forces and the superiority of the Germans in the maritime theater of operations. Based on his experience in Spain (he was a naval attaché there), in the spring of 1941, Kuznetsov developed and introduced a preliminary system of combat readiness: readiness No. 3 - fire weapons on duty are on alert; readiness No. 2 - all measures are taken to prepare to repel a possible enemy attack; readiness number 1 - the fleet is ready to immediately begin hostilities. That is why our Navy, which was subjected to an unexpected attack in the Baltic and the Black Sea, was able to repel the enemy's first strike almost without loss. Now there is no doubt

that the secret services of the NKVD and military intelligence should be fully responsible for underestimating the powerful potential of the German armed forces. These departments were too busy getting political information and not doing enough studying Wehrmacht tactics. I clearly remember the last pre-war days, my father

recalled. "Eitingon has just returned from China. Together with the mother of Ramon Mercader, the three of us were awarded in the Kremlin by Kalinin for the action against Trotsky in Mexico. The whole atmosphere seemed to exude enthusiasm and confidence. But on June 16, Fitin and Merkulov, the people's commissar of state security, returned from the Kremlin, both alarmed by something. Fitin immediately called me and Melnikov, his deputy for the Far East, and said that the Boss (as we called Stalin among ourselves) found his report contradictory and

ordered the preparation of a more convincing conclusion on all intelligence information relating to the question of a possible outbreak of war with Germany. Contrary to what

General Ivashutin and other authors of memoirs write, I do not remember Beria's angry remarks on Agent Yastreb's memos: "This is British disinformation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish." I don't remember any agent codenamed Hawk at all. In addition, there was no tradition in the intelligence and security services to write lengthy

comments.

Equally unbelievable is the resolution attributed to Beria to recall and punish our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, the former chief of intelligence of the NKVD, for bombarding him with "disinformation." The same people claim that Beria **wrote to Stalin on June 21, offering to recall Dekanozov, but this was generally outside his competence, since Dekanozov went to work in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and reported directly to Molotov.** As mentioned above, intelligence

reports about the possible start of a German invasion were contradictory. So, Sorge reported from Tokyo that the invasion was planned for June 1. At the same time, our residency from Berlin reported that the invasion was planned for June 15th. Prior to this, on March 11, military intelligence reported that the German invasion was scheduled for the spring. The picture was further confused by the intention of the leadership to start negotiations with the Germans. At a cocktail party at the German embassy

in Moscow, a few days before the start of the war, Zoya Rybkina noticed (she wrote about this in her memoirs) that some decorations and paintings had been removed from the walls. Trying to identify new places to install listening devices, she found that the embassy workers were packing their bags for departure. This message is extremely disturbing.

At the Metropol Hotel, Yakovlev and Reichman, coordinators of counterintelligence operations against the Germans in Moscow, intercepted two German couriers carrying diplomatic bags. One was locked in an elevator car, while the other was locked in the bathroom of the suite where they lived. When the courier, who was in the elevator, realized that he was blocked, he pressed the button to call the elevator operator. "Extracted" it, of course, workers

counterintelligence officers, who, in the five minutes at their disposal, rescued him from the elevator, opened the second diplomat in the "suite" and photographed the contents of the mail bags. Among the documents was a letter from Ambassador Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, in which he wrote that he could be a mediator in resolving Soviet-German contradictions. At the same time, Schulenburg reported that the instructions to reduce the staff of the embassy had been implemented and the diplomats were leaving for Germany on schedule. Although the signs of an approaching war were obvious, this document, Schulenburg's position and his high reputation confirmed that the door to a peaceful settlement was still not closed. **"On the day when**

Fitin returned from the Kremlin, Beria called me to his place," my father recalled those dramatic days on the eve of the war. - Beria gave the order to organize a Special Group from among the intelligence officers under his direct subordination. It was supposed to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage actions in case of war. At the moment, our first task was to create a shock group from among experienced saboteurs capable of resisting any attempt to use provocative incidents on the border as a prelude to starting a war. Beria emphasized that our task is to prevent German provocateurs from carrying out actions similar to the one organized against Poland in 1939, when they seized the radio station in Gleiwitz in Germany. German provocateurs went on the air with anti-German statements, and then shot their own criminals, dressed in Polish uniforms, so that from the outside it looked like one of the units of the Polish army had really attacked the radio station ... "

The fact that the Germans (meaning the German special services) on the eve of the start of the war with the USSR were masters of any kind of provocation was well known to our intelligence and counterintelligence. Many of them even stopped in time. Naturally, there was a possibility that the beginning of the war could unfold according to the familiar "Polish scenario".

As his father tells in his memoirs, he immediately began to insist that Eitingon be appointed his deputy.

Beria agreed with this proposal. So on the eve of the war, they immediately began to look for people who could form the backbone of a special group that could be airlifted to the conflict areas on our European and Far Eastern borders. My father recognized Eitingon for his significant military experience and therefore almost completely relied on his assessments. It was he, emphasized the father, who acted as a link between our group and the military command. Together with Eitingon, my father drew up plans for the destruction of the fuel depots that supplied the German motorized tank units, which had already begun to concentrate on our borders. On June 20, 1941, Eitingon told his father that he had

unpleasant impression conversation with the general

Pavlov, commander of the Belarusian military district. He and Eitingon knew each other from Spain. Eitingon asked Pavlov for friendly advice on which border areas, in his opinion, should be paid special attention, where provocations from the Germans are possible. In response, Pavlov said something, according to Eitingon, unintelligible, he seemed to understand nothing at all in matters of coordinating the actions of various services in modern warfare. Pavlov believed that no particular problems would arise even if the enemy managed to seize the initiative at the very beginning on the border, since he had enough forces in reserve to withstand any major breakthrough. In a word, Pavlov did not see the slightest need for subversive operations to disorganize the rear of the enemy troops. On June 21, my father stayed in his office all night, despite the fact that he and his mother had agreed to go to the dacha in the evening. A year earlier, she decided to leave the operational work at the Center and began teaching at the Higher School of the NKVD as an instructor in operational work with agents. She left school on Saturday, June 21, at about

three o'clock in the afternoon. My father knew that Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin met with Gavrilovich, the Yugoslav ambassador, at his dacha that evening. In general, it so happened that on that fateful night he was the only one from the authorities who was at work. "...According to our rules," my father wrote, "we could leave work only after the secretary of the people's commissar called and gave

boss's permission to go home. The department heads usually left at eight, going home or to safe houses to meet with agents, and then returning to their work at ten or eleven in the evening to summarize the messages received from the agents, which were immediately locked in safes. On Saturdays, however, no one usually returned to work after eight.

This time I did not receive permission to leave work either from Secretary Beria or from Merkulov and remained in my office, only called home and warned that I would be late. My wife agreed to wait for me at home and fell asleep peacefully. While waiting for a call from the authorities, I began to look through the documents, but after six, neither mail nor new messages arrived. There was only one call - from the commander of the border troops Maslennikov. He was visibly disappointed when I said that the Special Group would not be ready for action until ten days later. I knew that neither Beria nor Merkulov was there, but the secretariat was expecting them at any moment: they were summoned to the Master ... I was overwhelmed by anxious thoughts, but it could not even occur to me what kind of misfortune would soon fall on all of us. Of course, I felt the threat of a military provocation or conflict, but I was not able to imagine its scale. I believed that, despite any difficulties, we are able to control events.

At three o'clock in the morning the phone rang - Merkulov demanded that I immediately come to his office. There I found the heads of all the leading departments and departments. Merkulov officially announced to us that the war had begun: German troops had crossed our border. He immediately ordered that the entire apparatus be called to work on an alarm. By nine o'clock in the morning, he declared, each chief of the direction must propose specific measures in accordance with the plan of action in the conditions

of the outbreak of war. Fitin arrived at about nine. We held an official meeting of employees in the conference hall of the Undepartmental Administration, where we announced the start of the war. There was no panic, but during the meeting the remarks of the staff became laconic, and our real wits, especially Eitingon, refrained from their usual jokes. Here it is

appropriate to quote the statements of my father, which became the basis of an interview given in 1991 to the "Izvestinsky" journalist

A. Evseev. When asked by a correspondent about the attitude of the top Soviet leadership to the reports of our intelligence about the time of the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, my father gave this answer:

- ... Yes, the leadership told us that the rumors about the war of the Germans against the Soviet Union were lies spread by the British, who decided to draw us into a conflict with Germany. Did we believe it? No, we believed the information coming from the agents more. I still remember the disturbing message of Colonel Rogatnev (he is still alive and well, lives in Moscow. At that time he was in Italy), who warned us about the upcoming war. We believed the information transmitted from Poland by Gudimovich and Mordzhinskaya (they are husband and wife) and which dealt with the preparations of the Germans for a war against our country. The sources were reliable, there was no doubt. And we - I mean Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, the head of the Foreign Department, Leonid Eitingon, a senior official of the same department, Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin and many other employees of the department - knew the Germans well and in their time did a lot of work against them. We were professionals and simply could not help but believe what we were told by the same professionals as we are. Of course, we also knew that the highly authoritative East Prussian officers sought to convince Hitler of the disastrous war with Russia. But we also knew the insufficient degree of their influence on the decisions made by the Fuhrer.

Shortly before this, I myself had returned from a three-year business trip, during which I was on the territory of three Western European countries, including fascist Germany and Austria, and, according to the conditions of my stay, moved among people who actively worked in favor of Germany and were hostile to the Soviet Union. . They all dreamed of starting this war. More than that: they simply craved it. And they were already preparing for military operations on the territory of the Soviet Union. Naturally, understanding all this, we

could not be frivolous and not engage in preparations for the upcoming war. In our work we tried to take into account the experience of both the first and second world wars. I remember that we carefully analyzed the implementation

provocation by the Nazis, which served as a pretext for the attack on Poland - I mean the seizure of the radio station in Gleiwitz ... We are accustomed to taking the enemy seriously. And they had no doubt that his people were specialists in their field, with vast experience in capturing foreign territories, and that his power was based on the economic capabilities of many European countries.

And then, in itself, the preparation for the war with us was so big, so huge, that it was almost impossible to hide it. The smoke from the fire, which was lit in Berlin, was already pouring from other rooms of the European house. For example, we were aware that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which maintained contacts with the Croatian Ustashe in Yugoslavia, already knew that the Ustashe were preparing to start a war with the Soviet Union.

So, believe me, all this information was not at all a surprise for us, and therefore, despite all the official reports, we were convinced: a little bit - and the war will begin!

When asked how they had to act in a very contradictory situation: on the one hand, the interests of the country, the interests of the cause, on the other, the will of the authorities, their unconditional instructions that had to be followed, my father gave the following answer:

- Of course, all this was not easy enough ... We didn't act contrary to the instructions of Stalin and the Central Committee of the party - that would be too harshly said, so, they say, what brave men they were, they themselves went against the line of the Central Committee, no, we just proceeded out of common sense, it was he who dictated to us some necessary and absolutely conditioned steps that we simply had to take. Common sense told us to be prepared for the worst. And the measures that we carried out before the war itself did not offend anyone - neither Stalin nor the Central Committee. What were they? We determined which of our employees could actively participate in this confrontation with the enemy - it was about sabotage intelligence work ... And you should know that we, in the NKVD of the USSR, had two intelligence centers until 1938 - one headed by Artuzov, then Slutsky, Dekanozov and Fitin, the other was the intelligence center, which was called the "Yasha Group" and about which even the employees of the Foreign Department knew little, although he did a lot of preparatory work related to

possible deployment of sabotage behind enemy lines. This center was destroyed in the 38th year. Naturally, we felt that it should be revived as soon as possible. Moreover, it was supposed to operate exclusively at the strategic enterprises of Western Europe, primarily in Germany. But all his employees, as well as many, many Chekists, with the exception of the leader, were shot, and the leader in those days that we are talking about was on death row, waiting for the sentence pronounced on him by a military tribunal to be carried out .. Can you imagine what it is like to live for months, knowing that the castle will clang and you will be taken to be shot?

This inexplicable delay, this whim, the game of fate saved him - we will call this person S. The day came, and Stalin - and he knew many prominent intelligence officers personally - asked Beria where S. was now. "He is in prison, waiting to be shot," Beria replied. "What nonsense?" Stalin reacted **unexpectedly. This was enough for me to immediately be instructed to take S. to my department. I went down several floors to the cell where he was. Of course, he felt uncomfortable - S. decided that that was all ... What was there to do? I said, "I have come to take you to my office. You will go home ... "S. spent four months in the hospital before he started working again - by that time the war was already in full swing ...**

But I seem to have moved away from the topic of conversation ... So, we "inventory" the remaining intact personnel, so that it becomes clear who we can have. It was the first step. We did the second by forming a parachute group headed by Arkady Mikhailovich Fateev, an honored master of sports, an experienced paratrooper. We understood that we would have to throw people behind enemy lines. In this regard, I can repeat that

we were sane people and, of course, did not think that the whole war would be fought only on enemy territory ... But the fact that we were seriously engaged in parachute training and prepared people not only for landing , but also to splashdown, it was very good and said a lot.

To the question: does he remember how the war began for him? - father answered:

- Still would. Such, but do not remember ... I, as usual, stayed late at work. On the eve, many messages came from our agents about the increased activity of the White Guard and Ukrainian emigration. Their meaning was the same: war was on the threshold. Call at half past five. First Deputy People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov: "Come in." I enter the office. I can see it on my face that something has happened. "The war has begun," says Merkulov. The Germans attacked from all sides. There are messages from the border guards, foreign radio broadcasts about the same ... We must immediately reorganize all work. Gather all employees. Recall everyone who is on vacation... Your headquarters outside of Moscow is in Ozyory. The whole territory, all premises, servants - everything is at your disposal. Put there phones, walkie-talkie. Proceed..." Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, head of the Intelligence Directorate (I was his deputy), at that time, as if on purpose, was outside of Moscow. Searched for him. "You see, we didn't miscalculate," Fitin said calmly. - I'm leaving.

The city was still sleeping, the janitors were watering the streets, bread was delivered to the bakeries, and our doors were already slamming, all the employees hurriedly gathered in the department. On the faces of one question: what's the matter? I explain. No surprise, no shock - everyone was waiting for this. A rally was held on the landing... Do not be surprised. Yes, even in such a system as the NKGB, it could not do without it ... But business is business, questions arose immediately, where to be deployed, where to train intelligence

officers and saboteurs ... Can I name today the addresses where we launched training people?.. I can. In Mytishchi, at the Dynamo shooting range. Combat training of scouts and saboteurs took place there. The main attention was paid to work with explosives, shooting ... We also made extensive use of the Lakes region, which I have already mentioned. There, both in summer and in winter, our people lived in the forest, heated by a fire, in exactly the same conditions in which they then had to operate. One of our centers was located at the Dynamo stadium, well known to Muscovites, under the stands of which registration for the troops of the Special Group of the NKVD of the USSR was taking place. There were more

several out-of-town facilities where the same combat preparatory work was going on. Of course, a special group of people was created who were trained in isolation from

everyone.

Somewhere in the middle of the day, the phone suddenly rang - a special apparatus of the people's commissar. "Come in," says Beria ... (It would be extremely absurd to believe that Stalin could entrust this most important post to a non-professional. Beria knew thoroughly what combat work was like in underground conditions abroad.)

I go down to the third floor. Beria is sitting at the table: "What did you manage to do?" I am reporting on the parachute service, that we have begun combat training in Mytishchi and that we are selecting candidates for lone agents who will be launched (forgive the professional terminology) behind enemy lines. "Areas of your operation?" - "Near and distant rear of the enemy in the Western direction." - "And the East?" I say: "But we have no war with Japan." "A lot of things can happen. Get ready. Take care of the Far East. Create reconnaissance groups without chatter. We will need scouts. We need people who can speak Japanese. Try to find them as soon as possible." By this time it was already clear that the troops were having difficulty holding back the Nazi armada. Contrary to all forecasts,

the war was already on our territory. A number of the most important centers of the country were under threat of capture. "Immediately send people on whom we can rely, to the Minsk, Odessa, Kiev directions and to the Baltic states," Beria ordered. As my father testifies, all the services of the people's commissariat were immediately instructed to render him assistance in every possible way. Without delay, work

began on the formation of the so-called troops of the Special Group. They required a huge number of people - thousands and thousands. No states of the NKGB could stand it. And most importantly, for all these people, who were ready to immediately take part in the armed struggle against the Nazis, a reliable legal basis was needed. After all, the leadership clearly understood: there will be wounded, there will be dead. And all of them were supposed to be protected by the law, so to speak - to take everyone under their guardianship. This is how the idea of an unusual military

part, which was supposed to deal exclusively with reconnaissance and sabotage work. The Central Committee of the All-Union

Leninist Young Communist League provided effective assistance in the formation of this army. He mobilized about a thousand people from among the Komsomol members to help the Chekists. Almost the entire sports elite of Moscow has joined here - the country's champions, world record holders. All this was a courageous people, having a clear concept of duty. It was a great honor for ordinary Komsomol members to fight alongside such people.

"It turned out," my father recalled, "that before I came to Beria, Georgy Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern, called. It was about political emigrants who found refuge in the Soviet Union.

I went to Dimitrov. "There are people who want to fight, they ask to be sent to the front," he said. "Who exactly, how much?" - "First of all - the Spaniards, several hundred people ..." ... Yes, we fought with Germany, but information has already come that Franco is asking to become a participant in the war against the USSR and is sending the Blue Divisions. But most importantly, the Spaniards, whom Dimitrov spoke about, were very experienced people who went through the difficult school of the civil war in their homeland and knew what shooting was and what sabotage and reconnaissance was ... Not only Spaniards were handed over to us, but a large group of Bulgarians, Germans, the Baltic states, the British, the French, nine Vietnamese - all then fought as part of our units behind the front line. Work has begun. I didn't leave the People's Commissariat. It was possible to forget about

the house... We understood that the most difficult thing was to endure, to resist. At least three or four months. Then it will be easier. Viktor Alexandrovich Drozdov, the son of a miner, a courageous and experienced Chekist, a very interesting person, was appointed to us as my deputy. It was he who trained the famous Kuznetsov. However, not only him ... When asked by a correspondent how many people were sent behind enemy lines, his father said that there were more than ten thousand of them. And when asked

if there were any other Kuznetsov class scouts,

answered in one word:

- A lot. We had such an outstanding scout - Heine. Our exceptional find. Igor Miklashevsky was a boxer. They sent him behind enemy lines not in a group, but alone

- it's more difficult. He made his way to where we needed to... To Berlin. Found the person we needed. Did what was needed. He left, he was wounded. But he successfully got out of all situations ... I repeat: there were many such people ...

The war taught us cruelly, and most importantly, quickly. I think we resisted German intelligence not bad at all ... The main thing was, as they say now, to start the mechanism. Then he took off on his own. Hatred of the enemy is a strong and unfailing feeling.

..Lubyanka worked, although it was half empty. A number of services, including archives, were evacuated to Kuibyshev and even further. And we did our jobs. After all, we were ordered to meet the enemy in our own way. We had to prepare properly. Work in the underground was not ruled out, and this is an extremely complex business, not like what is shown in the movies. First of all, it was necessary to provide themselves with radio communications. Many of our underground radio stations were located in different parts of Moscow. One of them, by the way, was located on the site of the current Obraztsov Theater - then there was some kind of long-term construction. In his basement, we placed our walkie-talkie, one of many - it allowed us to keep in touch with Kuibyshev, transmit messages and receive instructions on further work. The unfinished construction was generally an ideal cover: trenches, cellars - the devil will break his leg, and a knowledgeable person in these catacombs is at home. We placed our illegal residencies there. Joseph Stalin

and Georgi Dimitrov at a meeting of the 7th Congress of the Comintern. Moscow, 1935.

In the battles near Barcelona (the mountains of the Sierra Guarrama). On the left in a beret - the commander of the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment L.P. Vasilevsky, the commissar of the Galars detachment Perez Peregrin, the third - the senior adviser of the 14th

partisan corps G.S. Syroezhkin with fighters. September 1937 Jan Berzin, senior military adviser
The Spanish

city of Guernica is the victim of a German barbarian bombardment Workers steadfast revolutionary party, the uprising was crushed

The commander of the Twelfth International Brigade, General Lukacs (writer Mate Zalka) and the military adviser of the brigade, Pablo Fritz (General P. I. Batov). Spain, 1937.

USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov in Berlin meets with R. Hess, Hitler's deputy for the Nazi Party British Prime Minister N.

Chamberlain after signing the Munich agreement said: "I brought peace to our generation" 1938 Solemn march of the Soviet and German troops on the occasion of the

transfer of the Brest-Litovsk fortress to the Soviet command. September 22, 1939 German soldiers visiting the Soviet border guards. Imitation of

loyalty to the pact German troops before leaving Brest-Litovsk. End of September 1939

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"During February 8 ... the skirmishes of advanced infantry units that continued on the Narelsion Isthmus during the last days led and) anyagiga by our units of the fortified area of Khotinen (Summa region) with eight reinforced concrete artillery-riisnim structures "Karl Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland Resident

of Soviet intelligence in Finland B A. Rybkin

Difficult winter war (Soviet-Finnish 11/30/1939 - 03/12/1940)

In the picture: the operational report of the Leningrad Military District about the capture of the Khotinen fortified area with eight reinforced concrete artillery structures by advanced units of the front on the Karelian Isthmus.

February 9, 1940. In the picture on the right: a diagram of the direction of the strike of the Red Army units to defeat the impregnable "Mannerheim Line"

**Fascist Germany is ready to march east. The picture shows
A. Hitler at the review of selected units of the
Wehrmacht. 194 0
Ribbentrop welcomes V. M. Molotov in Berlin**

PC

**Alexander Korotkov
Petr Gudimovich
Elizaveta Zarubina
(Gorskaya, Rosenzweig) Georgy Mordvinov
Vasily Zarubin
Fedor Karin Vasily Pudín Ivan Kaminsky Dmitry
Bystroletov Boris Bazarov Gleb Rogatnev (Shpak)
Vasily
Roshchin Evgeny Kravtsov Walter
Krivitsky (Walter), defector Ignas Poretsky
(Reiss, Ludwig), defector Roland Abbiat (Viktor
Pravdin) In pre-war Paris, the
threads of many intelligence converged
European states Josef
and Erika Leppin Villa
in Coyacan, where the official residence of L. D. Trotsky was
located camera
mexican**

**maximum security prisons
Mexican police officers demonstrate to journalists the murder
weapon - an ice ax Tombstone stele on
the grave of Leon Trotsky in Coyacan. Mexico**

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Documents from the police file on Frank Jackson. Under this name, Ramon Mercader infiltrated L. D. Trotsky's close circle to carry out a terrorist act against him among Mercader, Hero of the

Soviet Union, and died in 1978 and rests at the Unconsecrated cemetery in Moscow under the name of Ramon Ivanovich Lopez horn * 1C . <|u"* A.-* |"* <• Souychehp?

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German officers work out secret plans for a surprise attack on the USSR Japanese

Foreign Minister Matsuoka after the signing of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo pact in the capital of the Third Reich. 1941

The leadership of Ukraine on the eve of the big war. From left to right - members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U: I. A. Serov, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs

of the Ukrainian SSR, L. R. Korniets, Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR, M. S. Grechukha, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CP(b)U Central Committee, D.S. Korotchenko, Secretary of the CP(b)U Central Committee, M.A. Burmi-stenko, Second Secretary of the CP(b)U Central Committee, K.S. Karavaev, member of the CP(b)U Central Committee b) U, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the

Ukrainian SSR, K. Z. Litvin, Secretary of the Stalin Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. Kiev, February 1941. To the question: how was the decision to prepare answered like this:

- Two people led the NKVD: Beria and Kobulov. From Beria, - said my father, - a signal came about the preparation of illegal immigrants for Moscow ... In the fall, somewhere in September - October, he called me to him: "The situation is difficult. It is possible that some part of the Germans will be able to break into the city. We want to create illegal residencies and militant groups in Moscow. They will deploy illegal work here." The city center was occupied by militants, units of our Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Special

appointment (OMSBON) - it was deployed in the Hall of Columns and in the building of the current GUM on Red Square. This entire area - from Okhotny Ryad along Gorky Street to the Belorussky railway station - was occupied by units of the brigade. In the event of a German breakthrough, Moscow was divided into areas controlled by military units and groups of illegal militants who were supposed to fight in Moscow itself and work in the rear of the Germans. On the territory of the city, people of the NKVD Directorate for the Moscow Region, headed by Mikhail Ivanovich Zhuravlev, acted - he took an active part in preparing Moscow for defense. The capital's garrison was involved, all available internal troops, cadets of the border school. They put everything under the gun

found.

I remember one meeting, Beria, Malenkov, the secretary of the MK Popov took part in it. The conversation was tough. I realized that the matter was more serious than I thought. On that day, several explosives engineers were transferred to my subordination. Among them were Ponomarev and Razzhivin - the largest experts in explosives, who dealt with charges of at least a thousand tons. They worked flawlessly... ..The question of leaving nothing of Moscow did

not stand and could not stand even in that incredibly difficult time. Only certain objects were prepared for the explosion, but I would not

wanted to name them.

We, by the way, had one very interesting battle group of four. One is a whistling artist (specialist in artistic whistling). The other is a female juggler. She was juggling live grenades disguised as... small logs. Can you imagine? There is a concert, say, in the German officers' assembly. On the stage

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a lady gracefully juggles with her "poles". And suddenly these "firewood" fly to the

audience ... Maklyarsky came up with this number. The one who later wrote the script for the film "The Feat of the Scout." He worked very hard and was very efficient. Of course, like everyone

talented person, he had his shortcomings and breakdowns, and when they put it on my mind, I usually answered: "And the results of his work? And the agents he trained? I had such trump cards that you can't beat: one of our most striking operations - "Monastery" - was his brainchild ... By the way, we started it precisely in the fall of forty-one ...

We prepared for underground work in Moscow such a well-known person as the composer Lev Konstantinovich Knipper, the author of the famous song "Polyushko-Polye". The business that he was to deal with could be very promising, since his sister Olga (by the way, the niece of the famous Olga Leonardovna Knipper-Chekhova) lived in Germany since 1922 - she emigrated. She settled down there firmly ... She has the surname "Chekhov" from her husband - nephew Anton Pavlovich. Knippers are German. The elder Knipper, the father of the future composer, was a major railway worker in Tbilisi; this family was well known there. And Olga Chekhova attended government receptions in Berlin, where Hitler could also be seen. This attracted us as a possible option for the future ... Lev Konstantinovich himself was a participant in the Civil War, and he fought on the side of the Whites. Then - emigration. Knipper-Chekhova, People's Artist of the USSR, simply dragged him back to Russia... She played a big role in the return of the Moscow Art Theater from abroad. We have established very good business relations with Lev Konstantinovich. In the event of the occupation of Moscow, he had to act alone, according to an individual plan ...

Further, the father spoke about the German agents that the Germans kept in Moscow. It was enough, but as a result of operational actions, many agents were withdrawn from the "game".

These were people prepared hastily. Maybe the Germans had such an attitude - to take in numbers? They got to Moscow in different ways. They had an appointment with a well-known Moscow doctor. Went to see him. And the doctor sent them to one of our people, his relative. It was there that a business conversation began - both about the walkie-talkies, and about who arrived with what task ... The "alien" relaxed. Then it was a matter of technology ... About each case

the appearance of saboteurs was reported to the People's Commissar. Moreover, his father always asked him not to rush into arrests. "Give me the opportunity to "lead" these people around Moscow for two or three days: where will they go, who will they turn to?" father urged.

"We'll take your head off if you lose sight of it!" - answered the authorities. It worked out. Then everyone

was on their toes. **"Arriving in Moscow," my father said, "the German agents were primarily interested in whether new military units were being drawn to Moscow, how things were going on the railroad, what was the situation with food, what moods prevailed in Moscow, was there any kind of a weakness in the actions of the local Soviet administration that could be exploited? And what is most remarkable - almost every second agent dreamed of killing one of the members of the Politburo. ... After the war, when the archives of**

the Abwehr fell into the hands of the Soviet special services, it was possible to establish that the "productivity" of our counterintelligence operations was still high.

"All of us," my father said, "were living people and, therefore, we are not insured against anything in this life. Everything was - both mistakes and misses. But it was also important. Faith in our righteousness, in our victory. It was stronger than other feelings. It made me gather into a fist. So there was no landslide panic, about which so much is now being said. Although, maybe I don't know everything here. I had a specific case. I just couldn't get away from him.

End of the first book

APPS

Little-known documents (originals), a presentation of materials from the domestic and foreign press, memoirs of P. A. Sudomatsov's contemporaries and reflections on certain problems that he once dealt with as an operational officer of the Cheka— About the GPU— NKVD— MIA.

Below is a material that tells about military organizations created in different years abroad by Russian émigrés, military men of the former tsarist army. All of them lived with a single goal - to return to their homeland \ even if this would require force of arms. But, alas, these aspirations were not given to come true. The fact that this did not happen is the great merit of the Soviet foreign intelligence and such intelligence officers as Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov.

WAR WITHOUT VICTORIES

The "Russian All-Military Union" (ROVS) was created by General Wrangel in 1924 from the remnants of the White armies, united about 30 thousand soldiers and was the core of the pre-war political emigration. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich was the supreme commander of the Russian army abroad; the commander-in-chief and de facto head of the ROVS is General Wrangel, the last legitimate ruler on Russian soil. This made the ROVS, to some extent, the custodian of the tradition of Russian statehood, which was also facilitated by the neighborhood with the Church Abroad (at first, the leadership

ROVS, and the leadership of the Church were in Sremski Karlovica in Serbia; in 1926 Wrangel moved to Brussels; after his death in 1929, General Kutepov moved the headquarters to Paris). In order to emphasize the supra-party and state character of the army (and in order not to violate the unity of the ROVS with political differences, including intra-monarchic ones), General Wrangel from the very beginning issued Order No. 82, which forbade the military to join political organizations.

The activities of the ROVS were first thought of as a forced break in hostilities, in anticipation of a new "spring campaign". In essence, it was an army, transferred to a civilian position, scattered over many countries, but retaining traditions and discipline in order to continue the fight "at the first call". Therefore, the soldiers of each unit tried to get a job at one enterprise, working in artels and living in dormitory barracks. ROVS

supported many right-wing press organs, including Renaissance. The unofficial communication body of the ROVS was the magazine "Hour", founded in 1929 (by V. V. Orekhov, E. V. Tarussky and S. K. Tereshchenko) and existed until 1988 (with a break during the war years).

In 1930, there were the following departments of the ROVS: 1st department (France with colonies, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Finland, Egypt); 2nd (Germany, Hungary, Austria, Danzig, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, England, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Persia); 3rd (Bulgaria and Türkiye); 4th (Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania); 5th (Belgium and Luxembourg), 6th (Czechoslovakia); departments in the Far East (general M. K. Diterikhs), in North and South America, a branch in Australia.

However, the hopes for a "spring campaign" did not come true, because not a single Western country wanted to support the armed struggle of emigrants against the USSR. Therefore, from the beginning of the 1920s, General A.P. Kutepov insisted on penetrating into the USSR for underground revolutionary work, especially since there were calls from there to "lead the already ongoing struggle." In this Kutepov found support from Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, but Wrangel was skeptical of such methods of action and stepped aside from leading them. Wrangel's

fears were justified, for for several years the GPU had led Kutepov by the nose with the help of the false pseudo-monarchist organization Trust, which allegedly operated successfully in Russia and wished to attract emigration to its struggle. This plan for introducing numerous agents into emigrant organizations was developed by the ChK-OGPU as early as 1921-1922 and tested on Savinkovo. In parallel, the lines of indoctrination of the Young Russians, Eurasians, and others stretched. The Brotherhood of Russian Truth was

founded in 1921 by General Duke G. N. Leuchtenberg, publicist S. A. Sokolovsh Krechetov, and General Krasnov. At different times, representatives of the BRP were: in Paris - V. Burtsev, in the Baltic states - Prince Lieven, in the Far East - D. V. Gondatgi, in Yugoslavia - S. N. Paleolog and S. N. Treguboe, in America - A. A. Vonsyatsky and others. The Brotherhood acted with the approval of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich and with

blessings of Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky). The organization consisted of autonomous combat detachments that conducted a guerrilla struggle, for security reasons not reporting secret details even to the center.

"The fighting personnel of the organization were the remnants of the Belarusian national detachments, the so-called "Green Oak Squads", Bulak-Balakhovich's detachments, Savinkov's organizations, etc. For ten years, the organization has grown and developed more or less successful partisan activities in Russia itself, mainly in Belarus, giving the Bolsheviks a lot of trouble. Lacking a clear

ideology and abandoning a coherent program, the "Brotherhood" put forward a number of slogans that make it possible to define its political nature: "All-Russian National Revolution", "Land to the Peasants", "Orthodox Christian Rus'", "All-Russian Zemsky Sobor". In the articles of the journal *Russkaya Pravda*, intended for distribution in the USSR, it was openly stated that the members of the brotherhood were monarchists. These articles, written in the pseudo-folk language of Rostopchin's posters, were often not serious. The favorite tactic of the struggle of the "Brotherhood" was guerrilla warfare and the so-called "grassroots terror". This tactic found expression in the slogan: "Kill the snake, but don't let the kites through." Life itself has shown the inexpediency of this tactic: long-term partisanship easily comes into contact with simple banditry, grassroots terror does not achieve its goal, because the central government has at its disposal all the means to respond to such terror with terror tenfold.

Judging by the reports of the BRP itself, in the 1925-1930s, its partisan activities (stopping and "checking" trains, shooting Chekists, blowing up objects) in the western Soviet regions acquired considerable scope; Entire districts were under the control of the BRP. However, in such reports, the BRP also attributed spontaneous uprisings to itself (it is difficult to assume that it was the "fraternal free word" that inspired the population of the Caucasus, Turkestan, Siberia ...). But the GPU turned out

to be stronger, introducing agent Kolberg into the organization, whose exposure "caused a severe split in the top of the Brotherhood" ... The Bolsheviks, possessing secret information about the BRP

through the Latvian Social Democratic Party, revealed the secret work of the BRP in Latvia. In 1933, the BRP was crushed in Latvia." In the Far Eastern Department of the BRP, "the Bolsheviks inflicted a major blow with the assassination in Harbin (December 1932) of one of the leaders, Colonel Argunov ... The BRP could not withstand the crisis."

"Struggle for Russia" under the leadership of S. P. Melgunov, then M. M. Fedorov - a group around the magazine of the same name (Paris, 1926-1931, 240 issues were published; the editors also included V. L. Burtsev, A. V. Kartashev, T. I. Polner, P. Ya. Ryss). "During the development of the activities of the group" B. for R." a connection was established with the yoke of Russia. Even people went from the group to work illegally in the USSR. Since 1930, the activity of "B. for R." starts to wither. Lack of funds and lack of success led to the end of the group's activities. The failure can be explained by the vagueness of the ideology (not predecision) and the liberal-"intelligentsia" character of the journal." The ideological sympathies of the BZR are evident from its attempt to create a coalition with the Milyukov Republican-Democratic Association, the right SRs and Peasant Russia*.

Peasant Russia, an organization founded in 1920 in Moscow and revived in exile in 1921 by right-wing Social Revolutionaries and Cadets, also spoke of "the need to wage an active revolutionary political struggle against Bolshevism." She published collections of the same name, and since 1925 the newspaper "Bulletin of Peasant Russia" in Prague (edited by

A. A. Argunova, A. L. Bem and S. S. Maslova; circulation 1500-3000 copies), renamed in 1933 into the "Banner of Russia". After the first congress in 1927, it called itself the Labor Peasant Party (TKP). There were also TCH departments in Poland, the Baltic states, Yugoslavia, and the Far East.

The name of the organization reflects the importance of the peasant question in those days. (In the 1920s, many groups arose that put this topic at the forefront, which worried the main masses of the Russian population: "Native Land", "Needs of the Village", "Peasant Affairs"; a lot of materials about this appeared on the pages of Latest News, "Wills of Russia" and even "Modern Notes.")

organized in economic cooperatives and politically in the TCH." But her main job was propaganda among "friendly parties in foreign circles." "It is difficult to exhaustively analyze its internal Russian information, because the only source about it is the Znamya Rossii party organ. Whatever it may be, "the desire to fight, relying solely on the peasant masses, is not justified either tactically or politically ... the city has been, is and will be the stronghold of all revolutionary activity." The Moscow TKP group was crushed in 1925; The emigrant organization lasted until 1939.

* * *

OGPU NOTE TO I. STALIN1

No.

40919 November

18, 1931 To the Secretary of the

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. Stalin According to the information we received, a person sent by British intelligence to our territory was supposed to appear at the safe house to one of our agents in November to

establish communication and transmit instructions. On November 12, indeed, with the appropriate password, a white officer arrived (through an unknown to us British intelligence crossing), as it soon turned out, a white officer - a secret employee of British intelligence working through the ROVS2 and the oil -

section of Torgprom (GUKASOV) 3 . **The specified person was taken under care internal observation.**

November 16, passing with our agent at 3 hours 35 minutes. day on Ilyinka near d. 5/2 against Staro-Gostiny Dvor, an agent of British intelligence accidentally met you and made an attempt to grab a revolver.

According to our agent, he managed to grab the hand of the specified an English intelligence officer and entail, obstructing the attempt.

Immediately after this, the named British intelligence agent was secretly arrested by us.
I will keep you informed
as the investigation proceeds. I am enclosing a photograph of the arrested
person, who called himself Ogarev. Application: Mentioned. Deputy chairman
of the OGPU
(**Aku.yue**) (APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. [4](#)
200, l. 147. Original)

* * *

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC AUCP(b) Comrade STALIN about BERIA

In 1936 [5](#) I was appointed in the Transcaucasus as Chairman Zak. GPU. Before
leaving for Tiflis, the Pred. The OGPU Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me in detail about the
situation in Transcaucasia. Comrade Dzerzhinsky immediately informed me that one of my
assistants in the Transcaucasus, Comrade Beria, worked under the Musavatists in the Musavat
counterintelligence. Let this circumstance not in any way confuse me or put me on guard
against comrade Beria, since comrade Beria worked in counterintelligence with the knowledge
of the responsible comrades. Transcaucasians and what does he, Dzerzhinsky, and Comrade
Sergo Ordzhonikidze know about it. Upon arrival in Tiflis, about two months later, I went to
Comrade Sergo and

I gave him everything that Comrade Dzerzhinsky told me about Comrade Beria.

Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze told me that indeed Comrade Beria worked in the
Musavat counterintelligence, that he carried out this work on behalf of the party workers, and
that he, Comrade Ordzhonikidze, Comrade Kirov, Comrade Mikoyan and Comrade Nazaretyan
are well aware of this. Therefore, I must treat Comrade Beria with full confidence, and that he,
Sergo Ordzhonikidze, completely trusts Comrade Beria. During the two years of work in
Transcaucasia, Comrade Ordzhonikidze told me several

times that he highly appreciated Comrade Beria as a growing worker, that Comrade
Beria would develop into a big worker and that he, Sergo, reported such a description of
Comrade Beria, etc. Stalin.

During the two years of my work in the Transcaucasus, I knew that Comrade Sergo
appreciates Comrade Beria and supports him.

About two years ago, Comrade Sergo once told me in a conversation, but you know that right-wing deviators and other riffraff are trying to use the fact that he worked in Musavat counterintelligence in the fight against Beria, but nothing will come of it .

I asked Comrade Sergo if Comrade Stalin knew about this. Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze replied that Comrade Stalin knew about this and that he, too, had spoken to Comrade Stalin about it. Candidate of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party *of*
Bolsheviks

Pavlunovsky June 25, 1937. (APRF, fund 45, op. 1, file 788, sheets 114-115v. Original. Manuscript)
* * *

July 11, 1937

Top secret Personally

to the head of the DTO of the GUGB of the
NKVD of the USSR of the Kharkov South

Railway. d. tov. Leopold **ON THE FASCIST-REBELLION, SPY,**

SUBVERSION, DEFEATIVE TERRORISM ACTIVITIES

AND

OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE USSR "reveal a picture of the
long-term and relatively

unpunished sabotage and espionage work of Polish intelligence on
the territory of the Union. These materials show that the subversive
activities of the Polish intelligence service were carried out and continue to
be carried out so openly that the impunity of this activity can only be
explained by the poor work of the GUGB organs and the carelessness of
the Chekists.

Even now, work on the elimination of Polish sabotage and espionage
groups and the POV organization on the ground has not been fully
deployed. The pace and scale of the investigation is extremely low. The
main contingents of Polish intelligence eluded even operational records (of
the total number of defectors from Poland, numbering approximately 15
thousand people, only 9 thousand people were registered in the Union). In
Western Siberia, out of about 5 thousand defectors located on its territory,
no more than 1 thousand people were registered. The same position with

taking into account political emigrants from Poland. As for undercover work, it is almost completely absent. Moreover, the existing agents, as a rule, are double, substituted by the Polish intelligence itself. The insufficiently

resolute liquidation of the Polish intelligence cadres is all the more dangerous now, when the Moscow POV center has been destroyed and many of its most active members have been arrested. Polish intelligence, foreseeing the inevitability of its further failure, is trying to lead, and in some cases is already setting in motion, its sabotage network in the national economy of the USSR and, first of all, at its defense facilities. In

accordance with this, the main task of the GUGB organs at the present time is the defeat of the anti-Soviet work of Polish intelligence and the complete elimination of the still unaffected wide sabotage and insurgent ranks of the "POV" and the main human contingents of Polish intelligence in the USSR.

I ORDER: 1.

From August 20, 1937, to begin a broad operation aimed at the complete liquidation of the local organizations of the POV and, above all, its sabotage, espionage and insurgent personnel in industry, transport, state farms and collective farms.

The entire operation must be completed within 3 months, that is, by November

20, 1937. 2. The

following are subject to arrest:

found the most active members of the "POV" according to the

attached list; b) all prisoners of war of the Polish army

remaining in the USSR; c) defectors from Poland, regardless of the time

of their transition to the USSR; d) political

emigrants and political exchangers from Poland; e) former members of the PPS and other

Polish anti-Soviet political parties; f) the most active part of the local anti-Soviet nationalist elements in the Polish regions.

3. Conduct the arrest operation in two stages:

military plants, for defense purposes all other plants, in railway, water and air transport, in the electric power facilities of all industrial enterprises, in gas and oil refineries; b) in the second place, all the rest who work in industrial enterprises of

non-defense significance, in state farms, collective farms and institutions are subject to arrest.

4. Simultaneously with the deployment of the arrest operation, start investigative work. The main focus of the investigation is to focus on the full exposure of the organizers and leaders of sabotage groups, in order to exhaustively identify the sabotage network.

All spies, saboteurs and saboteurs passing on the testimony of the arrested are to be immediately arrested. Allocate a special team to conduct the investigation operational workers.

5. All those arrested, as their guilt in investigations can be divided into two categories:

a) the first category, subject to execution, which includes all espionage, sabotage, wrecking and insurgent personnel of Polish intelligence; b) the

second category, the less active of them, subject to imprisonment and camps for a period of 5 to 10 years. 6. Lists with

a summary of investigative and undercover materials characterizing the degree of guilt of the arrested person are compiled every 10 days for those classified in the process of investigation as the first and second categories, which are sent for final approval to the NKVD of the USSR.

Assignment to the first or

second category on the basis of consideration of undercover and investigative materials is carried out by the people's commissar of internal affairs of the republic, the head of the UNKVD of the region or territory, together with the corresponding prosecutor of the republic, region, territory. The lists

are sent to the NKVD of the USSR signed by the people's commissar of internal affairs of the republic, the head of the UNKVD and the prosecutor of the corresponding republics,

territories and regions. After the approval of the lists in the NKVD of the USSR and the prosecutor of the Union, the sentence is immediately carried out

the first category - they are shot, and according to the second - they are sent to prisons and camps according to the orders of the NKVD of the USSR.

7. To stop the release from prisons and camps of those who are finishing their term of imprisonment on the grounds of Polish espionage. On each of them, submit material for consideration at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR. 8. Skillfully and deliberately use all the work

to defeat the POV and all other contingents of Polish intelligence to acquire new agents along the Polish line.

When selecting agents, pay special attention to measures that ensure that the NKVD organs do not penetrate into the network of doppelgänger agents of Polish intelligence. Lists of agents scheduled for

recruitment, with an exhaustive description of them, should be sent for approval to the head of the GUGB NKVD comrade. Frinovsky. 9. Report the progress of the operation by telegraph every 5 days, that

is, on the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th of each month. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General

Commissar of State Security N. Yezhov True to the truth: Operative Secretary of the GUGB of the NKVD of

the USSR Commander Ulmer **Top** secret TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE UNION REPUBLIC, HEADS OF THE NKVD DEPARTMENTS OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC, REGIONS AND TERRITORIES

The NKVD of the Union has uncovered and is liquidating the largest and, judging by all the data, the main sabotage and espionage network of Polish intelligence in the USSR, which existed in the form of the so-called "Polish Military Organization" ("POV").

On the eve of the October Revolution and immediately after it, Pilsudski created his largest political agency on Soviet territory, which headed the organization now being liquidated, and then from year to year systematically transferred to the USSR, under the guise of political emigrants, exchanged political prisoners, defectors, numerous cadres of spies and saboteurs who were included in the general system of organization that operated in the USSR

and replenished here by recruiting among the local Polish population.

The organization was led by a center located in Moscow - consisting of Unshlikht, Muklevich, Olsky and others, and had powerful branches in Belarus and the Ukraine, mainly in the border areas, and a number of other areas of the USSR. By now, when basically only the head and the active of

the organization have been liquidated, it has already been determined that the anti-Soviet work of the organization has been covered - the NKVD system, the Red Army, the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, the apparatus of the Comintern - primarily the Polish section of the ECCI, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the defense industry, transport - mainly strategic roads of the western theater of war, agriculture. The active anti-Soviet work of the organization was

carried out in the following main areas: 1. Preparation, together with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and

Bukharinites, to overthrow the Soviet government, disrupt the Brest peace, provoke a war between the RSFSR and Germany and put together armed intervention units (1918). 2. Extensive comprehensive subversive work on the Western and Southwestern fronts during the

Soviet-Polish war, with the direct goal of defeating the Red Army and separating the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR. 3. Mass fascist-nationalist work among the Polish population of the USSR in order to

prepare a base and local personnel for sabotage, espionage and insurgent actions.

4. Qualified espionage work in the field of military, economic and political life of the USSR, in the presence of the largest strategic agents and wide middle and grassroots espionage

networks.

5. Subversive and sabotage work in the main branches of the defense industry, in current and mobilization planning, in transport, in agriculture; the creation of a powerful sabotage network for wartime, both from among the Poles, and, to a large extent, due to various non-Polish elements.

6. Contacting and unification of sabotage and espionage and other active anti-Soviet actions with the Trotskyist center and its periphery, with the organization of right-wing traitors, with Belarusian and

Ukrainian nationalists on the basis of joint preparations for the overthrow of Soviet power and the dismemberment of the

USSR. 7. Direct contact and agreement with the leader of the military fascist conspiracy, the traitor Tukhachevsky, in order to disrupt the preparations of the Red Army for war and to open our front to the Poles during the war. 8. Deep

infiltration of the members of the organization into the Communist Party of Poland, complete seizure of the leading bodies of the party and the Polish section of the ECCI, provocative work to disintegrate and demoralize the party, disruption of the united and popular front in Poland, use of party channels to introduce spies and saboteurs into the USSR, work aimed at turning the Communist Party into an appendage of the pilsud-chiny in order to use its influence for anti-Soviet actions during Poland's military attack on the USSR. 9. Complete seizure and paralysis of all

our intelligence and counterintelligence work against Poland and the systematic use of the penetration of members of the organization into the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army for active anti-Soviet work.

The main reason for the unpunished anti-Soviet activities of the organization for almost 20 years is the fact that almost from the very moment the Cheka was founded, major Polish spies who had penetrated the Cheka — Unshlikht, Messing, Pilyar, Medved, Olsky, Sosnovsky, Makovsky, Loga — were sitting in the most important areas of anti-Polish work. -novsky, Baransky and a number of others, who completely took over the entire anti-Polish intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD.

ORIGIN OF ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF POLISH AGENCY IN THE USSR

The "Polish Army Organization" arose in 1914 on the initiative and under the personal leadership of Pilsudski as a nationalist organization of active supporters of the struggle for the independence of bourgeois Poland, trained in the combat organizations of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), for which,

Pilsudski mainly relied on the special military schools that he created to train the backbone of the future Polish army. These schools were created

by Piysudski in 1910-1914. in Galicia, where they were semi-secret in nature and enjoyed subsidies and practical assistance from the intelligence department of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. Even before the imperialist war, Piysudski had at his disposal a number of officers of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service, who trained Piysudski in military affairs, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage techniques, since the personnel that formed the "POV" a little later were intended to act in alliance with the Austro-German army on the rear of the Russian troops and for the acquisition of the Polish legions in anticipation of a war with tsarist Russia. Therefore, already then, in addition to the territory of tsarist Poland,

members of the "POV" were sent to Russia, recruited here on the spot, based on the principle of creating their own organizations wherever possible, mainly in large cities, to account for and mobilize their people for the purposes of communications and intelligence.

At the same time, POV was a tool for the political mobilization of Pilsudski's forces participating under his leadership in the struggle for the independence of Poland. In this regard, the "POV" secretly infiltrated all Polish political parties - from the extreme left to the extreme right, everywhere recruiting active leaders of these parties into their ranks on the basis of recognizing the indisputable authority and personal will of Pilsudski and the idea of \u200b\u200bstruggle for great-power Poland within the

borders of 1772 Along this line, since the pre-war years, the POV accumulated a rich practice of intra-party and inter-party provocation, which is the main method of the Pilsudschyna in its struggle against the revolutionary movement.

At the head of the "POV" was then the central headquarters, which was called "Komenda Naczelna" (abbreviated as "KN"), which led the activities of local Pilsudchik organizations that bore the same name, with the addition of a serial number, for example, in Belarus - "KN-1 ", in Ukraine - "KN-3", etc. Each of these local "komends" was a regional

territorial district "POV", divided into local commandant's offices "POV", the number of which in a given territory was determined depending on local conditions and tasks pursued by the Pilsudschyna in this area. At the end of 1918, in connection with

the formation of Poland, headed by Pilsudski as the sole dictator with the title of "head of state", the main command of the "POV" in full force merged into the general staff of Poland and formed the intelligence department of the headquarters. During the period of temporary removal of Pilsudski from power in Poland

(1922-1926), the POV main command, which was then generally eliminated by the endeks from the government bodies of Poland and only partially retained its influence in the intelligence department of the headquarters, the general continued sabotage reconnaissance work on the territory of the USSR, regardless official bodies of Polish intelligence and prepared a new coming to power of Pilsudski. After the so-called May Revolution of 1926, which again brought Pilsudski to power, the leadership and activists of the POV filled the entire state elite and the fascist government

apparatus of Poland; a significant part of the POV activists remained underground to fight the revolutionary movement in Poland by methods of provocation and revolutionary inspiration, and also, mainly, to illegally infiltrate the USSR in various ways. The activities of Pilsudski's conspiratorial organization on our territory became significantly more active in 1917, when, in connection with the events of the imperialist war, significant qualified cadres of Pilsudski's close associates from among the captured legionnaires accumulated in various parts of our country (Pilsudski's legions, formed by the POV,

were part of the Austro- Hungarian army) and refugees from the territory of tsarist Poland, then occupied by the Germans.

Thus, already by the time of the October Revolution, Pilsudski had in Russia significant cadres of POV participants, both from among the local Polish population, and mainly from among the Poles evacuated from Poland.

Since, however, the main cadres of the POV during the imperialist war consisted of people, more or less famous, their open Polish-patriotic convictions, and given the victorious growth of the influence of the Bolshevik Party, Pilsudski in the summer of 1917 took special recruitment measures to penetrate the RSDLP (Bolsheviks). For these purposes, on the personal instructions of Piłsudski, his entourage launched extensive recruiting work among the Polish Social Democrats and in the PPS-Levitsa, who later merged and formed the Communist Party of Poland.

During 1917, the members of the central leadership of the "POV" who were then in Moscow and Petrograd - Pistor (later the Polish Prime Minister), Puzhak (secretary of the Central Committee of the Ministry of Railways), Makovsky (member of the Moscow Committee of the PPS, later assistant head of the KRO OGPU and resident INO OGPU in Poland), Goluwko, Yuzefovsky (Volyn voivode), Matushevsky (later head of the 2nd department of the Polish General Staff) - involved in the POV a number of Polish Social Democrats and members of the PPS-Left, who later penetrated prominent positions in Soviet state apparatus: Unshlikht (former deputy chairman of the OGPU and RVS), Leshchinsky (secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland), Doletsky (head of TASS), Bronkovsky (deputy chief of the Red Army Intelligence Department), Muklevich (chief of the naval forces of the Red Army, deputy people's commissar of the defense industry), Longvu (corporate commander, head of the communications department of the Red Army) and a number of others who

formed the Moscow center "POV" in 1918 and led the management of all activities of the "POV" in the USSR. At the same time, at the beginning of 1918, Pilsudski issued a directive to a number of personally selected POV members who were members of the PPS and who were in the USSR to infiltrate the Soviet state apparatus by staging their break in the PPS and switching to Soviet positions. Among the Polish agents who infiltrated the Soviet system in this way are:

the former member of the Moscow Committee of the PPS Loganovsky M.A. (before the arrest of the deputy people's commissar of the food industry), Makovsky, Voytyga (infiltrated the KRO and INO OGPU-NKVD), Baransky (head of the department INO OGPU - NKVD) and a number of others.

In an effort to take over our intelligence and counterintelligence work against Poland, Pilsudski, along with the introduction of the above-mentioned members of the "POV" into the Cheka, undertakes during 1919-1920. and subsequently a number of measures to introduce highly qualified career intelligence officers into the Cheka - officers of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters, who, with the assistance of Unshlikht, Pilyar, Messing, Medved and other major Polish agents, infiltrated senior positions in Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.

So, I. I. Sosnovsky (before his arrest, deputy head of the NKVD Directorate for the Saratov region), who in 1919 was Pilsudsky's emissary and a resident of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters on the territory of Soviet Russia, then received a directive from the head of the 2nd department Major Matushevsky to infiltrate the apparatus of the Cheka. Using his arrest by a special department of the Cheka in the summer of 1920, Sosnovsky, with the assistance of Pilyar, staged his break with the Polish intelligence service and the POV, of which he was the leader, gave away, with the permission of the 2nd department of the PPP, an insignificant part of his network and infiltrated himself to work to the central office of the Cheka. Soon, Sosnovsky managed to infiltrate a whole group of large Polish intelligence officers into the Cheka: Lieutenant Colonel of the 2nd Department of the Plenipotentiary Staff Witkovsky (who served as head of the Polish branch of the special department of the Cheka, who then went to work in the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry), Klyakovsky (head of the Anglo-Romance

department. KRO VChK) , Roller (before his arrest - head of the Special Department of the Stalingrad Territory), Brzezovsky (deputy head of the Special Department of Ukraine) and others. early The Red Army Intelligence Agency, infiltrated the entire Intelligence Agency system, took over and paralyzed all intelligence work against Poland (Budkevich - head of the department and a

foreign resident), Zhbikovsky, Sherinsky, Firin, Iodlovsky, Uzdansky, Maksimov, etc. One of the types The use of these major Polish spies in the foreign work of the INO and the Intelligence

Agency was a wide base of doubles in our residencies abroad. Subsequently, through staging of failures, the doubles substituted by intelligence we

espionage and sabotage work.

At various times, Polish agents infiltrated and worked in responsible leadership positions in the Red Army: Unshlikht - deputy. prev. RVS, Muklevich - early. naval forces, Longva - early. Communications Department of the Red Army, Kokhansky - commander, Kozlovsky - commissar of a number of units and many other Polish agents who penetrated into the most diverse parts of the Red

Army. The main frame of Polish agents who penetrated the People's Commissariat for Affairs was created by the one who worked in it in the period 1925-1931. Loganovsky, and here, too, the Polish agents concentrated on the area of work of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, connected with Poland (spies Morshtyn, Konyts were referents for Poland), and a number of other important areas (plenipotentiary Brodovsky, plenipotentiary Gaikis, plenipotentiary Karsk

Having seized the leading bodies of the Communist Party of Poland and the Polish section of the ECCI for a long time, the POV systematically transferred its participants - spies and saboteurs to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants and exchanged political prisoners, specially staging the arrests and convictions of members of the POV who had infiltrated the Communist Party . Regardless of the POV, the method of

transferring spies to the USSR under the guise of political emigrants was widely used by the Polish political police (defensive), which has in the Communist Parties of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus a significant number of personnel of its provocateur agents from among Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian nationalists who penetrated into various revolutionary organizations.

At the same time, various organs of Polish intelligence (mainly local apparatuses of the 2nd department of the polglav headquarters - Vilna and Lvov exhibits, border reconnaissance points, reconnaissance, political police of the rear and border regions of Poland) systematically, on a massive scale, transfer spies and saboteurs to the USSR under the guise of defectors. These "defectors" covered up the criminal goals of their arrival in the USSR with various motives and pretexts

(desertion from military service, flight from police persecution, from

unemployment - in search of work, for living together with relatives, etc.). As it turns out now, Polish spies

and saboteurs, transferred to the USSR under the guise of defectors, despite the fact that they had independent ways of communication with Poland, in a number of cases contacted the participants of the POV on our territory, acted under their leadership, and the mass of defectors as a whole was a source of active personnel for the organization. A number of qualified Polish spies, transferred to the USSR under the guise of

defectors - soldiers who had deserted from the Polish army, settled in the Saratov region, where Polish agents Pilyar and Sosnovsky were operating. Political emigrants and defectors form the backbone of the Poles' sabotage network in industry and transport, recruiting

sabotage cadres from among local Polish nationalists and, most importantly, at the expense of a wide variety of non-Polish, deeply concealed anti-Soviet elements.

The POV organization in Ukraine was headed by Lazovert (State Arbiter of the Ukrainian SSR), under whose leadership the POV center was partially liquidated in 1933 in Ukraine (Skar-bek, Politur, Vishnevsky), and in Belarus - Benek (People's Commissariat of Agriculture BSSR), which, like Lazovert, was a member of the Moscow center "POV" since 1918.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ANTI-SOVIET REVOLUTION IN THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION

The first stage of the active work of the "POV" in Soviet Russia includes actions aimed at disrupting the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in early 1918 and preparing, together with the Bukharinites and the Left SRs, an anti-Soviet coup in order to draw Soviet Russia into the continuation of the war with Germany, since by that time, Pilsudski had already reoriented himself to the Entente and directed the activities of his organizations according to the directives of the French headquarters.

Members of the organization - Unshlikht, Leshchinsky and Doletsky, together with Bukharin and the Left SRs, developed a plan for the arrest of the Council of People's Commissars during

led by Lenin. For these purposes, Pestkovsky, on behalf of Unshlikht, established contact with the French intelligence representative in Moscow, General Laverne, and the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries; Bobinsky put together armed detachments to participate in the Left SR uprising; in the Polish units that survived from the time of Kerensky, work was underway to prepare their provocative military action against the German troops on the demarcation line.

Having failed in the implementation of the plan of an anti-Soviet coup and the resumption of the war with Germany, the Moscow organization "POV", acting on the instructions of Laverne and Pilsudski's adjutant, a prominent member of the "POV" Veniava-Dlugoshevsky, who illegally arrived on Soviet territory, switched to preparing an intervention against Soviet Russia, creating under the guise of the formation of the Polish units of the Red Army, their armed forces. Formed at the end of 1918, the so-called Western Rifle Division, staffed mainly by Poles, was

completely captured in its command head by members of the POV (division commanders Makovsky and Longva, commissars Lazovert and Slavinsky, brigade commanders Mayevsky and Dlus-sky, commissars of the Stsibor, Gruzel brigades and Chernitsky, commanders of the regiments - all without exception were members of the "POV"), who created groups of "POV" in various parts of the division.

DEFEATIVE WORK DURING THE SOVIET-POLISH WAR

Ÿ Since the beginning of 1919, the Western Front has become the main field of activity of the Moscow POV organization, where the organization, using the presence of a number of its members in leadership positions at the front headquarters (Unshlikht is a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front, Muklevich is the commissar of the front headquarters, Stashevsky is the head of the intelligence department headquarters of the front, Budkevich - commissar of the headquarters of the 16th army), in the Special Department of the Front (Medved, Olsky, Polichkevich, Chatsky), in the government bodies of Belarus (Tsikhovsky - chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Litbelrepublic), widely launched

defeat of the Red Army and facilitating the capture of Belarus by the Poles. The

first, largest act of the organization's activity on the fronts was the surrender of Vilna to the Poles, committed by Unshlikht, who seized the leadership of the defense of the Litbelrepublic.

In various parts of the Western Front, the organization concentrated a significant number of its supporters, gathering them from various parts of the country, under the guise of mobilizing the Poles of the Communists to the front, planted its people in various Soviet institutions of the front and led the work of the local organization "POV" in Belarus ("KN-1 "), created by the Poles independently of the Moscow center. Later, during the Soviet-Polish

war, the organization under the leadership of Unshlikht not only supplied the Polish command with all the most important information about the plans and actions of our army on the Western Front (Unshlikht handed over to the Poles the offensive plan for Warsaw), but carried out systematic work to influence operational plans front in the direction necessary for the Poles and launched a broad sabotage and insurrectionary work on the rear of the Western Front.

In the light of the facts now established by the investigation, it is absolutely undoubted that the POV organization, which is being liquidated, headed by Unshlikht, played a major role in disrupting the offensive of the Red Army on Warsaw.

FASCIST NATIONALIST WORK AMONG THE POLISH POPULATION OF THE USSR

During the Civil War, along with sabotage and insurrectionary activities, extensive nationalist work among the local Polish population was carried out by local POV organizations created independently of the Moscow center "POV" in Belarus ("KN-1"), in Ukraine ("KN-3"), in Siberia and other places.

After the end of the Soviet-Polish war, the local POV organizations are reorganized in accordance with peacetime conditions, and the leadership of all their anti-Soviet activities

concentrated in the Moscow center "POV", which launched a broad, still ongoing, fascist nationalist work among the Polish population of the USSR. Particularly active since the end

of 1920, the widespread introduction of Polish agents to the leading positions of the entire system of party-Soviet institutions for work among the Polish population of the USSR and the use of this system to carry out the work of the POV began.

Members of the "POV" Geltman and Neumann penetrate the positions of secretaries of the polburo under the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Vnorovsky, Vonsovsky, Mazepus - in the pol bureau of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Belarus, Skar-bek, Lazovert and others - in the pol bureau of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine, Dombal - the editor of the newspaper "Tribuna Radziecka" in Moscow, Prince and Zharsky - the editors of the Polish newspaper in Minsk, Other members of the "POV" seize leadership in the editorial offices of Polish newspapers in Ukraine,

in the Polish sections of the People's Commissariat for Education, Polish publishing houses, technical schools, schools and clubs in various parts of the USSR. Taking advantage of their official position, the right to distribute personnel, Geltman and Neumann sent from Moscow members of the "POV", hiding behind party cards, for party, cultural, educational, pedagogical, economic work in the most diverse regions of the USSR, where there is only a Polish population, not only to Ukraine , to Belorussia and Leningrad, but also to the Urals,

to Siberia, to the DVK - where Polish intelligence is conducting active, hitherto undiscovered work in contact with Japanese intelligence. The organization actively used its introduction into this system of party-Soviet institutions to create local grass-roots POV groups and launch broad chauvinist and Polonist work, which continues to this day and has as its goal the training, first of all, of sabotage and insurgent personnel and armed an

The same goals were pursued by the creation, under the influence of the POV, of Polish national village councils and areas in the border zone, often in areas with a minority of the Polish population, which also provided the POV with one of the opportunities for Polonization work among Ukrainians and Belarusians - Catholics. Its

penetration into the system of Soviet-party institutions for work among the Polish population "POV" widely used for

conducting comprehensive espionage work through its mass agents in various parts of the country.

THE USE OF TROTSKYIST AND OTHER ANTI-SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS BY POLISH INTELLIGENCE

In his In practical sabotage, espionage, terrorist and defeatist work on the territory of the USSR, Polish intelligence makes extensive use, primarily of Trotskyist hirelings and right-wing traitors.

In 1931, Unshlikht and Muklevich, having contacted the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center in the person of Pyatakov, and then with Kamenev, agreed with them on the joint wrecking subversive work of the members of the "POV" and the Trotskyites-Zinovievites in the national economy of the country and, in particular, in the military industry. In

September 1932, Unshlikht also came into contact with the center of right-wing traitors, having received Bukharin's consent to unite the sabotage and sabotage work of the right and the POV.

Finally, in 1933, with the knowledge of Pyatakov, Unshlikht contacts the traitor Tukhachevsky, receives from him information about his relations with the German fascists and agrees with him on joint actions aimed at eliminating Soviet power and restoring capitalism in the USSR. Unshlikht agreed with Tukhachevsky on supplying the latter to Polish intelligence with the most important espionage information on the Red Army and on opening our Western Front to the Poles in case of war.

All the local POV organizations carried on anti-Soviet work in close ties with Trotskyists, right-wingers, and various anti-Soviet nationalist organizations in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and elsewhere.

SPY WORK OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE USSR

Regardless of the espionage work of its lower ranks, the Moscow center "POV" carried out a systematic

supplying Polish intelligence with all the most important information about the military, economic and political situation of the USSR, including operational and mobilization materials of the headquarters of the Red Army, to which Unshlikht, Muklevich, Budkevich, Bronkovsky, Longva and other participants in the Moscow center had access through their official position.

Parallel to this, the Moscow center "POV" and residents of the 2nd department of the PGSH conducted a large-scale recruitment of spies from among non-Polish elements. Unshlikht, for example, in 1932 recruited Efimov, head of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, for Polish intelligence and received from him comprehensive information about the state of the artillery weapons of the Red Army. Another member of the Moscow POV center, Pestkovsky, carried out a number of recruiting activities in the Comintern, scientific institutes and other institutions, moreover, he recruited mostly non-Poles directly for Polish intelligence, as such, and only in some cases directly to the POV, since the Warsaw center authorized the organization include in some cases in the "POV" also non-Polish elements (Russians, Ukrainians). A large spy network in Narkomindel was created by Loganovsky.

Particularly large recruiting work was carried out by the resident of the 2nd department of the PG1P I. Sosnovsky and his deputy in residence, lieutenant colonel of the 2nd department V.

Vitkovsky. Sosnowski recruited and used pom. early Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Karina (who turned out to be a German agent since 1916), pom. early Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Meyer, Assistant Prosecutor of the USSR Pruss, Deputy. early Dmitrevsky camp of the NKVD Puzitsky and a number of other persons who held senior positions in the Red Army, the OGPU-NKVD and central government agencies.

V. Vitkovsky, introduced by Sosnovsky into the Cheka in 1920, was later transferred to espionage work in transport and the governing bodies of the national economy, where by the time of his arrest he had created a large sabotage and espionage network, consisting mainly of specialists.

The so-called school of

Red Communards (named before the disbandment of the Unshlikht United Military School). This military school, especially in the first period of its existence, was staffed by Poles sent to it, mainly by the Polish bureau at the central and local party bodies. Members of the POV who had infiltrated the Polish Bureau sent members of the organization

to the school, as well as career agents of Polish intelligence who remained in the USSR under the guise of prisoners of war from the period of the Soviet-Polish war who did not want to return to Poland or who arrived under the guise of defectors; in the school itself there was a strong group "POV", which carried out independent recruitment work.

The school prepared the command staff of the infantry, cavalry and artillery specialties, who were sent to the most diverse parts of the Red Army, where, of course, they also ended up graduating from school

Polish spies.

Communication with Warsaw was carried out by the organization regularly, with using a wide variety of different methods.

Prominent representatives of the Warsaw POV center and the 2nd department of the political headquarters regularly came to the USSR, who contacted Unshlikht, Pestkovsky, Sosnovsky, Witkovsky, Bortnovsky and others.

These representatives came to the USSR under various official pretexts (as diplomatic couriers, to audit Polish diplomatic institutions, on commercial matters), under personal cover (as tourists, to visit relatives, in transit, and also illegally). Specially for constant contact with Sosnovsky and Olsky, the Polish military attaches in Moscow sent officers from Warsaw, close to Pilsudsky, officers of the 2nd department of the PGSH Kovalsky and Kobylansky, meetings with which were legalized through fictitious recruiting by Olsky and Sosnowsky for the OGPU.

A number of members of the organization had a secret connection with the Polish military attaches office in Moscow and other members of the embassy residency (Vislyak, Budkevich, Dombal, Nau-iskaitis, Kobits, etc.).

Other members of the POV, who made their way to positions that gave them the opportunity to officially meet with the staff of foreign embassies, used these meetings for intelligence communications.

(Loganovsky - at official receptions, Morshtyn - for work in the NKID, Pestkovsky - in various Polish-Soviet commissions, etc.).

Members of the organization who were on foreign Soviet official or covert work contacted representatives of the "POV" and the 2nd department of the PGSH there (Loganovsky, Baransky and others in Warsaw, Brzhozovsky G. - in Finland, Czechoslovakia and Japan, Leshchinsky - in Copenhagen, Budkevich - in France, etc.). Finally, a number of large residents (Sosnovsky, Pestkovsky) had complex ciphers and passwords for communication. Through

all these communication channels, all the obtained espionage information and information about the activities of the organization were systematically transmitted to Warsaw, and money and directives were received from the main center of the "POV" and the 2nd department of the PGSh on the direction of the organization's active activities.

Wrecking and subversive work of the Polish intelligence service in the national economy of the USSR

Immediately after the end of the Civil War, Polish intelligence, through the Moscow center "POV" and along other parallel lines, began wrecking work, aimed in the first period at disrupting the restoration of the industry of the USSR. In 1925, a

representative of the Warsaw POV center, M. Sokolnitsky, who came to Moscow, handed over to Unshlikht a directive to intensify sabotage work, soon supplemented by an indication of a transition to sabotage operations. In accordance

with these directives, the Moscow center "POV" launched and carried out, until its liquidation, extensive sabotage and sabotage activities aimed at undermining the defense capability of the USSR. A number of the most

prominent members of the POV were introduced into the governing bodies of the Red Army and the Red Army Fleet, as well as into civilian institutions in charge of the country's defense (the staff of the Red Army, the Office of the Naval Forces, the defense, transport and metallurgy sectors of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Glavmorprom, etc.).

In 1925, at the headquarters of the Red Army was formed military-economic department of the Mobilization Directorate.

Botner S., a member of the POV, was introduced to leadership work during this period, who was at the same time a member of the Polish espionage and sabotage group Gorbatyuk operating in the military-scientific sector.

Together with the latter, S. O. Botner launched serious sabotage work in Mobupre of the Red Army headquarters, designed to prepare for the defeat of the Soviet Union in the upcoming war. Thus,

when working out mobilization problems, the group, by shifting the focus of attention to questions of providing rear services, sabotagely cut off the demands of the army itself for wartime as allegedly overstated. The terms of the mobilization deployment of industry were extended to a year or more, which, in essence, left a number of enterprises unprepared for defense. The resolution of the issues of providing the Red Army with military equipment and improving the latter was systematically frustrated.

In 1927, the defense sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR was created, which plays a major role in preparing the country's defense, mobilizing industry and transport. In

order to seize this most important sector in their hands, the Moscow center "POV" introduced Botner, mentioned above, to leadership work in the defense sector of the State Planning Commission, and then, with his and Unshlikht's assistance, members of the "POV" penetrated there: Kolesinsky V. A., Muklevich Anna, Shsrinsky Zaslav and others, and in 1931 Unschlich himself, who served as deputy. Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. These individuals, in turn, have re-engaged a number of high-profile defense

sector officials into the organization. In its practical activities, the organization sought above all to undermine the development of the military industry.

Initially, members of the organization openly opposed the construction of military factories under the guise of being expensive and unsustainable, wreckingly recommending that military production be established in civilian industry. In this activity, Unshlikht, Kolesinsky,

Botner and others formed a bloc with the anti-Soviet Trotskyist Smilga group in the Supreme Economic Council.

In the future, from risky open speeches against military construction, the organization switched to more disguised methods of undermining the Soviet defense base.

During the development of plans for the capital construction of the military industry in the defense sector of the Gosplan of the USSR, the members of the organization deliberately scattered funds for many construction projects and did not provide the decisive construction projects with the necessary funds. As a result, the construction of military plants was stretched out over long periods, the capacity of individual workshops was understaffed, and the practice of unplanned construction

was encouraged. In this regard, especially characteristic is the disruption in the construction and reconstruction of shell factories, which, in combination with other sabotage actions, is aimed at creating a "shell shortage" for

the duration of the war. In a number of regions, for example, in the Urals, only shell factories were built, while there were no shell factories. This has led and continues to lead to the fact that the production of shell cases is located at a distance of several thousand kilometers from the places where they can receive equipment. In those cases when the construction of equipment factories was nevertheless carried out, its development was deliberately slowed down, and the facilities serving the equipment plants (water, steam, energy, sewerage)

were disorganized. Also, the construction and reconstruction of factories for the production of shell cases was deliberately disrupted. Unshlikht, Kolesinsky, Botner, in practical contact with the Trotskyist organization in industry (Pyatakov, Smilga, Yerman, Krozhevsky), deliberately confused the capacity of these factories, dragged out their construction

and reconstruction. A similar situation took place with the production of gunpowder. During the development in the defense sector of the State Planning Commission of the plan for the construction of new gunpowder factories, Unshlikht, Kolesinsky, Botner accepted and put into practice the sabotage installations of Rataychak, in particular, calculations of capacities according to outdated standards. At the same time, sabotage went along the line of delaying the construction of new facilities (for example, the Aleksinsky powder plant in the Moscow region), disorganizing

disruption of the reconstruction of old gunpowder factories (Kazan No. 40, Kosyakov No. 44,

etc.). In terms of planning, the organization deliberately underestimated the plans for the need for metals for military orders, gave false, deliberately underestimated information about the production capacities of the military industry, proving that the plans for orders of the military specialist for the military industry were unrealistic, and reduced the mobilization orders of the military specialist and the NKPS to the maximum, as a result which from year to year the underfulfillment of defense construction programs and the shortage of mobilization reserves grew. Plans for

providing the mobilized industry with a labor force were not developed at all for a number of years. Despite the

shortage in providing military industries with non-ferrous metals in wartime, measures to replace non-ferrous metals were hampered in the same way as the development of the industry of rare metals.

Separate areas of mobilization training in the defense sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR were deliberately left abandoned, in particular, mobilization training in the field of health and agriculture. Personally, Unshlikht, with the help of the Trotskyite Epifanov recruited by him for Polish intelligence, carried out significant wrecking work in the transport sector of the USSR State Planning Committee. These sabotage

actions were aimed at disrupting the delivery of raw materials to factories, disrupting the production of finished products and were carried out by setting deliberately low standards and indicators. Necessary repair of transport was systematically thwarted by cutting down on the orders of the NKPS for metal. The elimination of bottlenecks in transport was artificially hampered by the sabotage distribution of appropriations when approving the title lists of capital work in transport.

For a long period of time, the plan for mobilization transportation in rail transport was drawn up in such a way that with the declaration of war, economic transportation should almost completely stop, which meant a disruption in the mobilization of industry and the normal life of the rear of the country.

Serious wrecking and sabotage work was carried out in the system of the navy and Glavmorprom by one of the leaders of the "POV" Muklevich R.A. the work of POV.

Muklevich involved his deputy Zinovievite P. I. Kurkov, who was a member of the anti-Soviet organization in the navy, to the wrecking work, and through him used this group in the interests of the POV.

Muklevich's wrecking work in the navy began with the slowdown in the construction of torpedo boats, patrol ships, and the first series of submarines. Muklevich commissioned the design of these vessels to Ignatiev, who headed the pest control group in the scientific and technical committee. The terms for the design and construction of these ships approved by the Revolutionary Military Council were violated and changed without permission. The ships laid on the stocks were riveted several times and shifted again. Orders for equipment were placed untimely and incomplete.

In 1934, having moved to the post of head of the Glavmorprom, Muklevich formed a wrecking and sabotage organization there, without losing contact with the anti-Soviet organization in the RKKF. Muklevich involved more than 20

leading employees of the shipbuilding industry from among the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and anti-Soviet specialists into the wrecking organization in the system of naval shipbuilding. With their help, Muklevich launched extensive wrecking and sabotage activities in the Glavmorprom and at the shipbuilding industry.

As a result of this activity, the construction and delivery of a number of ships and submarines to the military commander were delayed. In particular, by delaying the production of diesel engines, the delivery of submarines for the Far East this year has been thwarted. In the submarine "Malyutka" the size has been sabotagely increased, making it impossible to transport it by rail. The construction of serial destroyers was thwarted. On destroyer leaders, the ship's hull is made too light, which hinders the use of stern artillery. Anti-aircraft artillery is placed on cruisers

so that it cannot be brought into battle at the same time. The preparation of stocks for laying down battleships at the Nikolaev plants was disrupted.

By agreement with the anti-Soviet organization in the RKKF, the testing of already finished ships was systematically hampered, and they were not put into

operation. Along with widespread sabotage, Muklevich also prepared acts of sabotage.

So, in particular, at the direction of Muklevich, Streltsov and Brodsky, members of the organization in the marine shipbuilding industry, were to organize the decommissioning of the large stocks of the Baltic Shipbuilding Plant. This sabotage was planned to be carried out either by closing the electrical wires, which are in large numbers on the scaffolding surrounding the stocks, or by organizing an explosion. However, Muklevich failed to carry out this sabotage. The decommissioning of a number of large military plants in Leningrad was also being

prepared, including part of the units of the Kirov Plant, whose assistant director, Leo Markovsky, was also a member of the POV. Sabotage groups at the largest aviation (Plant No. 22, Perm Aviation Plant,

etc.) and artillery factories (named after Molotov, "Barricades", Tula, Kiev "Arsenal"), in the chemical industry were created by Loganovsky, Budnyak, Artamonov, Baransky and etc.

The largest base for a sabotage network in industry is made up of defectors and emigrants from Poland, who settled mainly in the Urals and Siberia. Since, however, in recent years, the main defense enterprises have been purged of these categories, the Polish intelligence and POV recruited various non-Polish elements working in the defense industry and not exposed until now in order to create a particularly covert sabotage network. The sabotage work of Polish intelligence in transport was concentrated mainly on the

railways of the western theater of war and the Siberian Railway, mainly in the Ural sector, in order to cut off the Far East from the central part

Union. However, there are still no deployments of Polish subversive groups in transport. In a number of

cases, in order to check the readiness of the sabotage network created for wartime, the organization carried out acts of sabotage in a number of places.

Thus, Veikht, a member of the POV organization in the Dnepropetrovsk region, under the directive of the Ukrainian POV center, carried out a sabotage act at the Kamenskaya power plant, during which the station was completely destroyed.

TERRORIST WORK OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE

On directives from Warsaw, Unshlikht, Pestkovsky, Makovsky, Dombal, Wislak, Matushevsky and others, together with the Trotskyists, were preparing central terrorist acts. So, for

example, Matushevsky created the POV group in the apparatus of the Moscow police, involved in it, together with Shiprovsky (former secretary of the police party committee), a large number of police officers (including non-Poles) who carried out their subversive activities in various areas police service (outdoor service, communications, metro security, militia komvuz).

According to the directives of Dombal, Matushevsky and Shiprovsky prepared central terrorist acts, using the presence of the group members on the protection of objects visited by members of the government.

Recruited by Sosnovsky in Saratov, the Polish agent Kaspersky (editor of the regional newspaper Kommunist) was a member of the Trotskyist organization, was associated with the Saratov regional Trotskyist center and, along with participation in its sabotage and sabotage work (a sabotage group at the plant of combines, lead batteries, de-195, etc.), got involved in the preparation of central terrorist acts. Sosnovsky and Pillar, who himself

participated in the preparation of terrorist acts, were also in business contact with the regional Trotskyist center.

Saratov group "POV", through the same Kaspersky, was in connection with the anti-Soviet organization of the right in Saratov.

The POV branch, which is now being liquidated, in the Dnepropetrovsk region, was preparing central terrorist attacks together with the Trotskyist-Socialist-Revolutionary organization in Dneprodzerzhinsk, with which he also contacted his sabotage and wrecking work. 15 A.Sudoplatov

- 1 **3§5** Along with the

terrorist work at the present time, the Moscow center "POV" had a directive to prepare a number of combat groups for the commission of central terrorist acts at the time of a military attack on the USSR. The work on the creation of such

groups was led by a member of the Moscow center "POV" Pestkovsky.

WRECKING IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK

After the end of the Soviet-Polish war, the main cadre of the organization returned to Moscow and, using Unshlikht's tenure as deputy chairman of the Cheka-OGPU, and then deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, began work to seize under his influence the decisive sectors of the activities of the Cheka-OGPU (Pilyar - head of the KRO VChK, Sosnovsky and his group in the KRO VChK, Ol-sky - chairman of the GPU of Belarus, Ikhnovsky - head of the ECU OGPU, Medved - chairman of the Moscow Cheka, later replaced Messing at the post of PG OGPU in the Leningrad Military District, Loganovsky, Baransky and a number of others in the system INO VChK-OGPU-NKVD) and Intelligence Department of the Red Army (Bortnovsky and others).

The work of the organization in the system of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and Razvedpre of the Red Army during all the years was directed mainly along the

following lines: agents on the territory of the USSR and various sectors of the national economic life of the country.

Pillar, Olsky, Sosnovsky and others in Moscow, Belarus, Messing, Medved, Yanishevsky, Sendzikovsky and others in Leningrad - systematically disrupted the activities of our bodies against Polish intelligence, saved the local POV organizations from defeat, warning groups and individual members of the POV information about the activities of the "POV" that had been sprinkled from honest agents, filled the intelligence network with doubles who worked for the Poles, did not allow arrests, and terminated cases. 2. Seizure and paralysis of the entire intelligence work of the NKVD and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army against Poland,

widespread and systematic misinformation of us and the use of our intelligence apparatus abroad to supply Polish intelligence with the information it needs about other countries and for anti-Soviet actions in the international arena. Thus, a member of the "POV" Stashevsky, appointed by Unshlikht to work beyond the borders, used his stay in Berlin in 1932 to

support Brandler in order to disrupt and derail the proletarian uprising in Germany, while acting on the direct directives of Unshlikht.

A member of the "POV" Zhyabkovsky, sent by Bronkovsky to the work of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, carried out provocative work in order to complicate relations

between the USSR and England. According to Unshlikht's directives, members of the organization Loganovsky and Baransky used their stay in the INO line in Warsaw during the period of Pilsudski's removal from power to create, under the cover of the OGPU, sabotage Pilsudczyk organizations that acted against the then Endek government in Poland, and prepared, on behalf of the INO residency, a provocative attempt on French Marshal Foch during his visit to Poland in order to disrupt the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between France and the USSR. 3. Use of

the position of members of the "POV" in the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD for deep anti-Soviet work and recruitment of spies.

Pilsudski's emissary and resident of the 2nd department of the PGSH I. Sosnowski widely used his position in the authorities to establish

contact with various, predominantly nationalistic, anti-Soviet elements and led their subversive activities in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and other places. However, perhaps the

greatest harm was done to us by the theory and practice of passivity in counterintelligence work, stubbornly and systematically carried out by Polish spies who penetrated the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. Taking advantage of the seizure of

leading posts in our secret intelligence apparatus, the Polish spies reduced all its work to narrowly defensive measures on our territory, did not allow work on the penetration of our counterintelligence agents into foreign intelligence centers and other actively offensive counterintelligence actions. By frustrating and preventing the main method of counterintelligence work, which consists in

transferring our struggle against foreign intelligence services to their own territories, the Polish spies in our bodies have reached the point where the Soviet counterintelligence, from the body entrusted by the proletarian state with the fight against foreign intelligence services and their activities in as a whole, has been turned into a helpless apparatus for a number of years, chasing individual petty

spies.

In those cases when counterintelligence attempts to go beyond the cordon were made, they were used by Polish intelligence either to introduce their large agents into the USSR (the Savinkov case), or to establish contact with the activities of anti-Soviet elements and activate them (the Mos-kvich-Boyarov case, prof. Isichenko and others).

PROVOCATOR'S WORK OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE COMPANY OF POLAND

The penetration of large Polish agents into the Communist Party of Poland, the Polish section of the ECCI and the apparatus of the Comintern was predetermined by the fact that when the Communist Party of Poland was formed at the end of 1913, a number of major members of the POV, who had previously been members of the PPS-Levitsa and

Polish Social Democracy, united in the formation of the Communist Party. Regardless

of this, the leading head of the POV, over the course of all subsequent years, systematically introduced its agents into the ranks of the Communist Party through various provocative measures, at the same time recruited new agents from among the nationalist-minded intelligentsia who had joined the communist movement, promoted these agents to the leading bodies of the party, in order to decompose it and use it in its own interests, and widely used political emigration and the exchange of political prisoners for the massive introduction of its agents in the USSR. An example of the largest political provocation of the Pilsudchins is the so-

called PPS opposition created by the POV in 1919, the leadership of which, headed by Zharsky, Lyande-Vitkovsky, Witold Sturm de Strem, consisted of the largest peowyak provocateurs. Initially having as its task to prevent the retreat of the revolutionary elements from the PPS to the Communist Party, the "opposition", unable to **keep** under its influence the working masses who had broken away from the PPS in 1920, merged with them into the Communist Party of Poland and captured a number of leaders there.

posts.

Another, the largest act of widespread political provocation already within the Communist Party of Poland on the part of the Pilsudschiki who infiltrated its leadership, is the use of the influence of the Communist Party among the masses during Pilsudski's coup in May 1926, when these provocateurs put forward and implemented a policy of supporting Pilsudski by the Communist Party. kovsky coup.

Anticipating that that part of the POV members who had infiltrated the leadership of the Communist Party of Poland and were directly working to use the Communist Party to facilitate the Pilsudczyk coup (Barsky, Kostrzheva, Kraevsky, Lands-Witkowski) will this was compromised and removed from the leadership, the POV kept in reserve the other a group of members of the "POV" (led by Leshchinsky), which outwardly was aloof from assisting the coup of 1926 and was intended to capture the leadership of the checkpoint after the failure of the Barsky group.

After the May coup, in order to distract the working masses from opposing the establishment of a new fascist regime by Pilsudski and to weaken and disintegrate the Communist Party from within, the POV developed and carried out a plan for a broad factional struggle between the Leshchinsky group (the so-called minority in the CPT) and the Barsky group - Kostrzhevs (the so-called majority). Both POV groups succeeded in drawing the masses of the Party into the factional struggle and paralyzed the work of

the Party for a long time. As a result, the POV group, headed by a member of the Moscow POV center Leshchinsky, managed to seize the leadership of the party, who concentrated his work on further disintegrating the party and slowing down the

revolutionary movement in Poland. In recent years, all the efforts of the Warsaw and Moscow center "POV" in relation to their work within the Communist Party of Poland have been aimed at disrupting the united and popular front in Poland and, mainly, at preparing to use the Communist Party for anti-Soviet actions during the Polish military attack on the USSR

In this direction, Unshlikht and Leshchinsky carried out special work on the use of party channels for the communication service of Polish intelligence during the war, and a plan was developed for a number of political provocative measures (ultimatums to the Comintern and the CPSU (b) on behalf of the Communist Party of Poland on inviolability of independence^{"Polish"}, the issuance of anti-Soviet appeals to the working class of Poland, the split of the party, etc.). Starting from 1920,

and especially widely after the May coup, the "POV" uses the channels of the Communist Party and the Polish section of the Comintern, which was penetrated by such major members of the "POV" as Sokhatsky Bratkovsky, Leshinsky, Prukh-nyak, Vertinsky, Bronkovsky and a number of others, - for the systematic wide transfer to the USSR of sabotage and espionage agents of various scales under the guise of political emigrants and political prisoners. So, under the guise of political prisoners, Polish spies Pilyar, Budzinsky, Nahuiskaitis, Vysotsky, Dombal, Belevsky were transferred to the USSR; as political emigrants - Wislyak, Heinrich Lauer (headed the metallurgy sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR), Zdziarsky, Henrykhovsky, Brzozovsky and many tens and hundreds of other spies who penetrated

the most various sections of the state industry, transport and device, agriculture of the USSR.

Not only the Communist Party of Poland was used as a cover for spies and saboteurs. The agents of Polish intelligence were transferred to the USSR also under the cover of belonging to the Communist Parties of Western Belarus, Western Ukraine and other revolutionary organizations, in the very emergence of which Polish intelligence was included for provocative purposes.

So, for example, the so-called. The Belarusian community - a mass peasant organization in Western Belarus - was actively used by Polish intelligence and the fascist organization of Belarusian nationalists, existing in Vilna, to defeat the peasant movement in Western Belarus and transfer their agents to the USSR.

The same mass organization as the Independent Peasant Party (the Independent Party of Khlopska) in native Poland was set up by the greatest provocateur, the officer of the 2nd department of the General Staff, Voevudsky, specifically to intercept the movement of the revolutionary Polish peasantry and also use it to transfer agents to the USSR under the guise of "peasant" figures fleeing police persecution.

All materials of the investigation in the present case with exhaustive certainty prove that the overwhelming, absolute majority of the so-called. political emigrants from Poland are either members of the "POV" (natives of native Poland, including Polish Jews), or agents of the 2nd department of the **PGS** or the political police (Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.).

ANTI-SOVIET WORK OF POLISH INTELLIGENCE IN BELARUSIA AND OTHER AREAS OF THE USSR

The POV organization in Belorussia, recently headed by a member of the Moscow POV center Benek, members of the Minsk POV center Vonsovsky, Klys, in addition, led by Pillar, Sosnovsky, Gelman, Dombal through many channels, has established organic ties with organization of Belarusian national

fascists, the Trotskyist underground and the anti-Soviet organization of the right, as a result of which there was a single anti-Soviet conspiracy in Belarus, led by Chervyakov, Goloded, Benek.

The united underground launched extensive wrecking and destructive work in Byelorussia, linked to the military plans of the Polish-German general staffs. The subversive work of the united underground

affected all sectors of the national economy of Belarus: transport, planning, economy, fuel and energy construction of enterprises, all branches of light agriculture, construction of state farms and so on. Over the past few years, new the united underground, through the artificial spread of infectious diseases (meningitis, anemia, plague), has done a lot of work to destroy the livestock of pigs, horse livestock in Belarus, as a result of which, in 1936 alone, more than 30 thousand horses.

In the process of preparing for the capture of the BSSR by the Poles, the united underground put forward and tried to carry out a wrecking project of draining the Polissya swamps, which are a natural obstacle to the offensive actions of the Polish army. At the same time, Dombal, who carried out the development of the Great Dnieper projects in a sabotage spirit, included in the work plan the digging of a deep-water canal in Belarus, designed to open access to Polish military courts on Soviet territory.

Simultaneously with the wrecking work in agriculture of the BSSR, the united underground was actively working to train insurgent personnel and an armed anti-Soviet uprising, widely practicing various methods of artificially inciting public discontent against the Soviet regime (planned "excesses" during various economic campaigns in the countryside, over-taxation, illegal mass confiscations for non-payment of taxes, etc.). Communicating with Poland through many channels (through the Moscow center "POV", the Minsk Polish consulate, the

Vilna center of the Belarusian national fascists with the 2nd department of the General Staff directly), the united underground led a comprehensive

espionage work, having a number of his connections in parts of the Belarusian military district and contact with the military-fascist group of the traitor Tukhachevsky, represented by Uborevich, a member of this group. On the direct

instructions of Zinoviev, the Trotskyist Gessen organized a terrorist group from the members of the united underground, which prepared an attempt against Comrade Voroshilov during his stay in Minsk in the autumn of 1936. obtained at the initial stage of the investigation in Moscow, and the

interrogation of the previously arrested Belarusian national fascists, thus demonstrating the skillful operational use of small initial data to defeat the organizing forces of the enemy.

Until now, work has been going on completely unsatisfactorily to liquidate the "GUV" in the Far East, Siberia, the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions and in the Ukraine. Having in the period 1933-1935. exceptionally great opportunities for opening the peovvatsky underground (arrests of the group of Skarbek, Stasyak-Konetsky), the apparatus of the NKVD of Ukraine did not then deploy investigations to the necessary limit of fully exposing the activities of the "POV" in Ukraine, which was used by the spy who was then in the Special Department of the center Sosnovsky for provoking failure in general. While sending out collections of interrogation protocols of Unshlikht and a friend of the arrested, I suggest

that you acquaint all the heads of the operational departments of the GUGB and senior officials of the third departments with this letter. P. P. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General

commissioner of state security **N. Yezhov** True:

Operative Secretary of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR Brigade

Commander **Ulmer** (Archive of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the Kharkiv Region.

Collection of documents. Arch. 89 - 136. Typescript. copy)

**DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS OF THE USSR
AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b)**

"ON ARRESTS, PROSECUTOR'S SUPERVISION AND INVESTIGATION"

dated November 17, 1938

Top secret

No. P4387

People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and Autonomous Republics, heads of the UNKVD of territories and regions, heads of district, city and district departments of the NKVD.

Prosecutors of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Territories and Regions, district, city and district attorneys.

Secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees, regional

committees, district committees, city committees and district committees of the CPSU (b). The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks note that in 1937-38. under the leadership of the party, the NKVD did a great job of defeating the enemies of the people and clearing the USSR of numerous espionage, terrorist, sabotage and wrecking personnel from the Trotskyists, Bukharinites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, bourgeois nationalists, White Guards, fugitive kulaks and criminals, who were a serious support for foreign

intelligence agencies in the USSR, and especially the intelligence agencies of Japan, Germany, Poland, England and France. At the same time, the NKVD bodies also did a lot of work to defeat the espionage and sabotage agents of foreign intelligence services, transferred to the USSR in large numbers from behind the cordon under the guise of so-called political emigrants and

defectors from Poles, Romanians, Finns, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Harbin residents and so on. . Clearing the country of sabotage insurgents and espionage personnel played a positive role in ensuring the

further success of socialist construction. However, one should not think that this is the p
spies, pests, terrorists and saboteurs is over.

The task now is to continue the merciless struggle against all the enemies of the USSR and to organize this struggle with the help of more perfect and reliable methods. This is all the more necessary because

the mass operations to defeat and uproot enemy elements carried out by the NKVD in 1937-1938, with a simplified investigation and trial, could not but lead to a number of major shortcomings and distortions in the work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office. Moreover, enemies of the people and spies of foreign intelligence services, who made their way into the NKVD bodies both in the center and in the localities, continuing to carry out their subversive work, tried in every possible way to confuse investigative and intelligence affairs, deliberately perverted Soviet laws, carried out mass and unreasonable arrests, while at the same time, saving his accomplices from defeat, especially those who had settled in the organs of the NKVD. The main shortcomings identified in recent years in

the work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office are the following:

Firstly, the NKVD officers completely abandoned intelligence work, preferring to act in a more simplified way, through the practice of mass arrests, without caring about the completeness and high quality of the investigation.

The employees of the NKVD have become so unaccustomed

to painstaking, systematic intelligence work and have become so addicted to a simplified procedure for the proceedings that, until very recently, questions have been raised about granting them so-called "limits" for mass arrests.

This led to the fact that the already weak undercover work fell further behind and, worst of all, many people's commissars lost their taste for undercover activities, which play an extremely important role in Chekist work. This, finally, led to the fact that,

in the absence of properly organized undercover work, the investigation, as a rule, could not fully expose the arrested spies and saboteurs of foreign intelligence services and completely reveal all their criminal connections. Such an underestimation of the importance of undercover work and an unacceptably frivolous attitude

towards arrests are all the more intolerable because

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in their decisions of May 8, 1933, June 17, 1935 and, finally,

On March 3, 1937, categorical instructions were given on the need to properly organize undercover work, limit arrests and improve the investigation. Secondly, the biggest shortcoming of the work

of the NKVD bodies is the deeply rooted simplified investigation procedure, in which, as a rule, the investigator is limited to obtaining a confession of guilt from the accused and does not at all care about supporting this confession with the necessary documentary data (testimony of witnesses, expert reports, physical evidence etc.). Often the arrested person is not interrogated within a month after the arrest, sometimes more. During interrogations of arrested persons, interrogation

protocols are not always kept. Often there are cases when the testimony of the arrested person is recorded by the investigator in the form of notes, and then, after a long time (a decade, a month or even more), a general protocol is drawn up, and the requirement of Article 138 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for verbatim, if possible, fixing the testimony of the arrested person is completely not met. . Very often, an interrogation protocol is not drawn up until the arrested person confesses to the crimes committed by him. It is not uncommon for the protocol of interrogation to fail to record the testimony of the accused, refuting one or another of these accusations. Investigation files are drawn up sloppily, rough, unknown by whom corrected and crossed out pencil notes of testimony are placed in the file, protocols of testimony not signed by the interrogated and not certified by the investigator are placed, unsigned and unapproved indictments are included

conclusions, etc.

The bodies of the Prosecutor's Office, for their part, do not take the necessary measures to eliminate these shortcomings, reducing, as a rule, their participation in the investigation to simple registration and stamping of investigative materials. The organs of the Procurator's Office not only fail to eliminate violations of revolutionary legality, but actually legitimize these violations.

This kind of irresponsible attitude to investigative proceedings and a gross violation of the procedural rules established by law were often skillfully used by enemies of the people who made their way into the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office - both in the center and in the localities. They deliberately perverted Soviet laws, committed forgeries, falsified investigative documents, prosecuted and arrested on trifling grounds and even without any grounds at all, created "cases" against innocent people for the provocative purpose, and at the same time took all measures to in order to shelter and save from defeat their accomplices in criminal anti-Soviet activities. Such facts took place both in the central apparatus of the NKVD and

and on the ground.

All these absolutely intolerable shortcomings noted in the work of the NKVD and the Procuracy organs were possible only because the enemies of the people who had made their way into the organs of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office tried in every possible way to tear off the work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office organs from the party organs, to get away from the party control and leadership, and thereby make it easier for themselves and to his accomplices the opportunity to continue his anti-Soviet, subversive activities.

In order to decisively eliminate the above shortcomings and properly organize the investigative work of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

1. Prohibit the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office from carrying out any mass arrests and evictions. In accordance with Art. 127 of the Constitution of the USSR to make arrests only by order of the court or with the sanction of the prosecutor.

Eviction from the border zone is allowed in each individual case with the permission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on a special proposal from the relevant regional committee, regional committee or Central Committee of the national communist parties, agreed with the NKVD of the USSR.

2. Eliminate judicial troikas created in accordance with special orders of the NKVD of the USSR, as well as troikas at regional, regional and republican police departments of the Republic of Kazakhstan. **From now on**, all cases, in strict accordance with the current laws on jurisdiction, should be submitted for consideration by the courts or **the Special Meeting** of the NKVD of the USSR.

3. When arresting the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, be guided by as follows:

a) Arrangement for arrests to be carried out in strict accordance with

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 17, 1935;

b) when requesting arrest warrants from prosecutors, the NKVD bodies are obliged to submit a reasoned decision and all materials substantiating the need for arrest; c) the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office are obliged to carefully and

essentially check the validity of the decisions of the NKVD bodies on arrests, demanding, if necessary, the performance of additional investigative actions or the submission of additional investigative materials;

d) the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office are obliged to prevent proceedings arrests without good reason.

Establish that for each incorrect arrest, along with the employees of the NKVD, the prosecutor who authorized the arrest is also responsible. 4. Oblige the organs of the NKVD to carry out the

investigation exactly
comply with all requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In particular: a)

complete the investigation within the time limits established by law; b) to interrogate the arrested no later than 24 hours after their arrest; after each interrogation, immediately draw up a protocol in accordance with the requirement of Article 138 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with an exact indication of the time of the beginning and end of the interrogation. When familiarizing

himself with the protocol of interrogation, the prosecutor is obliged to make an inscription on the protocol about familiarization with the designation of the hour, day, month and year;

c) documents, correspondence and other items taken during the search, be sealed immediately at the place of the search, in accordance with Art. 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compiling a detailed inventory of everything sealed. 5.

Oblige the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office to strictly comply with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the exercise of prosecutorial supervision over the investigation carried out by the bodies of the NKVD. In accordance

with this, oblige prosecutors to systematically check the implementation by the investigating authorities of all the rules for conducting investigations established by law and immediately eliminate violations

these rules; take measures to secure for the accused the procedural rights granted to him by law, etc.

6. In connection with the growing role of prosecutorial supervision and the responsibility assigned to the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office for arrests and the investigation conducted by the NKVD bodies, it is necessary to recognize as necessary:

a) establish that all prosecutors supervising the investigation carried out by the NKVD bodies are approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the proposal of the relevant regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist

Parties and the Prosecutor of the USSR; b) oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to check and submit for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the

candidacies of all prosecutors supervising the investigation in the NKVD bodies; c) oblige the Prosecutor of the USSR Comrade. Vyshinsky to select politically verified qualified prosecutors from the staff of the central apparatus to supervise the investigation conducted by the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, and submit them for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks within two decades.

7. To approve the measures of the NKVD of the USSR to streamline investigative proceedings in the NKVD bodies, set out in the order of October 23, 1938. In particular, to approve the decision of the NKVD on the organization of special investigative units in the operational departments. Attaching particular importance to the correct organization of the

investigative work of the NKVD bodies, to oblige the NKVD of the USSR to ensure the appointment of the best, most politically tested and qualified party members who have proven themselves at work as investigators in the center and in the localities.

Establish that all investigators of the NKVD bodies in the center and in the localities are appointed only by order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

8. Oblige the NKVD of the

USSR and the Prosecutor of the USSR to give instructions to their local authorities on the exact execution of this resolutions.

* * *

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR **and** the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks draw the attention of all **employees** of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office to the need to decisively eliminate

the shortcomings noted above **in** the work of the NKVD **and** the Prosecutor's Office **and** the exceptional importance **of organizing** all investigative and prosecutorial work in a new way

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks warn all employees of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office that for the slightest violation of Soviet laws and directives of the Party and Government, every employee of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office, regardless of persons, will be subject to severe judicial responsibility.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR **V.**

Molotov Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-

Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks **I. Stalin**

* * *

In his speech at the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ya. In general, the apparatus and the people who are there ... are of great value ... "

REPRESSIONS IN THE NKVD BODIES IN THE MIDDLE 30s

Three years later, appearing before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, the defendant Yezhov admitted: "I cleared 14,000 Chekists. But my great fault lies in the fact that I didn't clean them enough ... "2 According to our calculations, only in the top leadership of the NKVD, who received special titles in 1935 (commissars of state security 1,2, 3 ranks and senior majors of the State Security Service) , for 1936-1938. out of 7 commissioners of the highest rank were repressed - all seven; out of 13 commissars of the 2nd rank, 10 were repressed and 1 died; out of 20 commissioners of the 3rd rank, 15 were repressed, three committed suicide and one fled abroad; out of 49 senior majors, 39 were repressed and one committed suicide.

Thus, about 80% of the senior members of the NKVD were destroyed or died during the Yezhovshchina period. The

very course and nature of the repressions within the NKVD was due to the existence in its structure of "informal groups" of Chekists, connected by internal clan-client relations and the struggle between them for supremacy and power, which unfolded against the background of mass political repressions in the country. Starting to

purge the NKVD apparatus, Yezhov drew professional cadres loyal to him from the ranks of the "regional Chekist elite", which was in a certain opposition to the central apparatus of the OGPU-NKVD and was vitally interested in removing the former leadership from power. Yezhov himself stated this at the trial:

"I was surrounded by enemies of the people, my enemies. Everywhere I cleaned security officers. I did not clean them only in Moscow, Leningrad and the North Caucasus. I thought they were honest..."³

An analysis of documents from the central and local archives of the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the FPS of Russia confirms the existence of such "informal" Chekist groups that formed in the late 1920s and early 1930s. in the peripheral (republican, regional) bodies of the ⁴. OGPU-NKVD. The most numerous and cohesive of them was the so-called.

"North Caucasian group" E. G. Evdokimov - M. P. Frinovsky Its core ⁵. was identified in 1919-1920 among the closest employees of Evdokimov in the Special Department of the Moscow Cheka and the Special Departments of the Southern and South-Western Fronts - M. P. Frinovsky, L. M. Zakovsky, E. Ya. Grundman, F. T. Fomin. When Evdokimov was the plenipotentiary of the GPU for the Right-Bank Ukraine, the "core" was replenished by local Chekists - N. G. Nikolaev-Zhu-rid, V. M. Kursky, J. M. Veinshtok, M. S. Alekhin,

A. M. Minaev-Tsikanovsky, A. G. Abulyan.

The "North Caucasian group" was finally formed in 1923-1933. during the work of Evdokimov as the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the North Caucasian district. Here, Evdokimova I. Ya. Dagin, P. G. Rud, Ya. A. Deich, S. N. Mironov-Korol, I. P. Popashenko, A. I. Mikhelson, M. A.

Listengurt, R. A. Listngurt, V. V. Khvorostyan,

K. A. Pavlov, I. Ya. Lavrushin, G. F. Gorbach, P. F. Bulakh **And others.** In 1929, after Yevdokimov falsified the "**Shakhtinsky** case", Stalin introduced him **to** the leadership of the OGPU of the Union **as a** "counterweight" to Yagoda and Menzhinsky. Only in 1931 did **they** manage to remove Evdokimov to Central Asia, and then **back to** the North Caucasus. In 1934, Evdokimov switched to party work - **the secretary of** the North

Caucasian (Ordzhonikidzevsky) **regional committee, and at** the 17th Party Congress he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). **The unspoken** "leadership" in the "North Caucasian group" of the Chekists **passed** to his closest associate, M.P. Frinovsky, who by that time had become the head of the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guards of the NKVD of the Union. Equally numerous was the "Ukrainian group" of Chekists, which took shape in the period 1923-1933 in the apparatus of the GPU-

NKVD of Ukraine around the chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and the plenipotentiary of the OGPU in Ukraine (then People's Commissar of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR) V. A. Balitsky. It included such prominent Ukrainian Chekists , as K. M. Carlson, S. S. Mazo, I. M. Blat, M. K. Aleksandrovsky, B. V. Kozelsky⁶.

Ya. V. Pismenny, G. S. Lyushkov, A. B. Rozanov, V. M. Gorozhanin and others. In 1931, after a trial in the "case" of the "Union of Violence of Ukraine", Balitsky was appointed the third deputy chairman of the OGPU of the Union, and some of his Ukrainian Chekists got to work in

the central office of the OGPU. In 1933, Yagoda managed to push Balitsky and his people back to Ukraine, after which a split occurred in the "group" between Balitsky and his deputy Leplevsky. The "renegade" Leplevsky and his personal followers (D. I. Dzhirin, E. A. Insarov-Polyak, V. P. Karelin, Z. M. Ushakov-Kshimirsky) were removed from the organs of the GPU of Ukraine⁷ .

At the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Balitsky, who enjoyed the support of the 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks, P. P. Postyshev, was elected a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The so-called "Siberian-Belarusian" (or "Leningrad") "group" of Chekists was headed by L. M. Zakovsky (G. E. Shtubis) ⁸ . He began his service career with Evdokimov in Moscow and the Right-Bank Ukraine, but inst

North Caucasus in 1926 he was sent as the plenipotentiary of the OGPU in the Siberian region. Since 1923 he was the chairman of the GPU of Belarus, and in December 1934 he became the head of the UNKVD in the Leningrad region. Among the most prominent figures of his apparatus, which was formed in Siberia and Belarus, were A. K. Zalpeter, G. A. Lupekin, M. A. Volkov-Weiner, V. N. Garin, K. Ya. Tenison, N. E. Shapiro-Daikhovsky. During the years of Zakovsky's work in Leningrad, the circle of his trusted security officers included S. G. Zhupakhin, V. F. Rogov, P. A. Korkin, P. V. Karamyshev, Ya. E. Perelmutr, S. F. Monakov, K. E. Denisov and others.

The "Moscow group" of Chekists took shape relatively late, in 1933-1936, in the NKVD for the Moscow Region, led by S. F. Redens. Having begun his service in the Cheka as the personal secretary of F. E. Dzerzhinsky, Redens in 1924-1928 (when Yagoda led the "sharing of power" in the OGPU) served in the Supreme Economic Council in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of the RKI. Appointed plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU for the Transcaucasus, in

1931 he was a stranger there, and soon he was supplanted by the Caucasian L.P. Beria. Despite the support provided by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U S. V. Kossior, Redens' work in Ukraine in 1931-1933 did not bring him much success. The entire Chekist apparatus of Ukraine was already "engaged" by Beletsky and "focused" only on him. Only after becoming in 1933 the Plenipotentiary Representative of the OGPU (since 1934 - the head of the UNKVD) in the Moscow region, Redens finally got the opportunity to select people for "his" apparatus. In addition to the closest (who are familiar from work in the GPU of the Crimea employees - A. P. Radzivilovskiy, A. S. Zhurbenko, A. A. Arnoldov Keselman), in Moscow Redens puts forward young security officers for responsible work: A. I. Uspensky, A. A. Nasedkina, P. 111. Simanovskii, V. Ya. Zazulin, N.

In the autumn of 1936, the first step of the new People's Commissar Yezhov was to increase the staff of his deputies (in addition to Ya. S. Agranov) from among the heads of the Main Directorates of the NKVD, who had no relation to the Chekist Central Directorate proper - the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) and were "at odds" with the former People's Commissar Yagoda, - M. D. Berman, M. P. Frinovsky and L. N. Velsky.

Ezhov's employees from the CPC apparatus and the Secretariat of the Central Committee were nominated to lead the non-operational units of the NKVD - S. B. Zhukovsky (Administrative and Economic Department), M. I. Litvin (Personnel

Department), V. E. Tsesarsky (special commissioner under the People's Commissar), and I. Shapiro

(NKVD Secretariat). Already the first appointments of the leadership of the operational departments of **the GUGB** - N. G. Nikolaev-Zhurid (Operod) and V. M. Kurskaya (SPO) - mark the main trend in Yezhov's personnel policy - "emphasis" on security officers-operatives of the "North

Caucasian group". At the same time, the Special Department was headed by the "renegade" of the "Ukrainian group" Balitsky I. M. Leplevsky. He and his Ukrainian Chekists (Ushakov-Ushmirsky, Karelin, Agas) were entrusted with the entire "technical" side of the fabrication of the case "on the military-fascist conspiracy in t

At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Yezhov condemned the "vicious methods" of the leadership of the NKVD Yagoda and exposed the "treason" in the GUGB - the connection of the Chekist G. A. Molchanov **with** the "Trotskyists * and the" group of Polish spies "with I. And. Sosnovsky headed 1®. At the same time, Yezhov noted the "help" in the fight against outrages in the NKVD, provided to him by the Chekists S.F. Redens, A.R. Stromin-Stroev and others. It is noteworthy that at the Plenum, Yevdokimov and Zakovsky made especially violent attacks on Yagoda, expressing the objective desire of the Chekists of their "groups" to purge the NKVD of "Yagoda's

people"¹¹. In March-April 1937, following Yagoda, the arrests mainly affected his personal supporters (who had been nominated by him in the OGPU since 1924) - P. P. Bulanov, G. E. Prokofiev, M. Ya. Gai, I. I. Ostrovsky and others. The decisive role in the nomination of the Chekists of the "North Caucasian group" in the elimination of the "leading core of the anti-Soviet conspiracy in the NKVD system" was played by the appointment in April 1937 of the first deputy of Yezhov and the head of the GUGB M. P. Frinovsky. From that moment on, the network of arrests becomes much wider. In April-May 1937, the remaining employees of the central apparatus were arrested: K. V. Pauker, A. M. Shchanin, G. I. Boki, L. G. Mironov, A. X. Artuzov, G. I. Blagonravov. At

the same time, in the spring and summer of 1937, for "espionage" and "participation" in the "Polish military organization" were repressed

Chekists-Poles and employees of units engaged in work in Poland: head of the UNKVD for the Saratov region R. A. Pillar, security officers S. V. Puzitsky, F. D. Medved, S. G. Firin-Pupko, E. I. Seykevich, G. I. Brzhozovsky, Yu. I. Makovsky, S. I. Chatsky, former Chekists - S. A. Formeister, I. I.

Grodis, Ya. K. Olsky-Kulikov-sky, S. A. Messing .

According to a similar "national-political line", allegedly "for participation in the Latvian fascist organizations" and "espionage", the arrests of the Latvian Chekists were carried out - I.P. Zirnis (Irkutsk), V.A. Styrne (Kiev), R.I. Austrina (Kirov), I. A. Zalpeter, G. P. Matson. In the

summer-autumn of 1937, the leaders of the NKVD organs at the republican and regional levels were arrested and subjected to repressions: XX Mugdusi (Armenia), Yu. L. Zverev (Turkmenistan), Ya. S. Agranov (Saratov), T. D. Deribas and V. A. Balitsky (Far East), I. F. Reshetov (Sverdlovsk), A. B. Rozanov (Voronezh), V. R. Dombrovsky (Kalinin), B. A. Bak (Arkhangelsk), N. M. Raysky- Lekhtman (Orenburg), I. M. Blat (Chelyabinsk), P. G. Rud (Tatar Republic), K. I. Lordkipanidze (Crimea) and others. The bodies of the NKVD of Ukraine were subjected to a particularly severe pogrom. The "renegade" Leplevsky appointed here, with the support of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U Kosior, subjected to the total extermination of the party cadres of Postyshev and the Chekists of the "Balitsky group" (see above). Balitsky and his Ukrainian Chekists were accused of creating a "conspiracy in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR", organizationally adjoining the "cons

The arrangement of personnel in the GUGB headed by M.P. Frinovsky in December 1937 is interesting, when all "spies and traitors of the Chekists were basically arrested and destroyed, and their "fighters" were awarded and exalted by Yezhov. Four (non-operational) of the 12 departments of the GUGB were headed by Yezhov's former party apparatchiks - M. I. Litvin, V. E. Tsesarsky, I. I. Shapiro and S. B. Zhukovsky. Two departments were "received" by security officers of the "Zakovsky group" from Leningrad - M. A. Volkov-Weiner and A. K. Zalpeter, and Rogov became the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. Four more departments changed their leaders to Chekists from the "North Caucasian group" - I. Ya.

and Ya. M. Weinshtok. At the head of the territorial bodies of the NKVD stood the Chekists, who were not part of any of the dominant groups, but personally marked by Yezhov: B. D. Berman (Belarus), D. 3. Apresyan (Uzbekistan), G. S. Lyushkov (Far East), D. M. Dmitriev (Sverdlovsk), A. R. Stro-min-Stroev (Saratov).

In addition to Leningrad (L. M. Zakovsky), members of his "group" took control of a part of the local bodies of the NKVD: P. A. Korkin (Voronezh), S. G. Zhupakhin (Vologda), G. A. Lupekin (Irkutsk), To J. Tenison (Karelia).

Members of the "Moscow group" of S. F. Redens also headed **a number of** local NKVD bodies: A. P. Radzivilovskiy (**Ivanovo**), A. I. Uspenskiy (Orenburg), A. A. Nasedkin (**Smolensk**), P. Sh. Simanovsky (Kursk), S. I. Lebedev (**Tula**), **etc.** The "**lion's**

share" of such appointments was received by the Chekists of the Evdokimov-Frinovsky "group": V. V. Khvorostyan (Armenia), I. Ya. Lavrushin (Gorky), Ya. A. Deich (Rostov-on-Don), A. I. Mikhelson (Crimea), M. G. Raev-Kaminsky (**Stalingrad**), G. F. Gorbach (Novosibirsk), etc., more than 15 in total regional and regional offices. By the end of

1937, the decline in repressed Chekists was **so great** that Frinovsky was forced to patch up "personnel **holes**" at the expense of his Chekists-border guards: N. N. **Fedorov** (Odessa), S. Ya. Vershinin (Ryazan), I. P. Lotsmanov (**Kyrgyzstan**), V. A. Tkachev (Buryato Mongolia), etc. In January 1938,

after the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the Cheka-NKVD, pressure was exerted on Yezhov from above in order to weaken the wave of mass **terror**. According to Malenkov's report, on January 14, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a resolution was adopted "On the mistakes of party organizations in the exclusion of communists from the party ...", which created at least some restriction on terror. Under these conditions, Yezhov had to sacrifice the

most odious figures from the local "exaggerated" Chekists. In January, People's Commissar Lepelevsky was recalled from Ukraine and **appointed** head of a secondary department of the GUGB, and **Redens** was removed from Moscow to "honorable exile" by the People's Commissar of the NKVD of Kazakhstan. In addition, two major **Chekists** **were arrested - and**, it is significant, both in the North Caucasus: **the heads of the U**

A. Deutsch. The arrest of the latter, apparently, resulted in the removal of the first secretary of the Rostov Regional Committee, A. G. Evdokimov, who **was transferred** in May to economic work.

In April 1938, Leplevsky was arrested in Moscow as a member of the "anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist organization" and the leader (second!) of the "conspiracy in the NKVD of Ukraine." In Moscow and Kiev, his closest associates, Bluman, Gerzon, Karelin, Dzhirin, and Insarov, were captured as "accomplices . " At the same time, Yezhov's deputy and the new head of the Moscow NKVD, Zakovsky, and his Chekists (Zalpeter, **Ga-Rin**, Tenison) were unexpectedly removed from operational work and sent to manage construction in the Gulag, where they were soon arrested. Since the April appointment of

Yezhov as People's Commissar for Water Transport, a hidden "erosion" of the Chekist apparatus of the 1937 model begins through a nomenclature personnel solitaire. So, from work in the NKVD, its proven Chekist cadres are removed and sent to the People's Commissariat for Transport: Ya. M. Veinshtok, A. I. Mikhelson, R. A. Listengurt. In May 1938, the disgraced E. G. Evdokimov also ended up there. Chekists L. N. Volsky and M. A. Volkov-Weiner are transferred to work in the NKPS, A. M. Minaev-Tsikanovskiy is transferred to the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry, S. N. Mironov-Korol is

transferred to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In May 1938, a major scandal erupted in connection with the suicide of the new head of the UNKVD for the Moscow region, L. N. Velsky's "protégé" - V. A. Karutsky'⁴ . The metropolitan administration itself at that time existed in an atmosphere of uncertainty and "leapfrog" management: in 1938, six chiefs were replaced in it. An experienced functionary Yezhov feels that he is losing control over people and apparatus. In June 1938, he started the reorganization of the structure of the NKVD, completed in September by Beria. In June-September 1938, individual arrests of Chekists from among the "extortioners" of terror and compromised by ties with them continued. Thus D. M. Dmitriev, A. P. Radzivilovskii, B. D. Berman, and Z. M. Ushakov-Kshimirskii were arrested.

On June 13, 1938, one of the "peregivers" (in Moscow they could still remember his connections with Balitsky and Molchanov), the head of the UNKVD for the Far Eastern Territory G.S. Lyushkov, having received a call from Moscow, preferred to cross the Soviet-Chinese border and surrender

Japanese occupation authorities. Lyushkov's "leaving" for the cordon was a strong blow to the reputation of the "iron people's

commissar"¹⁵. In August 1938, L.P. Beria was appointed Yezhov's first deputy. Such a deputy in the rank, the only one in the Union, of the 1st rank commissar of state security and with the party status of a member of the Central Committee became Yezhov's clear and imminent successor. In September, Frinovsky was dismissed from the NKVD and appointed People's Commissar of the Navy. With his replacement of Beria as head of the GUGB and the arrival of the Transcaucasian Chekists - Merkulov, Kobulov, Dekanozov and others, in November 1938, an "epidemic" of arrests of the Chekists of the "North Caucasian group" remaining in the central apparatus and Yezhov's party nominees began. This was

preceded by some kind of scandal (inflated, apparently, already ^{1m} by Beria himself) in the department (security department) of the GUGB, in the center of which was

its chief, I. Ya. Dagin¹⁶. The well-known role of the "God from the Machine" in the fall of Yezhov was played by the head of the UNKVD for the Ivanovo region, V.P. Zhuravlev. The latter's statement was discussed on November 19, 1938 at a meeting of the Politburo, after which Yezhov was forced to resign.

Working in September 1937 - February 1938 in Kuibyshev, Zhuravlev sent "signals" to Moscow against the "disgraced" P. P. Postyshev, who was appointed secretary of the Kuibyshev regional committee. His "signals" got to the then head of the SPO GUGB M.I. Litvin and were invariably "extinguished".

This led to the conclusion that he, who knew Postyshev closely from joint work in the Far East and Ukraine, was covering for the "enemy of the people"¹⁷. Summoned to Moscow for trial, Litvin shot himself on November 12 in his apartment in Leningrad. We add that Zhuravlev's "timely" actions were duly appreciated by Beria: in December 1938, he was appointed head of the UNKVD for the Moscow Region. In the November arrests

that followed, A. M. Minaev-Tsikanovsky, I. Ya. Dagin, N. N. Fedorov, S. F. Redens, I. P. Popashenko, A. S. Zhurbenko, I. I. Sha-pirikh, V. E. Tsesarsky, S. B. Zhukovsky and E. G. Evdokimov. On November 14, People's Commissar of the

NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR A.I. Uspensky, simulating suicide, secretly fled from Kyiv and remained on the illegal

position until his detention at the Miass station in April 1939¹⁸. Meanwhile, in Moscow,

Beria began an investigation into another grandiose "conspiracy in the NKVD system" led by Yezhov, Frinovsky and Evdokimov. Their main accomplice was the Chekists of the "North Caucasian group", the "Moscow group" of Redens and Yezhov's party nominees in the NKVD. The arrests in 1939 of M.P. Frinovsky, N.I. Yezhov, L.N. Velsky, M.A.

Volkov-Vainer, N.G. " which became unnecessary "laborers" of mass terror of 1936-1938 and a sign of the transition to Beria's "liberalization".

Thus, against the general background of mass political repressions in 1936-1938, the following chronology of repressive campaigns in the NKVD system of the USSR itself can be distinguished:

- November 1936 - April 1937 - Yezhov's repressions directed against the Chekists of the central apparatus from Yagoda's personal environment; - April-June 1937 - Yezhov

- completely purges the central apparatus of the NKVD from the personnel layer of Dzerzha Chekists] 1sky-Yagoda; - June-December 1937 - Yezhov's repressions in the NKVD bodies of the union and autonomous republics, territories and regions; the destruction of the Chekists of the "Ukrainian group" of Balitsky; - January-April 1938 - limited

- repression of the Yezhovites Chekists for "excesses" of terror in the localities; the liquidation of the Chekists of the "Leningrad group" of Zakovsky and the Leplevsky group;

- April-September 1938 - repressions of "exaggerators" of terror in the field and associated employees of the central apparatus of the NKVD; hidden rotational "erosion" of Yezhov's KGB cadres; - September-December 1938 - Beria's

- repressions against the Yezhov Chekists of the "North Caucasian", "Moscow" groups and party nominees in the NKVD in the center and in the field;

- 1939 - the end of Beria's purge of the NKVD from Yezhov's cadres.

¹ Questions of history. 1994. No. 10. P. 20.

² Moscow news. 1994. No. 5. January 30-February 6. S. 76.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In the work on personalities, archival service records were used.

cards of the Personnel Department of the FSB of the Russian Federation, archival personal files and service cards of the regional departments of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (Omsk, Moscow, Irkutsk, St. Petersburg, Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Khabarovsk and etc.); materials provided by the KNB of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs Republic of Uzbekistan and the security services of Ukraine.

⁵ Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Omsk region. Archival personal file No. 189733 Evdokimov E. G. RTSKHIDNI. Registration form M 1872034 sample 1936 for a member of the CPSU (b) Frinovsky M. P.

⁶ Our past. Kyiv, 1993. S. 42-43. Help on Archival investigative case M 612517 on charges of Balitsky V.A. Personnel department of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Archive service card on Balitsky V.A.

⁷ Our past. Kyiv, 1993. S. 53. Complaint to the military prosecutor Kyiv Military District from Gudz G. G. dated January 26, 1956

⁸ Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Omsk region. Archival personal file M 305235 (8643) to L. M. Zakovsky

h Department of Personnel of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Archive service card on Redensa S. F.

1» Questions of history. 1994. No. 10. S. 25-27.

and **questions of history. 1994. No. 12. S. 10-14. 1995. No. 2. S. 3-8.**

12 Our past, Kyiv, 1993, pp. 42-42. Help on archival investigation case K 612517 on charges of Balitsky V.A. and our past. Kyiv, 1993. S. 55-59. Overview help for archival-investigative case No. 967454 on charges of Leplevsky I. M.

¹⁴ Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Moscow Region. Archive service card for Karutsky V.A.

¹⁵ Personnel **department** of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Archive service card **on Lyushkova G.S.**

¹⁶ Historical archive. 1992. No. 1. S. 61-63.

¹⁷ **There.**

¹⁸ Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. Archival investigation file No. 14770 on charges of Uspensky A. I. T. 1. S. 3-5.

REPORT TO THE REICHSFUEHRER SS AND CHEF OF THE GERMAN POLICE

The corrupting activity of the Communist **International**, which was carried out until the conclusion of the German-Soviet non- aggression pact on August 23, 1939, in **relation to** the Axis countries, especially against National Socialist Germany, was widely known.

The hopes that after the conclusion of the pact the Soviet **Union** would, in accordance with the articles of the treaty, pursue **a loyal** policy and stop subversive work against **the Reich**, **did not** come true. On the contrary: ideological decay, **sabotage and** terror, as well as the extremely intensive development **of the activities** of military, political and economic intelligence, were still the goals of the Soviet rulers. The only thing that has changed is the methods that allow Russian

intelligence to use more advanced and **sophisticated** forms to

completing new tasks.

1. STRUCTURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE COMINTERN

The Communist International (Comintern) is an organization created by Soviet Russia, headquartered in Moscow. Paragraph 1 of the Charter of the Comintern speaks of its goals: "To unite the communist parties of all countries **into** a single world party, to fight to win over the working class, as well as for the principles of communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat." Until now, the members of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern are: Stalin, as the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Molotov, the German emigrant Pick, representing the German section of the Comintern, the leader of the French Communists Torez and the famous Bulgarian terrorist Dimitrov, chairman of the Presidium of the ECCI, known for the Leipzig trials.

For the administrative apparatus of the USSR, the Comintern is an unofficial institution that can be used for any subversive activities on an international scale. Along

with special intelligence services, the Comintern is also used to carry out such special tasks abroad, so that in the fight against these services it is difficult to distinguish one from the other.

The subversive work of the Comintern intensified during the war due to the use of large material and human resources. Appeals and directives from individual national sections of the Comintern were distributed throughout Europe, pursuing one goal - to call on adherents of the communist ideology to intense and prolonged subversive work against Germany, which was waging an "imperialist war", and the intentions of the Soviet Union to change the situation in their favor played an important role. resulting from the non-aggression pact.

2. NEW METHODS OF ILLEGAL SUBVERSION WORK a. against the Reich.

As a result of the merciless struggle against the Communist Party since 1933, which led to its destruction, as a result of the uncompromising positions of National Socialism, in the period before the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, all the efforts of the Comintern made from abroad, as well as the activities of small police-controlled remnants of the Communist Party inside the country, organized in the so-called AM and BB groups (AM - military policy, BB - industrial espionage), were in vain.

To intensify the fight against its agents, the Comintern began to methodically send out directives on the conduct of more refined subversive work. Guided by the example of

the "Trojan horse", **the Comintern** intensified its activities after the **Spanish Civil War**, which presented classic examples of such **an ode to activity**. As a result of the pact of August 23, 1939, **this activity** lost all propagandistic sound, **to which the Executive Committee** of the Comintern took new, more **energetic steps** to resume the activities of its **all-embracing AM and BB apparatus**. While **in the occupied** regions the work of the Comintern was facilitated by the fact that there are still strong intelligence organizations of the communist parties there, **all** of its

attempts to subvert the Reich never produced tangible **results**.

As a result of continuous surveillance, it was established that **in** the European countries the Comintern had again created a strong network **of its** agents and expanded its ties, setting itself the sole goal of intensifying subversive and intelligence activities against Germany. The main

communications center is in Stockholm, supported by the Swedish Communist Party. This is one **of the most** dangerous centers of activity of the Comintern. An idea of the methods of his work is given by the material presented below. **For** work

against the Reich, first of all, former leading functionaries of the German Communist Party, who had been studying in Moscow and other European cities **for a long** time, were used. They were first thrown into the Reich in 1939. One **of the most** clever managed to establish contacts with his old party **comrades** in Berlin **and**, thanks to systematic work, re-establish the production cells of the KKE in large Berlin enterprises fulfilling important defense **orders**. **The purpose** of this enterprise was to corrupt **the personnel**, incite them to sabotage and sabotage, as well as **conduct** industrial espionage. With the help of skillfully equipped courier wagons, Comintern instructors transported material, **instructions** and money to Berlin from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The leading role in the leadership of this **organization**, which expanded threateningly, was played by Linderöth, **a member of** the Swedish Parliament, who was the **representative of** the European Bureau of the Comintern in Stockholm. In particular, he carried out those instructions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern that concerned individual countries. From Stockholm, Linderöth directed the activities of the Commissioners of the Comintern in Copenhagen, providing them with financial support. KKE functionaries who moved to Germany, such as Artur Emmerlich, b. September 20, 1907 in Neuerwiese, Willy Gall, b. October 3, 1908 in Falkenstein/Vogtland, Rudolf Hallmeier, b. February 3, 1908 in Plauen, Heinrich Schmeer, b. On March 20, 1906, in order to protect themselves from the security police (SD), under the guidance of emissaries of Linderöth, they got acquainted with the methods of the police fight against espionage. Training was excellent

we know Dmitry Fedoseevich Krylov, the commissar of the GPU, which since February 3, 1941 has been included in the joint people's commissariat of internal affairs under the name "People's Commissariat of State Security". The organization created

by the above functionaries carried out its activities, maintaining contact with Moscow through Hamburg (where a reliable turnout was equipped), Copenhagen and Stockholm. Its purpose was to obtain data on the production of the latest types of weapons in Germany. In addition to these tasks, the organization was

also engaged in the production of subversive leaflets. From the last order of the Comintern, received at the end of May 1941 by Emerlich from Moscow, it is clear that in the next two months it was planned to train and transfer a large number of new instructors assigned to individual Gau (regions. - Per.) **Reich**.

Since the mere surveillance of the activities of the constantly crushing organization was not enough to prevent real damage, at the end of May we promptly moved to active measures and arrested all members of the organization. b. Against the areas occupied by

Germany. Methods of illegal work carried out by the Comintern in areas occupied by Germany are similar to those listed above.

The following should be emphasized: In

the protectorate. Already before the occupation of the former Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party launched a lively activity, the results of which, however, showed themselves only after the creation of the protectorate, with the transition of the party to an illegal position. In recent years, many party functionaries have been sent from this region to Moscow to study the theory and practice of military affairs and sabotage warfare.

After the establishment of the protectorate, these qualified personnel were thrown into practical work. They immediately

Litelyu began to recreate and expand the illegal organizations of the Communist Party of Germany. Communication with the Comintern, control and management of party work were maintained and carried out through the Consulate General of the USSR in Prague. The liaison officer of the Soviet Consulate General was a TASS correspondent and a press officer

Soviet consulate Kurt Besr (Jew!). He received from diplomatic representative offices Russian newspapers And communist propaganda material, which he, in accordance with the instructions, passed on to the leading workers of the KKE. In addition, huge sums came through him to finance illegal party work. In addition to communication through the Soviet consulate, there was also a direct radio link between the agents of the Comintern and Moscow in the protectorate. The party workers who were instructed to head this secret radio station of the Comintern were also trained in Moscow at the radio school. (This school is under the control of the Comintern and is guarded by units of the Red Army.) The curriculum of this school is carried out on the broadest basis and bears the code name "Ome", that is, the Organization of the International Connection.

The radio station in Prague, which operated until very recently, was equipped with powerful receiving and transmitting installations. Messages were broadcast from Prague on the general internal political situation, on the preparation and conduct of operations organized by the party, on meetings of the party leadership and the decisions made at them, as well as on the state, moods and activities of the party, and orders and directives of the Executive Committee of the Comintern were received from Moscow. Bilateral radio communications are exhaustive proof of the irreconcilability of the revolutionary ideas of the Comintern aimed at destroying the occupied part of France.

national socialism V

The Comintern also pays special attention to the French Communist Party, especially since, from the point of view of Lenin, France should become a bastion of Bolshevism in Western Europe. In the conditions of the split and internal weakness of France, the Communist International, which had numerous supporters in that country before the war, hopes to succeed. And here it was thoroughly established that the Communists in France receive money and propaganda material through the diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union of all ranks and types.

And here the pact of August 23, 1939 played no role, except perhaps the fact that from that day on the activity of the French communists in their struggle against Germany increased. The most convincing and at the same time the most objective proof of this is the act of the *surte nacional* (of the French secret police) discovered during a search in Paris concerning the French daily newspaper *L'Orsze*. As is clear from the authentic documents of the French police, the Czech Jew Otto Katz, aka Karl Simon, who is in the service of the Soviets. In November 1939, the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Suritz, together with the former minister of the Spanish republican government, Ne Green, and in January and February 1940, together with the secretary of the embassy, Biryukov, visited the editor-in-chief of the *Vige* newspaper at his villa in Saint-Cloud. During these meetings, an agreement was reached that the notorious Etevnnon, as an official representative of the Soviet embassy, would work on the editorial board of *L'Orge*. At the end of March, financial support provided for these purposes amounted to 800 thousand francs. After the dissolution of the French Communist Party, the leaders of the French Communist Party were ordered to circulate among their adherents a directive requiring them to read the newspaper *L'Orszere* as trustworthy and hostile to the Germans. in other occupied areas. In Norway, the Soviet mission in Oslo is also the center of the subversive propaganda of the Comintern. Here they managed to catch the embassy staff red-handed at the crime scene.

Holland, Belgium, former Yugoslavia
the use of the same methods of subversive work against the Reich.

Compressed*; the scope of this brief report does not allow us to give in full the testimony of witnesses and documents about the subversive and espionage work of the Comintern.

It remains to emphasize the fact that the attitude of **the Soviet** Union towards the Reich and the areas occupied by it is insincere and the subversive work of the Comintern after 1940 **began** to expand at a feverish pace.

SUBVERSION WORK OF THE COMINTERN

Even a decade before the start of the war, the Comintern began to send tested communists from all its sections to Soviet Russia, where they were trained in special schools to conduct sabotage work and the technique of subversive work. Beginning in 1930, the so-called military-political courses were reopened in Moscow, the activities of which have not ceased to this day. Since the Comintern, in pursuing its political goals, constantly had to take into account the possibility of a military clash, in the directives of the congresses it called on its adherents to commit acts of sabotage and terror, justifying these crimes with political necessity. The fact that on the territory of the Reich the forces of the security police

(SD) discovered many terrorist and sabotage groups created by order of the Comintern is indicative of the position taken by the Soviet Union in relation to the Reich. The preparation of acts of sabotage against objects of military importance, bridges, the explosions of important sections of the railway, the destruction and shutdown of important industrial enterprises and installations were the goals of these groups, which consisted entirely of communists who did not stop in carrying out their tasks and before killing. In addition to tasks related to the commission of acts of sabotage, members of the groups also received instructions to commit attempts on the leaders of the Reich.

Although it could be expected that the series of these crimes committed or being prepared by the Comintern would cease after the signing of the non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939, however, as a result of extensive investigations carried out especially in the territories occupied by Germany, evidence was obtained that the Comintern did not **intend** to stop their criminal activities against the Reich. Along with groups created by the British and

carrying out sabotage on ships, the purpose of which was to destroy the German fleet in peacetime, there was an even more extensive terrorist organization under the auspices of the Comintern, whose task

consisted mainly in the destruction of the ships of those states that are members of the anti-Comintern bloc.

According to reliable information, it is known that until the end of 1940, this organization acted, trying to penetrate from the territory of Denmark into the Reich. The head of this organization was a German emigrant Ernst Wollweber, who in 1931 **was** a member of the leadership of the Russian Geographical Society (Red Trade Union Opposition), and in November 1932 was elected a member of the Reichstag from the KPD. Having emigrated to Copenhagen, Wollweber in 1933 **headed** the leadership of the ISH (International of Sailors and Port Workers. - **Per**), which, being an international professional organization of sailors and port **workers**, carries out **acts** of sabotage on behalf of the Comintern, mainly against the German merchant fleet. **He** bears the main responsibility for the organization and activities of sabotage groups created at the direction of Moscow in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, **Belgium**, France and the Baltic states. Wollweber also **supervised** the acquisition and transportation of explosives, having, in addition, funds generously provided by the Comintern to finance **the organization** and pay agents. After the German troops entered Oslo in May 1940, Wollweber fled to Sweden, where he is **still** imprisoned in Stockholm. The Soviet government asked the Swedish government to allow Wollweber to travel to the Soviet Union, granting him Soviet citizenship for his successful work in the interests of the Comintern. As a result of the activities of these terrorist groups, spread throughout Europe, sabotage was committed against 16 German, 3 Italian, 2 Japanese ships, two of which were completely destroyed. At first, the saboteurs tried to set fire to the ships, but later changed their tactics, since the fire did not completely destroy them, and began to use explosives against ships cruising in the Baltic and North Seas. The largest strongholds of saboteurs are located in the ports of Hamburg, **Bremen**, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, **Reval** and Riga.

The communist sabotage groups created in Holland, Belgium and France were under the leadership of the Dutch communist Josef Rimbartus Schaap, who

he headed the interclub in Rotterdam and maintained close ties with the leaders of the entire organization. He was directly subordinated to the former head of the Hamburg organization of the Red Trade Union Opposition, Karl Bargstadt, who was in charge of the technical side of acts of sabotage. The explosives needed to carry out acts **of sabotage** were mined from mines in the north of Scandinavia and supplied to communist sabotage groups **in** Holland, Belgium and France with the help of Dutch **sailors** through the Norwegian port of Narvik and the Swedish port **of Lulea**. In Rotterdam, one of the most prominent **transporters** of explosives, the Dutch communist Willem van **Vreeswijk**, was arrested .

Both Dutch and Belgian groups had **laboratories** in which they made incendiary **and explosive** bombs. These groups carried out acts of sabotage on **the Italian** steamer Boccaccio **and** the Japanese steamer Kashi-maru. Sabotage on German ships in the ports of Amsterdam **and Rotterdam** was prevented in time. In the course of further searches by the

Security Police (SD), 24 kommas were arrested! sta-terrorists, among whom are also the head of the Dutch sabotage group Achilles Begwin and the head of the Belgian sabotage group Alfons Fistles.

The Danish police managed to arrest Schaap himself on August 1, 1940 in Copenhagen, where he intended to resume the activities of the Danish sabotage organization.

How stubbornly the Comintern seeks to strike devastating blows against the German merchant fleet and in the Baltic Sea is evident from the fact that from February to April 1941, the Security Police (SD), together with the Danish police, managed to arrest the leaders of the Communist Party of Denmark, who actively supported the activities communist subversive groups. Among those arrested were, in particular, Richard Jensen, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Denmark and General Secretary of the International Union of Sailors and Port Workers; Melchior.

The work of communist sabotage groups in Denmark is, in particular, sabotage on the German steamer "Saar" in the port of Reval and on the German steamer "Fila" in the port of Koenigsberg, as a result of which a hole appeared on the steamer "Fila" in the bow of the side at the waterline level. The chemical remote fuses were brought on board the ship in the port of Riga.

Explosives and fuses used by the Danish communist organization were delivered from A. Sudoplatov - 1417 Sweden.

They were

transported by a special courier from the men's clothing store in Malmö, where they were stored, to Copenhagen.

The most important information about the activities of the Comintern against Germany was also obtained from the testimony of other communist terrorists in Denmark. For example, the Comintern attached particular importance to the recruitment of Scandinavian sailors and their involvement in subversive work, since the Comintern believed that in a future war only the Scandinavian countries would remain neutral, as a result of which only citizens of these states would have the opportunity to commit terrorist acts in German ports and on German courts. In addition, the Comintern strongly insisted that the Scandinavians destroy their own cargoes by setting them on fire or blowing them up if this would serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Wollweber himself ordered individual sabotage groups in the Baltic states and German ports of the North Sea to recruit on all ships plying in the area at least one reliable person who would be best prepared to fulfill the tasks of the Third International in the future.

On his orders, an attempt was also made to organize a sabotage group in Danzig.

The leading officials of the International of Sailors and Port Workers who were part of these groups, among whom was a native of Oslo, a Norwegian citizen Arthur Samsing, who had lived in the Soviet Union for a long time, were arrested and gave detailed testimonies about the terrorist and sabotage acts committed by them against the Reich on Wollweber's task. On behalf of the Comintern, Wollweber created strongholds on

Baltic Sea islands Dago and Ezele. The employees recruited on these islands were to begin to act only if, during the course of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, German troops or the navy took possession of the islands. First of all, it was planned to carry out sabotage at submarine bases, airfields and fuel depots. How vigorous were the attempts of the Bolsheviks to develop their activities on the territory

of the Reich itself, is clear from the fact that since March 1941 the Security Police (SD) managed to establish as a result of investigations in Silesia and the General Government (most of the former Poland. - Transl.) that Polish sabotage and terrorist organizations were led in most cases by communes

sgic elements. Here, too, the organization of the crimes committed in recent times bears characteristic features typical of the methods of the Communists, set forth in the "**military** theses" of the 6th and 7th Congresses of the Comintern and **sent** to all sections. SOVIET

ESPIONAGE AGAINST REICH
(ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE)

1. The methods used by the GPU against German settlers nationality. When,

after the signing of the Russo-German border treaty of September 29, 1939, Russia managed to take advantage of the German victories over Poland by annexing significant territories, it used the delimitation of the spheres of interests of Germany and Russia in order to turn the newly emerged land border with the All-German Reich into a gateway for countless spies sent into the territory of their non-aggression pact partner.

The generosity of the Fuhrer, who allowed **the Germans** living on Russian territory to return to their homeland , was most vilely used for the above purposes.

When the Volksdeutsch, following the call of the Fuhrer, began to gather in masses on the road, the notorious GPU - which from February 3, 1941 became an integral part of the united People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, called the "People's Commissariat for State Security" - began to implement

his plan, which was to draw many of the settlers, using the most illegal means, into espionage activities against the country to which they returned, driven by love for their homeland. Although the GPU was practically not successful in this, since most of the forcibly recruited, returning to Germany, immediately reported on the assignments received, nevertheless, this fact in itself remains a shameful testament to the methods of the GPU and the Soviet rulers. The settlers in Germany were summoned to the

GPU, interrogated for hours, threatening not to let them go abroad if they did not agree to cooperate with the GPU. The following method was also widely used - the settlers were told that the remaining members of their families would be dealt with in the most severe way, they would be treated as hostages if the settler did not fulfill his forced obligations or dared to inform the German authorities about his assignment. They were also threatened, saying that the long arm of the GPU would get them in Germany too, a threat that had an effect on some of the weak-minded settlers. Not only men, but also women were forced to make commitments in such an inhuman way. Below I would like to give a few examples of how hundreds of Germans were treated when they returned to their homeland.

a) During the resettlement of Bessarabian Germans, a certain Maria Baumann from Chernivtsi was discovered, who reported that Russian intelligence wanted to force her to conduct intelligence work in Germany. She was repeatedly summoned to the GPU, where they tried in every possible way to force her to work for Russian intelligence. Since she has five children who do not have sufficient support (she is a widow), they promised her a high salary, saying that they could pay her 10 thousand rubles and even more. She was sent to spy work in Prague. She carried with her documents confirming that she had undergone special

training. b) Elisabeth Kroitel, whose husband had a bandaging shop in Chernivtsi, was also subjected to pressure from the GPU, where she went to get her exit passport. She was assigned to conduct intelligence work in Saxony. It was also provided with materials covering the activities of German intelligence and giving recommendations on how to combat it.

These two examples could be supplemented by hundreds of others, for it has been established that the GPU, even according to conservative estimates, tried to recruit about 50 percent of all migrants, forcing them to agree to cooperation by threats or promises.

But the GPU not only tried to make these Germans, using the most disgusting methods, traitors to their homeland, in many cases it even managed to rob these people, steal their identity cards, money and valuables. In sixteen cases we have evidence that the documents were stolen in order to hand them over to Russian agents. In another six cases, there is a strong suspicion that the GPU killed settlers in order to use their documents to quietly transfer their agents to the Reich. **2. Soviet diplomatic missions as centers of economic, political and military espionage against the Reich in order to prepare for war.**

After the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, Russian intelligence expanded its arsenal of methods. Without abandoning its usual brutal methods, it began to increasingly use the Russian missions accredited in the Reich - the leading role here belongs to the Russian embassy in Berlin - for intelligence purposes. The recall of the Soviet ambassador Shkvartsev and the appointment of Dekanozov to this post were a signal for the all-out intensification of espionage activities by collecting political, economic and military information. Dekanozov, a confidant of Stalin, in Russia was in charge of the information department of the NKVD (Russian People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), which includes the GPU as its task, a special intelligence department. formulated in to gain access to the highest authorities of the Reich Moscow, was through an ever-expanding network of trusted persons and, first of all, to obtain information about the military power and operational plans of the Reich. Dekanozov's faithful assistant was an employee of the GPU, the so-called "embassy adviser" Kobulov, who launched intensive espionage activities, shamelessly using his diplomatic immunity. Russian spies in the Reich sought to obtain, along with purely political information, information and

about the political plans of the Reich, and also planned to create a network of secret radio stations throughout Germany that would transmit to Russia all important information encrypted in a complex cipher. Thus, since 1940, extensive preparations were made for intelligence work, for which unimaginable sums were spent. (German counterintelligence was able to take the necessary measures in time.) Knowing that Russian intelligence launched

a particularly intensive activity in the eastern German regions - primarily in the general government and protectorate (former Poland and the Czech Republic. - Per), we were forced to pay **increased** attention precisely these areas. It was established that an employee of the Russian Consulate General in Prague, Leonid Mokhov, is the head of a Russian spy organization created by the GPU in the protectorate. Russian intelligence recruited former soldiers of the Czech Legion who fought during the war between Germany and Poland on the Polish side and in most cases were members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who after the defeat of Poland were captured by the Russians. First of all, they were trained in radio work. These people were sent to the protectorate, provided with forged documents, where they acted under the leadership of the mentioned employee of the Russian consulate, Leonid Mokhov. After the intervention of our police, more than 60 Russian agents were arrested, and a dozen underground radio transmitters were confiscated. (Note: This spy organization operated completely independently of the underground organizations operating in the protectorate under the leadership of the Comintern.)

In Berlin, meanwhile, an adviser to the Russian embassy and an employee of the GPU, Kobulov, was also not inactive. It is interesting to read the statement of the former Yugoslav diplomat, military attache in Berlin, Colonel Vauhnik, who can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the Germans; he declared that Colonel Korniyakov, assistant to the Russian military attache in Berlin, was engaged exclusively in intelligence, spending as much money on it as he seemed necessary. The goal of the leadership of Russian spies, which included, in addition to Kobulov, the military attache Tupkov with his assistant Skonyakov, was to create in the capital and in all major

cities of the Greater German Reich, a network of underground radio stations for the transmission of

intelligence messages. From all the extensive material covering the activities of these gentlemen and their accomplices, it seems possible to give only two examples:

a) Witold Pakulat, a baker from Mariampol in Lithuania, a former member of the German Kulturbund in Lithuania, who had relatives in the Reich, primarily in Berlin, was once summoned to Kovno by the GPU. Here they began to threaten him, promising to put him on trial for espionage activities. The fact that he was a member of the Kulturbund and traveled several times from Lithuania to Germany to visit his brother, who lives in Memel, was enough for the GPU to open a case against him on charges of espionage. The frightened man was promised to be released from punishment if he agreed, under the guise of a migrant, to make his way to Berlin and work there in accordance with instructions received from Russia. Leaving his wife and child, whom the GPU had detained as hostages, he went to Germany. They intimidated him, saying that the GPU had long arms, capable of reaching them even in Berlin, if he went on a betrayal. Despite this threat,

and despite the fact that his **relatives** were at the mercy of the GPU, this Volksdeutsch realized **his duty and** contacted the **Security Police (SD)** upon arrival in Germany. Thus it was possible to play a double game **with** the Russians, which they never figured out, due to **which all their** plans were confused and their activities were under our control from the very **beginning**. In Berlin, Pakulat **received** instructions and orders from the GPU's liaison officer, an employee **of the Russian** embassy. He was ordered to rent an apartment in Berlin, **in** which the GPU had equipped a large underground **radio station**. Then he was told to purchase a small hotel **with** a pub to use these premises for passing Russian couriers and agents. He was also ordered **to make** contacts with workers in the defense industry in order to obtain intelligence data. Russian intelligence conducted **its** work, taking into account the upcoming war, due to which, along with indicating targets for future bombing, it **also arranged** caches in public places to store **intelligence**

information and sabotage equipment in order to extract them from there **at the** right time.

In this case alone, Russian intelligence spent about **100,000** Reichsmarks. To set up an underground radio station, Russian intelligence recruited a German radio operator **from** Siemens through Pakulat. He was found for this role by the security police (SD), one of whose tasks was a double game **with** the Russians. Russian intelligence firmly believed that **Pakulat** had created a reliable intelligence network by recruiting sixty Germans who, in addition to performing espionage missions, would **also carry out** subversive work. The intelligence network, created according to **the rules** of the double shra, has expanded to Königsberg, where it is **at** the present time that work should begin on drawing defense enterprises on the city **plan** .

b) Another rumor of the shameless blackmail of a German, **a citizen** of the Reich, was discovered in Berlin. This German, **born** in St. Petersburg, whose name, for obvious reasons, cannot yet be named, after a second **stay** in Germany in 1936, returned permanently to Berlin. He left **his** wife in Russia . Their marriage was formalized according to **Russian** laws. From his marriage he had a daughter. Since, according to **Russian** law, his wife continued to be a Russian citizen, **he** was not allowed to take her with him to the Reich. While in **Berlin**, he tried with the help of the Ministry of Foreign **Affairs** to obtain the necessary documents for his Russian marriage to be recognized by a German court.

Since he suffered from a serious lung disease and, in connection with this, attached great importance to an early meeting with his family, he did not see any other way out in the current situation, how to go to St. Petersburg himself once again to obtain documents there and take his wife and daughter to Germany . To do this, he turned to the Russian travel agency Intourist, requesting the papers needed to enter Russia. When the head of this bureau, a Russian by the name of Shakhanov, understood from his stories that this sick man was extremely worried about the fate of his family, he began a game with him, striking in its meanness. Shakhanov promised him to arrange a trip to St. Petersburg on the condition that he would go to the betrayal of his homeland. Shakhanov relentlessly put pressure on the desperate man, bringing him to a state close to

suicide. Shakhanov constantly played on his marital and paternal feelings, hinting that his wife and daughter were held hostage in the hands of the GPU. In the end, the German informed our counterintelligence about everything. Following the instructions received, he apparently agreed with the proposals of the GPU agent Shakhanov and, on his orders, rented a large apartment, which was also used to equip an underground radio station. All this can be explained by the fact

that between Shakhanov and the "embassy adviser" Kobulov, a complete

understanding.

c) As a result of continuous monitoring of the radio operator from the Russian embassy in Berlin, who from time to time appeared in Danzig, it was also possible here - in the course of a double game - to create an underground radio station and a network of agents supplying political and economic information. And here, thanks to timely reports from the inhabitants of Danzig, the Formell brothers, forced by the GPU to work for Russian intelligence, the plans of the Russians were thwarted.

These examples can be continued, since Russian intelligence operates in all German cities of interest to it by the same methods.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The activities of the Soviet Union directed against National Socialist Germany, as the above examples prove, testify to the colossal scale of underground subversive work, sabotage, terror and espionage in order to prepare for a war being waged in the field of ECONOMIC POLITICS and defense.

After the conclusion of the non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939, the efforts made by the enemy not only did not weaken, but were carried out with even greater energy and on an even larger scale. Signature

Heydrich

Top secret, the 7th
department of the GUGB NKVD received the following intelligence
message from New York:

At a Cabinet meeting on January 29, 1937, Roosevelt announced that his talks with Runciman were preliminary; they may later lead to an agreement. Runciman emphasized that he had arrived as a special representative of the British Prime Minister Baldwin, but not on behalf of the Cabinet, and only upon his return did Baldwin inform the Council of Ministers of his final intentions. Roosevelt noted that in his negotiations, Runciman nevertheless frequently referred to the cabinet talks. The content of the main part of the negotiations was devoted to the question of US neutrality, for London expects war no later than 1938, and if it is not possible to receive war materials from the USA, then it is necessary to immediately start building large factories in England, France and Czechoslovakia. England is already building two large military factories, but this is not enough. Roosevelt told Runciman that America was making efforts to remain neutral for as long as possible.

If there is an armed conflict between democracy and fascism, America will do its duty. If the question is about the war that Germany or the USSR will cause, then she will take a different position and, at the insistence of Roosevelt, America will remain neutral. If the USSR is threatened by German, purely imperialist, i.e., territorial, aspirations, then the European states will have to intervene, and America will take their side.

In an Asian war, America will remain neutral as long as American interests are not directly affected. Japan's seizure of large Chinese territory without China's consent should be seen as a violation of American interests.

Runciman spoke in the sense that every attack by the fascists or their vassals on the USSR would be based on imperialist motives. Runciman declared that a European war could not be carried out without the moral and financial assistance of the United States. Runciman also raised the issue of Roosevelt's intervention in Spanish events, to which the latter replied that the government would only take a definite position on this issue if both sides in Spain refused to intervene or asked for cooperation in an arbitration court. The Cabinet knows that he

personally would like to support the supporters of the government; he never understood the behavior of France in this matter and fully recognizes the correctness of the position of the USSR. In the event of war, he will facilitate US intervention. In this case, he will approve the convening of a conference of powers in America or somewhere in

Europe. Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD, Major of State Security **{Shpigelglas}**

Right:

Beginning. 1st sector of the 7th department of the GUGB lieutenant of state security **(Grappen)**

FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE SNK OF THE USSR

dated August 28, 1939

We are told from Paris the following data of August 23 about Hitler's negotiations with the British: "Halifax and the British ambassador in Berlin have been invited to Hitler for important negotiations. They were instructed to agree to any negotiations, except for alleged concessions at the expense of Poland.

According to data from August 24, the French General Staff insists on immediately starting hostilities, believing that time is working for Germany. While England and France are losing prestige, Germany is receiving new reserves of raw materials and food at the expense of the USSR, and new concessions are useless. According to the

French ambassador in Moscow, the non-aggression pact only expresses the desire of the USSR to have freedom and independence from groups. On the contrary, Ambassador in Berlin Coulondre considers the pact the beginning of the economic and diplomatic rapprochement between Germany and the USSR, which can allegedly expand on the "ideological basis of anti-capitalism, self-determination of peoples, especially colonial ones, and other things." (Central archive of the FSB RF)

Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB NKVD received a brief text by telegraph document originating from the US State Department. *Dodd (U.S. Ambassador to Berlin) - Hull (Washington)*

TELEGRAM

No. 1639 January 8, 1937

Last week, Polish Prime Minister Beck gave a definite assurance that Poland had no agreement with the USSR allowing its troops and planes to pass through Polish territory in case of war. Confidential reports in the possession of the commander of the German ground forces, Fritsch, convince the leaders of the Reichswehr that Germany is not in danger from the USSR for a number of years and that the weapons of the USSR are intended not for offensive, but for defensive actions. In my opinion, Germany does not want war at this time. A person close to the Reichswehr claims that pro-Soviet sentiments

are growing in the army. Hitler and the radicals still hold the idea of the need for expansion to the East. Goering is inclined to take the side of Fritsch and Schacht. Von Hassel warns against too much confidence in Mussolini.

In the last conversation, von Nsirath told me that the American policy of isolation increases the military danger: if the US were the arbiter, Berlin would find it possible to comply.

Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD, Major of State Security (*Shpigelglas*) NK-8 is correct:

Beginning.

1st sector of the 7th division GUGB lieutenant of state security (*Grappen*)

Top secret **7th department**

of the NKVD GUGB

received a brief text by telegraph

document originating from the US State Department. No. 24 January 27, 1937 The British

Ambassador to the United States, Lindsay, in a conversation with Secretary of State Hull, declared that the British Government wished

use every occasion to keep the US government informed about developments in England and other parts of the world. Perhaps Mr. Hull is interested in the results of Eden's meeting with the French Foreign Minister Delbos, during which they drew up a joint general plan of action for determining the foreign policy of England and France in the near future. This plan is as follows: 1. A new attempt will be made to reach a full agreement

with Berlin. This was the aim of Eden's speech, which was to be followed, approximately a week later, by

follow a similar speech by the French Foreign Minister
affairs.

2. On the issue of relations with Berlin and other European countries, support for Italy is emphasized. This provision (Italy's support) is considered secured, whether or not the first point is met. It is likely that Göring, during the meeting, again contributed to Mussolini's rapprochement with Hitler, although a generous loan offer, in the current financial difficulties in Italy, could tip the scales significantly in the other direction. Under these conditions, a loan of one or two billion lire may be allocated. 3. This briefly concerns the basis of cooperation with the USSR, which is to act in full agreement with London and Paris. Moscow must clearly understand that the USSR must not

make individual statements in the field of international politics, thereby hindering the fulfillment of the plans of its democratic friends when it is to its advantage. This has been repeated too often in connection with the events in Spain, and the tension created by it is too dangerous to permit its repetition. London and Paris, in turn, will agree to consult with the USSR as an equal partner on all important questions of preserving European peace. If the impossibility of cooperating with Berlin on the basis of the aforementioned provision is proved, then the German Government will have to be forced to come to an agreement by applying more stringent measures. If all other methods turn out to be

unsuccessful, then England will consider a proposal for a general and strictly controlled boycott of all German industry. In the event that the USA joined France, England, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and one or several Balkan states in energetic actions directed against German trade, fascist Germany could be forced to abandon its aggressive policy. Lindsay agrees with the Foreign Secretary that Hitler is not yet ready for war. Reports coming from abroad to London indicate that the

question of the shortage of raw materials in Germany is in fact much more acute than is known. The same sources report growing discontent among the peasantry and the middle classes. There seems to be no way out of this impasse into which Hitler has placed German industry.

Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD, Major of State Security
(Shpigelglas) True: Beginning.

1st

sector of the 7th department of the GUGB lieutenant of state security
(Grappen) Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB NKVD received the following intelligence data from Berlin:

US Ambassador to Paris Bullitt spent 2-3 days in Berlin on his way back from Poland. He stated that he would like to see Göring, even though this was not in accordance with normal diplomatic procedure. The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Attolico, who is a close friend of Bullitt, strongly insists on such a meeting, so he (Bullitt) does not consider it possible to refuse. Bullitt's conversation with Goering lasted several hours. Bullitt did not share the nature of this conversation with anyone. The only thing he said was that Goering asked him if the US would act if Germany took over Czechoslovakia and Austria. According to Bullitt, he replied that if Germany began hostilities in these countries, the US would have to consider making a speech as well.

Bullitt added that Goering was much more interested in the question of the attitude of the United States towards Germany than in any other question. According to American diplomatic circles in Berlin, Bullitt traveled to Poland to persuade Beck to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. He stubbornly and persistently works the conservative circles in France against the USSR, referring to his long experience in order to convince them. Beginning sector of the 7th department of the GUGB NKVD captain of state security (**Reif**)

**FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b), SNK USSR,
NKO USSR and NKVD USSR**

dated March 6, 1941

Message from Berlin

According to information received from an official of the Committee for the Four-Year Plan, several members of the committee received an urgent task to make calculations of the stocks of raw materials and food that Germany could receive as a result of the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The same informant reports that Colonel-General

Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, is counting on unconditional success and lightning-fast occupation by the German troops of the Soviet Union, and above all of Ukraine, where, according to Halder, the good condition of railways and highways will contribute to successful operations. The same Halder also considers the occupation of Baku and its oil fields to be an easy task, which the Germans supposedly will be able to quickly restore after the destruction from hostilities. Halder believes that the Red Army will not be able to provide adequate resistance to the lightning-fast offensive of the German troops and the Russians will not even have time to destroy the reserves.

As regards the Committee's calculations under the four-year plan regarding the economic effect of such an operation, these calculations supposedly give a negative forecast.

According to information received from an employee of the headquarters of the High Command, the task of compiling similar calculations was also received from the General Staff by the head of the economic department of the

headquarters, Colonel Becker. Colonel Becker's calculations, on the contrary, prove the high economic effect that will be obtained as a result of military operations against

the USSR. (Central archive of the FSB RF)

FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE SNK OF THE USSR, March 11, 1941

March 6 this year. The British Ambassador Cripps gathered the press on conference, which was attended by English and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov. Warning

those present that his information was confidential and not to be used for publication, Cripps made the following statement. Soviet-German relations are definitely worsening, and Vyshinsky's

statement on the Bulgarian question is very significant in this respect. This statement is very strong and is the first open expression of dissatisfaction of the USSR with Germany. A Soviet-German war is inevitable. Many reliable diplomatic sources from Berlin report that Germany is planning an attack on the Soviet Union this year, probably in the summer. There is a group in the German General Staff advocating an immediate attack on the USSR. Until now, Hitler has been trying to avoid a war on two fronts, but if he is convinced that he cannot make a successful invasion of England, he will attack the USSR, since in this case he will have only one front. On the other hand, if Hitler becomes convinced that he cannot defeat England before America can help her, he will

will try to make peace with England on the following terms: the restoration of France, Belgium and Holland and the capture of the USSR.

These terms of peace have a good chance of being accepted by England, because both in England and in America there are influential groups who want to see the USSR destroyed, and if the position of England worsens, they will be able to force the governments to accept Hitler's peace terms. . In this case, Hitler will very quickly attack the USSR. Another reason why the Soviet-German war should start this year is that the Red Army is

constantly growing stronger, while the power of the German army, if the war with England drags on, will be weakened. Therefore, it is more profitable for Hitler to try to break the Red Army before its reorganization is completed.

Answering questions, Cripps stated that the German General Staff was convinced that Germany was capable of capturing the Ukraine and the Caucasus, all the way to Baku, in two to three weeks. The same opinion is shared by Dill, who gives a low estimate of the combat effectiveness of the Red Army.

According to Cripps, he told Eden and Dill that the Red Army was much better than they thought it was, and every day

becomes stronger.

(Central archive of the FSB RF)

*Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Comrade STALIN
SNK USSR Comrade MOLOTOV*

At the same time, I am sending an undercover message received from Berlin.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR **{L. Beria)** A
copy

of the Sov.

secret According to information received by the source from the assistant of the German Aviation Command, Goering is more and more inclined to conclude an agreement with England and America due to the difficulties that have arisen in the war with England and the deterioration of further prospects for the war. The main difficulties are that in

Due to the prolongation of the war, the economic situation in Germany is significantly

deteriorating. According to information received from a reliable source in Berlin, the attempts of the Germans to negotiate with the Americans were expressed in the fact that at a breakfast arranged for the American embassy in Berlin by GOERING's closest assistants - Marshal MILCHOM and Colonel-General UDET, the latter, in a conversation with the American military attache PEYTON, gave to understand to him that Germany would like to come to an agreement with America.

According to the same informant, the TASS denial regarding the presence of German troops in Bulgaria had the effect of a bombshell in the German Air Ministry. GOERING ordered the transfer of the "Russian abstract" of the Ministry of Aviation to the so-called active part of the aviation headquarters, which develops and prepares military operations. The Aviation Headquarters issued an order to conduct reconnaissance flights on a large scale over the territory of the USSR with the aim of reconnaissance of the border strip, including Leningrad, by photographing and compiling accurate maps. Aircraft equipped with improved cameras will fly over the Soviet border at high altitude. Right: Deputy early 5th sec. GUGB NKVD USSR (**Sudoplatov**)
TO THE HEAD

**OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
OF THE RKKA, THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FRONT AND THE
HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

March 9 p. 866 sp 287 sd in the village of Vashkovtsy, documents of the headquarters of the battalion of the 11 SS police regiment

were seized. Among the seized documents, an order was found concerning negotiations between Ukrainian nationalists and representatives of the German fascist command and an agreement reached on the service of Ukrainian nationalists for the benefit of the Germans.

Attached is a copy of this order.

Head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Major
General **S. Shatilov**

BATTLE GROUP PRITZMAN

Intelligence departments

Regarding: Relationships with members of the national Ukrainian rebel army ("UPA").

The negotiations started in the Derezhno region with the leaders of the national Ukrainian Insurgent Army were also successfully held in the Verba region. An agreement has been reached.

German units are not attacked by the UPA. "UPA * sends scouts, mostly girls, into areas occupied by the enemy and reports the results of Intelligence. division of the Battle Group. Prisoners of the Red Army, as well as Soviet partisans, are being escorted to reconnaissance! department^] for interrogation; local alien elements are used by the combat group at work. In order not to interfere with this necessary interaction, I Order: 1.

UPA agents who have certificates signed "Captain Felix", or those who

pretend to be members of the UPA, are allowed unhindered passage; leave weapons with them. At the request of the agent, provide them with the fastest access to intelligence [intelligence] departments [s]. 2. Members of the "UPA" units, when meeting with German units for identification, raise their left hand with spread

fingers to their faces; do not delay them, this means their mutual understanding.

3. On the part of the UPA there are complaints that the German regular police units are carrying out unauthorized requisitions, especially of poultry. In this regard, according to the order of February 2, 1944, unit commanders are involved in these wild requisitions so that they stop. **Brenner**, Major General and SS Brigadeführsr (TsAMO

USSR, f.

236, op. 2675, d. 79, l. 56-56v.,
translated from German)

**NOTE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY
TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT dated June 21, 1941**

of the year

MEMORANDUM

I

When the government of the Reich, based on the desire to come to balance of interests of Germany and the USSR, addressed in the summer

1939 to the Soviet government, it was aware that mutual understanding with the state, which, on the one hand, represents its belonging to the community of nation-states with all the ensuing rights and obligations, and on the other hand, being led by the party, which, as a section of the COMINTERN seeking to spread the revolution on a world scale, that is, to destroy these nation-states, is hardly an easy task. Suppressing serious doubts generated by this fundamental difference in the political orientation of Germany and Soviet Russia and the sharpest contradiction between the diametrically opposed worldviews of NATIONAL SOCIALISM and BOLSHEVISM, the German government nevertheless made such an attempt. In doing so, it was guided by the consideration that a conditional mutual understanding between Germany and Russia, the exclusion of the possibility of war, and the satisfaction of the new ~~between~~ ^{between} needs of both peoples, which have long been considered friendly, would thus be the best defense against the further spread of the communist doctrines of international Jewry in Europe. This idea was supported by the fact that certain events in Russia itself and certain measures of the Russian government in the international arena at least made it possible to consider a departure from these doctrines and from the old methods of corrupting peoples. Moscow's reaction to this proposal by the German government and the readiness of the USSR to conclude a friendly pact with Germany fully confirmed the likelihood of such a turn.

Thus, on August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed, and on September 28, 1939, the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the two states. The essence of these treaties was as follows: 1) in the

mutual obligation of states not to attack each other and

to be in good neighborly relations; 2) in delimiting the spheres of "interests" by refusing the German Reich from any influence in Finland,

Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and

Bessarabia, while the territory of the former Polish state up to the Narew-Bug-San line, at the request of Soviet Russia, was left behind it. Indeed, the government of

the Reich, having concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia, **significantly changed its policy towards the USSR**, and from that day took a friendly position towards the Soviet Union. It strictly followed the letter and spirit of the treaties signed with the Soviet Union. Moreover, it pacified Poland, which means that, at the cost of German blood, it contributed to the achievement by the Soviet Union of the greatest foreign policy success during its existence. This became possible only thanks to the benevolent policy of Germany towards Russia and the brilliant victories of the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the Reich government rightfully believed

that it could hope for a corresponding attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Reich, especially during the negotiations of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow. On other occasions, too, the Soviet government has repeatedly noted that these treaties are the basis for a long-term equalization of the bilateral interests of Germany and Soviet Russia, and that both peoples, respecting the political system of each side and not interfering in the internal affairs of the partner, will come to long-term relations of good neighborliness. **Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the Reich government was greatly mistaken in its assumptions.**

II

Indeed, immediately after the conclusion of the German-Russian treaties, the Comintern stepped up its activities in all areas. This applies not only

to Germany alone, but also to friendly or neutral states and territories of Europe occupied by German troops. In order not to openly violate the treaties, only the methods changed and the camouflage was carried out more diligently and more subtly. By constantly exposing the so-called "German imperialist war" in Moscow, apparently, they hoped to compensate for the results of the pact with National Socialist Germany. As a result of effective countermeasures taken by the police, the Comintern was forced to carry out its

subversive and reconnaissance activities against Germany by circuitous routes through their centers in countries neighboring Germany. To do this, they resorted to the services of former German communist leaders who were supposed to carry out subversive work in Germany and prepare sabotage actions. GPU Commissar Krylov was constantly engaged in education and training on this issue. Along with this, subversive activities were carried out in the territories occupied by Germany, especially in the protectorate and in occupied France, as well as against Norway, Holland, Belgium, etc.

The representations of Soviet Russia, especially the consulate general in Prague, provided effective assistance in this matter. With the use of radio-technical means of reception and transmission, reconnaissance was diligently carried out, which is irrefutable proof of the work of the Comintern directed against the Reich. On all other subversive and intelligence work of the Comintern there is an extensive documentary material of the testimonies of witnesses and written material. In addition, sabotage groups were created that had their own laboratories, in which incendiary and explosive devices were produced for carrying out sabotage actions. Such sabotage was, for example, carried out against at least 16 German ships. Along with this subversive sabotage work, **espionage**

was carried out. Thus, the resettlement of Germans from Soviet Russia was used **to** induce these German people to work for the GPU by the dirtiest means. Not only men, but also women were shamelessly forced to agree to cooperate with the GPU. Even the embassy of Soviet Russia in Berlin, headed by the embassy adviser Kozlov, did not hesitate to unceremoniously use the right of extraterritoriality for espionage purposes. Then Mokhov, an employee of the Russian consulate in Prague, organized the center of a Russian spy network that covered the entire protectorate. Other cases in which the police managed to intervene in a timely manner give a clear and unambiguous picture of the vast intrigues of Soviet Russia. The overall picture clearly shows that Soviet Russia carried out extensive illegal subversive activities against Germany.

activities, sabotage, terror and political, military and economic espionage aimed at preparing for war. As for the subversive

activities of Soviet Russia outside of Germany in Europe, it spread to almost all the states of Europe friendly to Germany or occupied by her. So, for example, in **Romania**, in order to create an anti-German mood, communist propaganda in leaflets sent from Russia blamed Germany for all the difficulties. Since the summer of 1940, the same thing has clearly manifested itself in **Yugoslavia**. There, leaflets called for a protest against the conclusion of a pact by the Cvetković regime with the imperialist governments in Berlin and Rome. At the gathering

In the case of communist leaders in Agram, the entire south-east of Europe from Slovakia to Bulgaria was designated as a Russian protectorate in the event, as they hoped, of weakening Germany militarily. In the Soviet mission in Belgrade, German troops came across documentary proof that this propaganda came from Soviet Russia. While communist propaganda in Yugoslavia used nationalist slogans, in Hungary it operated primarily among the Ruthenian population, whom it captivated with the hopes of liberation by Soviet Russia. Anti-German persecution was especially active in Slovakia, where agitation for joining Soviet Russia was openly conducted.

The notorious "Association for Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union" operated in **Finland**, which, in cooperation with the Petroskaya radio station, sought to disintegrate this country and worked in an extremely hostile spirit towards Germany.

In **France, Belgium and Holland**, the population was set against the German occupation authorities. The same persecution, only with a national and pan-Slavic coloring, was carried out in **the general government**. As soon as the German and Italian troops occupied **Greece**, the propaganda of Soviet Russia set to work here as well. The overall picture is evidence of the USSR's systematic campaign in all countries against Germany's attempts to establish a stable order in Europe. Along with this, direct counter-propaganda is being carried out against the efforts of German policy, which is trying to pass off these efforts as anti-Russian and win over the

countries on the side of Soviet Russia, turning them against Germany. Agitation was carried out in **Bulgaria** against joining the Tripartite Pact and for a guarantee agreement with Russia. In **Romania**, on January 23, 1941, an attempt was made to putch, behind which were the Bolshevik agents of Moscow, by infiltrating the Iron Guard and inciting its leadership, in particular the Romanian Groza. The Reich Government has corresponding irrefutable proof. As for

Yugoslavia, the Reich government has documents showing that already in May 1940, the Yugoslav envoy Georgevich, after a conversation with Mr. Molotov, came to the conclusion that Germany was considered there "the formidable enemy of tomorrow." Even more unequivocal was the attitude of Soviet Russia to the Serbian military requests for the supply of weapons. In November 1940, the Chief of the General Staff of

Soviet Russia told the Yugoslav military attache: "We will give everything you need, and immediately." The Belgrade government was given the right to set prices and payment procedures, and only one condition was set: **to keep it secret from Germany**. Later, when the government of Cvetkovic drew closer to the Axis states, Moscow began to delay the supply of weapons: this was briefly and clearly stated in the military ministry of Soviet Russia to the Yugoslav military attache. The organization of the Belgrade putsch on March 27 of this year was the culmination of this underground activity of Serbian conspirators and Anglo-Russian agents against the Reich. The Serbian organizer of this coup and the leader of the Black Hand, Mr. Zimich, is still in Moscow and in close contact with the propaganda organs of Soviet Russia and is now deploying active activities there against the Reich. The above facts are only a small part of the unheard of large-scale propaganda activities of the USSR in Europe

against Germany. The Reich government decided to publish the extensive materials at its disposal in order to present to the judgment of the world community a general picture of the activities of the services of Soviet Russia in this direction after

conclusion of German-Russian treaties. On the whole, the Reich government is compelled to

state: In concluding treaties with Germany, the Soviet government repeatedly and unequivocally stated that it did not intend to interfere directly or indirectly in the affairs of Germany. At the conclusion of the treaty of friendship, it solemnly declared that it would cooperate with Germany in order, in accordance with the true interests of all peoples, to put an end to the war between Germany on one side and England and France on the other side as quickly as possible. In the light of the above facts, which became especially apparent in the later course of the war, the agreements and declarations of Soviet Russia **turned out to be a deliberate deception**. Even all the advantages achieved only thanks to the friendly position of Germany could not induce the Soviet government to a loyal attitude towards Germany.

Moreover, the Reich government came to the conclusion that **Lenin's thesis**, once again clearly stated in the

"Directive of the Communist Party of Slovakia" of October 1939, according to which "it is possible to conclude agreements with other countries if they serve the interests of the Soviet government and neutralize the enemy", It was also used at the conclusion of treaties in 1939. Thus, the conclusion of friendship treaties was only a tactical maneuver for the Soviet government. The only goal for Russia was to conclude agreements beneficial to it and at the same time create prerequisites for further strengthening the influence of the Soviet Union. The main idea was to weaken the non-Bolshevik states so that it would be easier to disintegrate them and defeat them at the right moment. This was reflected with brutal clarity in a Russian document found after the occupation in the Soviet legation in Belgrade, which states: "The USSR will only react at the right moment. The Axis powers have further dissipated their armed forces, and therefore the USSR will suddenly strike at Germany.

III

If the subversive propaganda activities of the Soviet Union in Germany and in Europe generally leave no doubt about its position in relation to Germany, then **the foreign policy and military activities** of the Soviet government after the conclusion

German-Russian treaties is even more pronounced. In Moscow, during the delimitation of spheres of influence, the government of Soviet Russia declared to the Reich Foreign Minister that it did not intend to occupy, Bolshevik or annex the states within its sphere of influence, with the exception of the decaying areas of the former Polish state. In reality, however, as the course of events has shown, the policy of the Soviet Union is aimed exclusively at one thing, namely: ***in the space from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, wherever possible, push the armed forces of Moscow to the West and spread Bolshevization further into the depths of Europe.*** The development of this policy is characterized by the following stages: 1. The beginning of the development of this policy was the conclusion of the so-called mutual assistance treaties with ***Estonia, Latvia*** and ***Lithuania*** in October and November 1939 and the construction of military bases in these countries. 2. The next move of Soviet Russia was made in relation to

Finland. When the demands of Soviet Russia, the acceptance of which would have threatened the loss of sovereignty of the free Finnish state, were rejected by the Finnish government, the Soviet government ordered the creation of the communist pseudo-government of Kuusinen. And when the Finnish people abandoned this government, an ultimatum was presented to Finland, and in November 1939 the Red Army entered the territory of Finland. As a result of the Finnish-Russian peace concluded in March, Finland was forced to cede part of its southeastern provinces, which were immediately subjected to Bolshevization. 3. A few months later, namely in July 1940, the Soviet Union began to take measures

against ***the Baltic states.*** According to the first Moscow treaty, Lithuania belonged to the sphere of German interests. In the interest of preserving peace, although reluctantly, the government of the Reich in the second treaty, at the request of the Soviet Union, abandoned most of the territory of this country, leaving part of it in the sphere of German interests. After the presentation of the ultimatum of June 15, the Soviet Union, without notifying the government of the Reich, occupied the whole of Lithuania, that is, the part of Lithuania that was in the sphere of influence of Germany, thus approaching

directly to the border of East Prussia. Later, an appeal to Germany on this issue followed, and after difficult negotiations, having made another friendly concession, the Reich government gave the Soviet Union this part of Lithuania as well. Then, in the same way, in violation of the aid agreements concluded with these states, Latvia and Estonia were occupied. Thus, the entire Baltic, contrary to the categorical assurances of Moscow, was Bolshevized and, a few weeks after the occupation, immediately annexed. Simultaneously with the annexation, the concentration of the first large forces of the Red Army in the entire northern sector of the bridgehead of Soviet Russia against Europe followed. By the way, the Soviet government unilaterally terminated

Germany's economic agreements with these states, although, according to the Moscow agreements, these agreements should not have been damaged. 4. On the question of the delimitation of spheres of influence on the territory of the former Polish state, the

Moscow treaties clearly agreed that no political agitation would be carried out on the boundaries of spheres of influence, and the activities of both occupation authorities would be limited exclusively to questions of peaceful construction in these territories. The Reich government has irrefutable evidence that, despite these agreements, the Soviet Union, immediately after occupying this territory, not only allowed anti-German agitation in the Polish governorate general, but also supported it with Bolshevik propaganda in the governorate. Immediately after the occupation, large Russian garrisons were transferred to these territories as well.

5. While the German army in the West was fighting against France and England, followed by a blow from the Soviet Union in **the Balkans**. Whereas at the Moscow talks the Soviet government declared that it would never settle the Bessarabian question unilaterally, on June 24, 1940, the Reich government received a message from the Soviet government that it was determined to solve the Bessarabian question by force. At the same time, it was reported that Soviet claims also extended to Bukovina, that is, to the territory that was the old Austrian

crown land, never belonged to Russia and which at one time was not mentioned in Moscow at all. The German ambassador in Moscow told the Soviet government that his decision was completely unexpected for the Reich government and would greatly infringe on German economic interests in Romania, as well as disrupt the life of a large local German colony and harm the German nation in Bukovina. To this, Mr. Molotov replied that the matter was of exceptional urgency and that the Soviet Union was expecting a response from the Reich government within 24 hours. And this time (the German government] in the name of maintaining peace and friendship with the Soviet Union decided the issue in its favor. It advised the Romanian government, which turned to Germany for help, to make a concession and recommended that it give Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to Soviet Russia. Along with With a positive response from the Romanian government, Germany conveyed to the Soviet government the request of the Romanian government to give it time to evacuate the population from these large territories and to ensure the life and safety of the property of local residents. However, the Soviet government again presented an ultimatum to Romania and, even before the expiration of its term, on June 28, began the occupation parts of Bukovina, and then all of Bessarabia to the Danube. And these territories were immediately annexed by the Soviet Union, Bolshevized and thereby actually ruined. The occupation and Bolshevization by the Soviet government of the territory of Eastern Europe and

the Balkans, transferred to the Soviet Union by the government of the Reich in Moscow as a sphere of influence, completely **contradict the Moscow agreements**. Despite this, the Reich government even then took a more than loyal position towards the USSR. It showed complete neutrality in the Finnish war and the Baltic question, supported the position of the Soviet government in relation to the Romanian government and reconciled, albeit reluctantly, to the realities that had developed as a result of the actions of the Soviet government. In addition, in order to exclude the possibility of a disagreement between the two states from the very beginning, it undertook a broad action to resettle all Germans from the territories occupied by the USSR to Germany. Government

Reich believes that it could hardly have been more convincing evidence of his desire for a lasting reconciliation with the USSR.

IV

Russian expansion in the Balkans caused territorial problems in the area. In the summer of 1940, Romania and Hungary turned to Germany to settle their disputed territorial issues, after a sharp crisis arose due to these differences, fueled by British agents, at the end of August. Romania and Hungary were on the brink of war among themselves. Germany, which Hungary and Romania had repeatedly requested to mediate in their dispute with the goal of maintaining peace in the Balkans, together with Italy invited both states to a conference in Vienna, and at their request, on August 30, 1940, the decision of the Vienna Arbitration took place. As a result, a new Hungarian-Romanian border was established, and Germany and Italy, in an effort to help the Romanian government explain to their people the reasons for the territorial losses they suffered and to exclude any future clashes in this area, assumed the obligations of the guarantors of the Romanian state in *its* present borders. Since the Russian claims in this area were satisfied, these guarantees could not be directed against Russia. Despite this, the Soviet Union appealed against this decision and, contrary to its previous statements that with the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, its claims in the Balkans were satisfied, it declared its further interests in the Balkans, without defining them specifically yet.

From that moment on, the policy of Soviet Russia directed against Germany became more and more clear. The Reich government is now receiving more and more concrete reports that the talks of the British ambassador Cripps in Moscow, which have been dragging on for a very long time, are in a favorable atmosphere. At the government of the Reich took possession of documents testifying to the intensive military preparations of the Soviet Union in all areas. These documents are confirmed by a report recently found in Belgrade by the Yugoslav military attache in Moscow dated December 17, 1940, which, by the way, says verbatim: "According to the data received from Soviet circles, the rearmament of the Air Force, tank troops and artillery is in full swing, taking into account experience

modern warfare, which will be largely completed ***by August 1941. This period, obviously, is also an extreme (temporary) point until which tangible changes in Soviet foreign policy should not be expected.***

Despite the unfriendly position of the Soviet Union on the Balkan question, Germany is making new efforts to improve mutual understanding with the USSR, and the Reich Foreign Minister, in a letter to Herr Stalin, gives a broad outline of the policy of the Reich government after the Moscow negotiations. The letter especially emphasizes the following: when concluding the Tripartite Pact, Germany, Italy and Japan unanimously proceeded from the fact that this pact was in no way directed against the Soviet Union, and that the friendly relations of the three states and their treaties with the USSR should not be affected by this agreement at all. In the Tripartite Pact, signed in Berlin, this is recorded and documented. At the same time, the letter expresses the desire and hope of the states of the Tripartite Pact for further improvement of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and giving them concrete form. For the purpose of further discussion of these questions, the Reich Foreign Minister invites Herr Molotov to Berlin.

During the visit of Mr. Molotov to Berlin, the Reich government was forced to establish that Russia was ready for truly friendly cooperation with the state

of the Tripartite Pact, and especially with Germany, only if she is ready to fulfill the conditions set by the Soviet Union. These conditions consist in the further penetration of the Soviet Union into the North and South-East of Europe. In Berlin and at subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the German ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Molotov put forward the following demands: 1. The Soviet Union wants to provide guarantees

to Bulgaria and, in addition to this, conclude a mutual assistance treaty with this state on the model of mutual assistance treaties in the Baltic states, i.e. with military bases, while Mr. Molotov declares that this will not affect the internal regime of Bulgaria. For this purpose, the Russian commissar Sobolev visited Sofia at that time.

2. The Soviet Union demands the conclusion of an agreement with Turkey for the establishment of a base for land and naval forces on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease. In the event that Turkey does not agree to this, Germany and Italy must join Russian diplomatic efforts to force her to comply with these demands. These demands boil down to Soviet dominance in the Balkans. 3. The Soviet Union declares that it again feels threatened by Finland, and therefore demands Germany's complete renunciation of Finland, which practically means the occupation of this state and the extermination of the Finnish people. Naturally, Germany could not accept these Russian demands, the Soviet

performance government considered
a prerequisite for joining the states of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the efforts of the states of the Tripartite Pact to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union failed. As a result of this German stance, Russia intensified its already more overt anti-German policy, and its ever closer cooperation with England became evident. In January 1941, this negative Russian stance manifested itself for the first time in the diplomatic sphere. When Germany took certain countermeasures in Bulgaria this month against the landing of British troops in Greece, the Russian

ambassador in Berlin in an official demarche indicated that the ***Soviet Union considered the territory of Bulgaria and the zone of both straits to be the security zone of the USSR and that it could not be indifferent to the events in these areas, security. Therefore, the Soviet government, threatening it, warns against the appearance of German troops on the territory of Bulgaria and in the zone of both straits.***

In response to this, the Reich government gave the Soviet government exhaustive explanations of the reasons and goals of Germany's military measures in the Balkans. It pointed out that Germany would by all means prevent the consolidation of England in Greece, but she did not intend to occupy the straits, but would respect the sovereignty of Turkey. The passage of German troops through the territory of Bulgaria cannot be considered an infringement of security interests

The Soviet Union, the government of the Reich, on the contrary, believes that these operations also serve Soviet interests. After conducting operations in the Balkans, Germany

will withdraw its troops from there. Despite this statement by the Reich government, ***the Soviet government, in turn, immediately after the entry of German troops, published a statement addressed to Bulgaria of a clearly hostile anti-German nature, the*** meaning of which was that the presence of German troops in Bulgaria served not the cause of peace in the Balkans, but the interests of war. The explanation for this position was given to the government of the Reich by the more frequent reports by this time about the ever closer cooperation between Soviet Russia and England. Despite this, Germany did not react this time either. The rear cover promised by the Soviet Union in March 1941 to Turkey in the event that it enters the war in the Balkans belongs to the same category. This was, as the Reich government learned, the result of Anglo-Russian negotiations during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary to Ankara, whose efforts were aimed at drawing Russia deeper into British India in this way.

V With the outbreak of the Balkan crisis at the beginning of April of this year, the aggressive policy of the Soviet Government towards the German Reich, which has been intensifying since that time, and the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Britain, which has been to some extent veiled until now, become obvious to the whole world. Today it is unambiguously established that the putsch launched in Belgrade after Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact was staged by England with the consent of Soviet Russia. For a long time, namely since November 14, 1940, Russia secretly armed Yugoslavia against the Axis states. Indisputable proof of this are the documents that fell into the hands of the Reich government after the occupation of Belgrade, which reveal every phase of these Russian arms deliveries to Yugoslavia. After the successful coup, on ***April 5,***

Russia concludes a friendly pact with the illegal Serbian government of Simonovich, which was supposed to strengthen the positions of the putschists and help with its weight to unite the joint Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front. April 6, 1941 assistant

U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. **Samer Wells**, who had previously met the Soviet ambassador in Washington on several occasions, stated with obvious satisfaction in this regard: ***"Under certain conditions, the Russo-Yugoslav pact can be of great represents something more than just a pact of friendship and non-aggression."*** So, at a time when German troops were concentrated on the territory of Romania and Bulgaria against a massive landing of British troops in Greece, the Soviet Union, now in clear collusion with England, is trying to stab Germany in the back, namely: 1) openly supports Yugoslavia , politically and secretly

provides her with military assistance;

2) assuring Turkey of support, trying to induce her to take an aggressive position towards Bulgaria and Germany and to bring Turkish troops into Thrace in a very unfavorable military situation; 3) he himself concentrated

large military forces on the Romanian border, in Bessarabia and near

Moldova; 4) suddenly, in early April, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky, in conversations with the Romanian envoy Gafescu in Moscow, made an attempt to start a policy of rapid rapprochement with Romania in order to induce her to move away from Germany. British diplomacy, with the mediation of the Americans in Bucharest, is making efforts in the same direction.

According to the Anglo-Russian plan, a strike was planned against the German troops in Romania and Bulgaria from three sides, namely from Bessarabia, Thrace and Serbia-Greece. Only thanks to the loyalty of General Antonescu, the realistic position of the Turkish government and, above all, the operational intervention of Germany and the decisive victories of the German army, this Anglo-Russian plan was thwarted. As it became known to the government of the Reich from reports, almost 200 Yugoslav aircraft with Soviet and British agents, as well as with Serbian putschists under the leadership of Mr. Zimin, were partially sent to Russia, where these officers serve today in the Russian army, and partially - in Egypt. This fact alone

presents in a special light the close cooperation of England and Russia with Yugoslavia.

The Soviet government tried in vain in every possible way to disguise the true goals of its policy. The Soviet government, while recently maintaining economic relations with Germany and taking a number of individual measures, wanted to demonstrate to the whole world supposedly normal or even friendly relations with Germany. These include his expulsion a few weeks ago of the Norwegian, Belgian, Greek and Yugoslav envoys, the silence of the British press on German-Russian relations, organized by the British Ambassador Cripps in agreement with the Soviet government, and, finally, the recently published TASS refutation depicting relations between Germany and Soviet Russia as quite correct. These diversionary maneuvers, which are in flagrant contradiction to the real policy of the Soviet government, failed to mislead the government of the Reich. The hostile policy of the Soviet government towards Germany in the military field was accompanied by ***an ever-increasing concentration of all the armed forces at the disposal of Russia on***

a wide front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Already at a time when Germany was focusing on the French campaign in the West and when only a small number of German troops were in the East, the Russian high command began the systematic transfer of large contingents of troops to the eastern border of the Reich, with the concentration of the main forces being established near the borders of East Prussia and governor-general, as well as on the border with Romania in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Russian garrisons on the border with Finland were constantly reinforced. Further measures in this direction were the transfer of more and more Russian divisions from East Asia and the Caucasus to the territory of the European part of Russia. After the Soviet government in its

17 A. Sudoplatov • 1st time stated that, for example, it would send only a small number of troops into the Baltic States, only in this area after its occupation did it constantly increase the concentration of its troops there, which today number 22 divisions. By this very

one gets the impression that the Russian troops were getting closer and closer to the German border, although no military measures were taken on the German side that could motivate such actions of the Russians. And only these actions of the Russians forced the German armed forces to take countermeasures. In addition, separate parts of the Russian ground forces and the Air Force moved forward, and large parts of the Air Force were concentrated on airfields along the German border. It should also be noted the repeated violations of the border in early April and the increasing frequency of Russian aircraft overflying the territory of the German Reich. According to the Romanian government, similar incidents also took place in the Romanian border regions of Bukovina, Moldova and the Danube.

449 Since the beginning of the year, the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command has repeatedly pointed out to the foreign policy leadership of the Reich the growing threat to the territory of the Reich from the Russian army, and at the same time emphasized that only aggressive plans can be the reason for this strategic concentration and deployment of troops. These reports of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht with all the details will be brought to the public.

If there was the slightest doubt about the aggressiveness of the strategic concentration and deployment of Russian troops, then it was completely dispelled by reports received by the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command in recent days. After the general mobilization in Russia, at least 160 divisions were deployed against Germany.

The results of observation in recent days indicate that the grouping of Russian troops, especially motorized and tank formations, that has been created, allows the Supreme High Command of Russia to launch aggression at various sectors of the German border at any time. Reports of increased intelligence activity, as well as daily reports of incidents on the border and skirmishes between the outposts of both armies, complete the picture of an extremely tense, explosive military situation. Information coming from England about the negotiations of the British Ambassador Cripps with the aim of further strengthening

cooperation between the political and military leadership of England and Soviet Russia, as well as the appeal of Lord Beaverbrook, who was always an enemy of the Soviets, for the full support of Russia in the future struggle and the call for the United States to do the same, irrefutably testify to what fate was prepared for the German people.

BASED ON THE

FACTS PRESENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REICH IS FORCED TO STATE: ***The Soviet government, contrary to its obligations and in clear contradiction to its solemn declarations, acted against Germany, namely: 1. Subversive work against Germany and Europe was not***

simply continued, and with the outbreak of war, it was also strengthened.

2. Foreign policy became more and more hostile relation to Germany. 3.

All armed forces on the German border were concentrated and deployed in readiness for attack.

THEREFORE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BETRAYED AND VIOLATED TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH GERMANY. THE HATE OF BOLSHEVIST MOSCOW TO NATIONAL SOCIALISM TURNED OUT STRONGER THAN POLITICAL MIND. BOLSHEVISM IS THE DEATH ENEMY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. BOLSHEVIST MOSCOW IS

READY TO STRIKE IN THE BACK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY, LEADING THE FIGHT FOR EXISTENCE.

THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO A SERIOUS THREAT ON THE EASTERN BORDER. THEREFORE, THE Führer GIVED THE ORDER TO THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES TO REVEAL THIS THREAT WITH ALL FORCE AND MEANS. THE GERMAN PEOPLE REALIZES THAT IN THE COMING STRUGGLE IT IS CALLED NOT ONLY TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND, BUT ALSO TO SAVE THE WORLD CIVILIZATION FROM THE DEATH DANGER OF BOLSHEVISM AND TO CLEAR THE WAY TO A GENUINE PROSPERITY IN EUROPE.

Berlin, 21 June 1941

BLOOD FOR BLOOD AND DEATH FOR DEATH

Partisan-sabotage activities of the Moscow Department of the NKVD AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

In connection with the beginning of the war, the Moscow Department of the NKVD took under protection 14 railway bridges of strategic importance; in addition, the Chekist support was organized for 114 enterprises that switched to the production of defense products; in order to divert fascist aviation from important defense facilities, 20 false structures were erected, and other necessary counterintelligence measures were taken. In the process of radio games with enemy intelligence agencies, 18 German agents were called to false trap addresses and arrested. Under the leadership and with the active participation of the MK of the CPSU (b), the Moscow

Directorate of the NKVD created 87 destruction battalions with a total strength of 41,000 people. Over 600 employees of state security agencies were appointed to command positions in them. In a short time, 377 reconnaissance and sabotage groups consisting of 7947 people were trained.

A fighter motorized rifle regiment successfully fought in the enemy rear, in which the Moscow Chekists also made up the command core. Particularly great work was carried out on the formation and deployment of partisan detachments behind enemy lines. In Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Lotoshinsky districts, 41 partisan detachments were active.

The organization of partisan and sabotage activities behind enemy lines was carried out by a specially created 4th department of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region.

Oath of

soldiers and commanders of special groups of the NKVD Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region before being sent behind

enemy lines I, a citizen of the great Soviet Union, a faithful son of the heroic Russian people, I swear that I will not let go of weapons until the last fascist bastard on our Soviet land will be destroyed.

I undertake to unquestioningly obey the orders of my commanders and chiefs, to strictly observe military discipline.

For the burned cities and villages, for the death of our children, for the torture, violence and mockery of my people, I swear to take revenge on the enemy cruelly, mercilessly and tirelessly.

Blood for blood and death for death.

I swear by all means to help the Red Army to destroy the rabid Nazi dogs, not sparing blood and my life.

I swear that I would rather die in a fierce battle with the enemy than give myself, my family and the entire Soviet people into slavery to insidious

fascism. If, due to my weakness, cowardice, or ill will, I break this oath of mine and betray the interests of the people, let me die a shameful death at the hands of my comrades.

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR OF THE MOSCOW REGION
--

Owls. secret

Copy to the secretary of the

MK VKP(b) comrade

Shcherbakov and comrade Sudoplatov

» consisting of 9 people.

In accordance with the assignment received, the groups acted on enemy communications in the area of the Western and Kalinin fronts. During

the period from September 19 to October 22, 1942, the special groups carried out a number of special operations in the areas: Yartsevo - Svishchevo (railway Vyazma - Yartsevo), the Vadino - Yakovskaya railway line, the Yartsevo - Dorogobuzh railway line and the Yartsevo - Dukhovshchina highway. The collapse of 4 military echelons with equipment, ammunition and manpower of the enemy was blown up

a railway bridge, a mill, warehouses with grain and hay, and a number of other sabotage activities were burned. As a result

of all the actions carried out by the special groups destroyed: 1.

Locomotives - 4. 2.

Wagons and platforms with ammunition, medium tanks, vehicles, food and manpower - 58. 3. Railway bridge - 1. 4. Tankette - 1. 5.

Trucks with fodder and manpower
- 2. 6. A mill and

about 3,000 pounds of grain were burned. 7. Cut
up to 2000 meters of telephone wire. 8. Burned about
40 tons of hay. 9. Killed and wounded up to 300 German
soldiers and officers. 10. Policemen

killed - 18 people. 11. Provocateurs and accomplices were
shot - 4 people. 12. Taken alive one

art. corporal, transferred to the Special Partisan Detachment.

Intelligence has established that there are no enemy regular troops in the
areas of operations,

but only their proteges are police officers.

The special groups "Fighters" and "Fast" in the personnel of the losses are not
had.

Head of the Department of the NKVD of Moscow and the Moscow Region
Senior Major of State, Security

(Zhuravlev)

* * *

MEMORY IS ALIVE

January 23 at the Moscow State University preparing to celebrate the 75th anniversary of Professor Evgeny Aleksandrovich Anufriev. But the hero of the day asked to postpone the celebrations and left for the Kaluga region, to the regional center of Duminichi. Not to his native land, but to where he was born for the second time, miraculously surviving in a fierce battle on January 23, 1942. He went

where an obelisk rises near the village of Khludnevo with the names of twenty-two fallen soldiers of one of the divisions of the OMSBON of the NKVD of the USSR - Separate motorized rifle brigade of a special destination.

- At two o'clock in the morning we were taken out on skis from the village of Ko-tor, and after about an hour we approached Khludnev, - Evgeny Alexandrovich recalls. - After consulting, the commander and the commissar sent me and another fighter to reconnaissance. On skis, we went down to the village, found posts there ... And coughing was heard everywhere - then we learned that a battalion of a division that had arrived from France was stationed here. Here they are after the heat there and caught a cold ... It was very cold and clear, the snow was very deep ... You can't tell in a nutshell about OMSBON

and the combat affairs of the brigade. "Units of the 4th Directorate and a separate brigade destroyed 157 thousand German soldiers and officers, liquidated 87 high-ranking German officials, exposed and neutralized 2,045 enemy intelligence groups ... In the history of the NKVD, this is perhaps the only chapter that his successors continue to be proud of" - wrote one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, in the book Intelligence and the Kremlin.

The fighters of the brigade were trained as scouts and saboteurs - and they received excellent training. However, they were not taught to fight in infantry style ... Meanwhile, in the zone of operations of the 10th Army, Lieutenant General F. Golikov, the situation was so difficult that the commander, in agreement with Moscow, used several units of the OMSBON as infantry ... On fulfilling the task, the Omsbonovtsy set off well armed and equipped, with a supply of ammunition and food. The documents were handed over, notes with names were sewn into the clothes ... - We walked through the snow, very hard, track after track ... The team arrived

- to prepare grenades. We had four of them: two - tank, two - such. Armed with carbines, few have machine guns. Lazniuk ordered to turn around for battle. Grenades flew into the houses, the Germans began to jump out into the street, confusion began, but then commands were heard - they instantly took up defense.

Worked very well! I now think that the trouble was that we were not supported by the remnants of the infantry units that were nearby, they were supposed to deliver the main blow. But no... In the end, we took the defense. The detachment of Senior Lieutenant Kirill Laznyuk included

about thirty people. The battle, in which the unit was killed almost completely, can be considered one of the hundreds, if not thousands of fragments of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation carried out by the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts from January 8 to April 20, 1942. There is no doubt that there were battles much larger, more significant and bloody. But even behind dozens and hundreds of other feats, the heroism of the KGB skiers was not forgotten. Of course, the unique nature of the brigade, which

included the detachment, also played a role here. OMSBON was formed not only from Chekists and border guards, but also from athletes, including the most famous, up to champions of the USSR, from soldiers-internationalists - citizens of Germany and Spain, Poland and Czechoslovakia ... Communists and Komsomol members served in it - workers and collective farmers, students and recent schoolchildren. I also belonged to those - Evgeny Anufriev, a volunteer who graduated from the ten-year plan in June 1941 ... Still, the main thing is that the special unit fought in a special way. The feat of his fighters was told on February 14, 1942 by Pravda. The material "Heroes-Skiers" was signed by the divisional commissar - that is, Major General - A. Lobachev, a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army, the army

commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky. Not a word was said about the unit's belonging to the NKVD. And no specifics: "The Germans fortified the village of M, turning it into a strong knot of resistance on the path of advancement of our units ..." Only in one place is not N. but X. Not a typo, not

a hint for the insiders.

The newspaper report ended with pathetic words, which later turned out to be prophetic: "The memory of the skiing heroes will remain forever. Their fame will be transmitted from generation to generation."

On July 21 of the same year, all the dead Chekist soldiers were awarded the Orders of Lenin. For the first time, such a large group of heroes was awarded the highest award of the state - posthumously. Several survivors were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

- I was on the very right flank. It was difficult to shoot - there was very powerful fire from the other side, mostly bursts, tracer bullets. Then the mines began to explode... For me, then time was very compressed, and now I can't remember everything in detail. And how much time has passed - I can not say. I remember Lazshock coming up behind me, his face covered in blood. He ordered to retreat to the sheds. I saw the guys crawling, and one of them, wounded, losing strength, suddenly blew himself up with a grenade. I approached the sheds with almost no cartridges ...

Now few people can tell about the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, obscured by the previous ones and overshadowed by subsequent battles and battles. But here is an excerpt from the book "Fascism: the path of aggression and death" by the Soviet historian D. Pro-ektor, a story about a meeting in Hitler's bunker on

December 12, 1942: "Our main mistake this year," Hitler said, "was that we were advancing on Sukhinichi. Not Stalingrad and the Caucasus, not a "general offensive" against the Soviet Union as a whole, but Sukhinichi!" It turns

out that even against the backdrop of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Sukhinichi did not disappear in Hitler's mind - those very Sukhinichi, on the way to which the Omsbonites stopped the enemy at the cost of their own lives ... In general, a lot of our soldiers died in the battles on that land - and infantrymen, and tankers, and artillerymen.

- The Germans bypassed us, came from the rear. The ammo has run out. Then I brought the revolver to my temple - this is not a show, it was impossible for us to get captured ... At this time, the wounded Kruglyakov literally fell out from behind the barn and with him the completely bloodied Laznyuk. Kruglyakov shouted: "Help!" I hid the revolver, and the two of us began to pull Laznyuk out. It was very difficult in the snow. Where we run a little, where we fall, we crawl ... They fired at us very hard ... I even had to shoot back with a revolver - but it was far, I didn't hit ... Finally we fell into a ravine, there was some kind of infant

unit, near the platoon, which did not dare to come to our aid ... Soldier's memories. Not very

coherent, not at all heroic, and therefore very authentic. Even about his feat - to save a commander in battle has always been considered one of the highest manifestations of soldier's prowess - Evgeny Alexandrovich speaks as about something ordinary, self-evident. While Kruglyakov and Anufriev were saving the commander, their comrades-in-arms, who were surrounded, went on a breakthrough. Everyone died - the last of the survivors, deputy political instructor Lazar Papernik, blew himself up and the Germans surrounding him with a grenade. He, the first of the OMSBON fighters, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

* * *

SPECIAL PURPOSE Brigade

Mikhail Fedorovich Orlov in the Red Army since 1920, a Kremlin cadet. In 1926 he was sent to the internal troops of the NKVD, held a number of command positions, then taught at military schools, was the head of the Sebezsh military school of the NKVD. During the war, he was the commander of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON), whose personnel acted! on the fronts and behind enemy lines. Below are excerpts from his story. The war found me in Moscow, where I was

preparing to pass state exams at the MV Frunze Military Academy. All my insistent requests to be sent to the front remained unanswered, and on June 28 I was unexpectedly summoned to the head of the Special Group of the NKVD. In the office, I saw the Commissar of State Security with two rhombuses

in buttonholes and three orders on the

chest. "Pavel Anatolyevich," the commissar introduced himself and then, without any preamble, announced: "A special group of the NKVD is being created from the volunteers to carry out special tasks. Brigade commander Bogdanov was appointed chief of staff of the group's troops. You will be his deputy."

He briefed me on the tasks of the new formation. The troops being created were supposed to be used during the day behind enemy lines and to fight tanks.

Brigade commander M. P. Bogdanov at first entrusted me with the formation of detachments of volunteers and their training. Volunteers were selected by a special commission at the Dynamo stadium, and then they went to the place of formation - to the Dynamo and Osoaviakhim shooting ranges near Moscow, where a whole tent city had grown up. Several hundred athletes and students from Moscow universities have already arrived here; Later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League sent to us a large group of Komsomol members from various regions of the RSFSR. To complete the detachments, teachers and students of special schools, employees of state security agencies and commanders of the NKVD troops came. The Executive Committee of the Comintern sent to us a large group of anti-fascist political emigrants who lived on the territory of the USSR. Among them were Austrians, Hungarians, Germans and representatives of other nationalities. The bulk of foreign volunteers were Bulgarians and Spaniards.

By the end of August, our tasks were clearly defined. We had to quickly prepare for actions behind enemy lines, where we had to help the development of the partisan movement in every possible way, conduct reconnaissance and sabotage work ...

Brigade commander Bogdanov received a new appointment in July, and the duties of chief of staff were assigned to me. The situation at the front hurried us. In early October, we completely completed the formation of two regiments and various special units, which became part of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes. OMSBON - this is how the troops of the Special Group of the NKVD now began to be called. I was appointed commander of the brigade, and Alexei Alekseevich Maksimov, a former engineer who had recently joined the state security organs, was appointed commissar. He was a smart and charming man. Alive, energetic, he became the soul of our team...

When the enemy was already on the outskirts of Moscow, part of the units of the brigade worked on the installation of explosive barriers in the most important directions leading to the capital. Our first detachments carried out mining in the areas of Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Kashira.

In the terrible days of November, by order of the General Staff of the Red Army, we assigned a consolidated operational engineering detachment to set up explosive barriers in the zones of action of the 16th and 30th armies. The detachment included the battalion of Captain M.S. Prudnikov, a separate sapper company and other units. The detachment was headed by brigade engineer major M. N. Shperov. The units laid mines and land mines on the Leningradskoye, Rogachevskoye and Dmitrovskoye highways, prepared highways, bridges, and pipelines for an explosion. The soldiers had to act under enemy fire.

But our main task was sabotage and reconnaissance operations behind enemy lines. Before moving on to the massive deployment of OMSBON detachments and groups behind enemy lines, it was necessary to find out the situation in the occupied territory: how the rear guard was organized among the Nazis, what kind of support the Soviet patriots fighting the invaders needed. The fragmentary information that came from behind the front line was clearly not enough. Complete, qualified information was required. At the end of July, we sent a reconnaissance

group to the Smolensk region consisting of Yakov Stepanovich Kumachenko, a former associate professor at Moscow State University, Zinaida Alekseevna Pivovarova, a teacher at the Institute of Foreign Languages and radio operator Nikolai Gavrilovich Abramkin. The group quickly managed to get a job as translators at the headquarters of a German tank division and gain confidence in the Nazis. Through the detachment of senior lieutenant of state security Ivan Spiridonovich Zuenko, who operated in this area, Kumachenko's group passed on very valuable information about the enemy to us.

In August 1941, a detachment under the command of Alexei Kandievich Flegontov, an experienced partisan, hero of the Civil War, went behind enemy lines. Operating in the area of the villages of Pozhogi, Kaminskaya and Selishche of the Smolensk region, the detachment conducted reconnaissance, set up ambushes and attacked small groups of the enemy. The same operational groups under the command of V. I. Pudín, I. P. Golkovsky and others at the end of the summer of 1941 were sent to the enemy rear in the occupied territory of Belarus and Ukraine, in the Oryol and Kursk regions.

I want to tell you more about the Mitya detachment, which played a big role in the deployment of combat and reconnaissance operations of the OMSBON behind enemy lines. "Mitya" is Dmitry Nikolaevich

Medvedev, later Hero of the Soviet Union. Readers are well aware of his books "It was near Rivne", "Strong in spirit", "On the banks of the Southern Bug". Many are familiar with the exploits and stories of the intelligence chief of this detachment

A. A. Lukin and partisan doctor A. V. Tsessarsky. But few people know that this was Medvedev's second raid behind enemy lines. And the first one went like this. At the beginning of the war, Dmitry Nikolayevich came to the Special Group and said: "Send me to fight

behind enemy lines. I might go with the squad to the Bryansk region, to their native places. I know everything there.

Medvedev's proposal was accepted... He met the geologist Dmitry Dmitrievich Staroverov, an experienced polar explorer who led more than one geological party in peacetime. Medvedev offered him the post of chief of staff. The communist G. N. Kulakov, a young engineer who came to us on the direction of the Central Committee of the party, was appointed commissar in the Medvedev detachment. The raid began in September. Place to cross the front line

chose on the Desna River near the village of Belogolovl ... Now how get out of the front line as quickly and imperceptibly as possible, where fascist garrisons stood in almost every village, and enemy troops moved along the roads in cars, motorcycles or simply on foot ... Initially, the detachment settled in the Kletnyansky

forests. The entire population warmly welcomed the fighters. The detachment began to grow rapidly, it was joined by local residents and encircled soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. The former knew the area well, but, as a rule, they had no military experience, the latter were already ready-made fighters. They came to the detachment singly and in whole groups. So, the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M. Sipovich, V. Chichkanov, A. Tvorogov, N. Sarkisyan, M. Oborotov, I. Grudsky, I. Petrushin, I. Belov and many others came to the Medvedev detachment. Lieutenant I. M. Kuzin brought with him a group of sixteen people.

Medvedev established contact with local partisan detachments - Bezhetsky, Dyatkovsky, Lyudinovsky and others. They often worked together. The soul and leader of many military operations was D. D. Staroverov. Once, the head of intelligence of the detachment headquarters, Senior Lieutenant I. Pochinikin, received information about

relocation of the 576th German engineer battalion. The battalion worked on the section of the Varshavskoye highway - the main highway that fed the southern section of the enemy's central grouping. Medvedev's people have long wanted to deal with this battalion. And so the opportunity presented itself. With a group of fighters of the Old Believers detachment went
to the highway.

An all-terrain vehicle walked ahead of the battalion column, followed by two staff vehicles, a motorcycle, tankettes and trucks with soldiers.

- Skip the all-terrain vehicle! - Staroverov ordered quietly and reminded: - Signal - my shot. Staroverov's sniper shot

killed the driver of the staff car. She stopped helplessly across the highway. A second car hit her. Now everyone was shooting. Grenades were thrown at the cars. Tankettes turned back. Trucks followed them.

On the same day, the detachment's radio operator Anatoly Shmarinov reported to Moscow: "... the banner of the battalion, headquarters documents, weapons, food were captured, many enemy soldiers were destroyed ..."

The Hitlerite command, alarmed by the actions of the partisans, threw SS units against them. Autumn came, the

leaves were falling, and the forest was now visible far away. Snow soon fell. We tried to supply the Medveds with warm uniforms, weapons and food. But the Germans discovered the planes, and the pilots, afraid to give the punishers the location of the detachment, flew back. On October 10, information was received that a large detachment of punishers had appeared not far from the Medvedev camp. Staroverov decided to go into reconnaissance himself. He took with him two people - Captain I. I. Lukovenko and fighter Ivan Shaura - and went to the village of Bataevo. There lived a teacher who helped the partisans more than once. The Old Believers did not return from intelligence. The exhausted Ilya Lukovenko dragged the

wounded Shaura on him and for a long time could not begin the story ... The SS men surrounded the house. The Old Believers and their comrades jumped

out into the yard and took cover behind the earthen roof of the glacier. The fight has begun. Three pistols and one rifle against a whole bunch of punishers.

The first to fail was Shaura, struck down by two explosive bullets. Staroverov was also wounded, but continued to shoot. After

the second wound, the Staroverov ordered Lukovenko and Shaura to retreat. Lukovenko dragged Shaura to the ravine. Staroverov's well-aimed shots did not allow the punishers to stick out, and they apparently did not immediately realize that one person was left behind the roof of the glacier. Lukovenko listened to the shots. He tried several times to leave Shaura and rush to help Staroverov, but the groans of the wounded man stopped him ...

The corpse of the chief of staff of Medvedev was found behind the glacier. Staroverov did not surrender alive, he kept the last bullet for himself. Dmitry Dmitrievich Staroverov was buried with military honors. On November 13, the detachment had to endure a battle with punishers. It lasted four hours. The Germans launched mortars and heavy machine guns. The Medvedevs lost five people, six were wounded. Dmitry Nikolayevich ordered to retreat, but it was difficult to escape the persecution. The group of political instructor A.F. Bogolyubov came to the rescue: it covered the retreat and detained the punishers. Bogolyubov died in battle. Dmitry Nikolayevich himself was shell-shocked and wounded in the leg.

Medvedev and local partisan detachments left the Kletnyansky forests and went to the Mogilev region. December has come. Once the radio operator Shmarinov heard good news in his headphones: our troops were advancing. The enemy strike groups that threatened Moscow are retreating to the west. These days, the activity of the Medvedev detachment has increased. We received from the Bryansk forests information about the concentration of German troops in Bryansk and Benitsa, about the location of enemy airfields, about the construction of fortifications by the enemy along the banks of the Desna and Botva. Medvedev's men managed to obtain and send across the front line diagrams of these fortifications with detailed

descriptions. At the end of December, a military operation was conceived with the participation of Lyudinovsky and Lyatkovsky partisan detachments, called "The Night Before Christmas". Medvedev's intelligence found that the Germans were intensively moving troops and equipment in the eastern and northeastern directions. On the railroads Roslavl-Kirov and Bryansk-Sukhinichi, traffic intensity increased so much that trains with troops and military equipment sometimes passed every 15-20 minutes. It was clear that the purpose of these transfers was to stop the advance of the Red Army.

On the evening of December 25, the implementation of the plan began. The first group under the command of D.N. Medvedev blew up the bridge south of the Zikeevo station, interrupting traffic on the Bryansk-Sukhinichi line. The second group, led by Commissar G. N. Kulakov and the new chief of staff, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M. I. Sipovich, blew up an echelon with troops on the Roslavl-Kirov line. The partisans laid four mines under the railway bed at once and blew them up at the same time. The train was almost completely destroyed. Debris blocked the path. The exploded train (this was established by intelligence later) turned out to be the first echelon of the Nazi division being transferred from France to the Eastern Front. The third group consisted of local partisan detachments under the command of Smertin, Kuklin and Brant. She raided the Sudimir station, where, due to the explosion of the bridge, military trains accumulated near Zikeyev. The partisans fired on and threw grenades at the carriages and the station building, where the Nazi officers celebrated Christmas. There were traffic jams on the railway lines. Military echelons were stuck at the station semaphores. There was another group headed by intelligence chief Pochinikin. She was given the task of penetrating Zhizdra. It was not so difficult to disarm the guards at the commandant's

office and the police department. The department found a list of police officers with their addresses. The city was in the hands of the medical girls. Pochinikin, however, was afraid that the burgomaster had not managed to warn the neighboring garrisons. He called Zikeevo by phone. - Tell me, did you fulfill the request of the

burgomaster? - Which request? "Didn't he call you?" - No. What

is the request? - insisted on

the other end of the wire. "Well then, he will call you. Pochinikin hung up and cut the wire - the

connection was interrupted. Medvedev's men released the arrested from

prison, seized weapons and documents. In the morning, the entire population of the city gathered on the square. Residents learned about the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow. In front of the eyes of the entire population, traitors were executed - the chief of police and several policemen. When raiding Zhizdra

The Medvedevs captured the son of Prince Lvov, who was famous in pre-revolutionary times. He lived in our country under the name Korzukhin and carried out the tasks of Hitler's intelligence. At the beginning of the war he was drafted into the army, but immediately deserted and returned to his masters. In the occupied territory, Lvov served in the Gestapo and was considered a "specialist" in partisans. Addresses of the appearances of German agents in the rear of our country were confiscated from Lvov. "Korzukhin"-Lvov was delivered to Moscow by plane. The capture of the traitor and the testimony given by him made it possible to neutralize many fascist spies and saboteurs who settled in the Rakhsh regions of our country.

The Medvedevs stayed in the Lyutsinovo region for four months, and a few days later we met them in Moscow. In September 1941, a small group of 31 people went behind enemy lines, 272 returned.

Medvedev's experience has become a common property. There was no end to questions and inquiries. They were interested not only in military operations, but also in the way of life, the life of partisans. For OMSBON, the Medvedev's raid was of great importance. He showed that the combat operations of our detachments behind enemy lines are not only possible, but also very

effective. The feat of the Medvedevs was noted by the Soviet government. Thirty-three fighters and commanders were awarded orders and medals. D. N. Medvedev and G. N. Kulakov were awarded the Order of Lenin. D. D. Staroverov and A. F. Bogolyubov were posthumously awarded...

Then there were new raids, heated battles with the Nazis and their servants. ... The

battle began at dawn. Dense fire and minefields blocked the path of the skiers. There was nothing to suppress the firing points, and the machine guns raged in their brick shelters. Mines exploded in the snow. There were wounded and dead. With the onset of darkness, the attack resumed. Laznyuk brought part of his detachment to help Gorbachev's detachment, and the skiers hit from both sides. Under the cover of darkness, senior sergeant V. I. Borisovich approached the house, from

where he was scribbling an easel machine gun, and destroyed the crew with a grenade thrown through the window. The detachments broke into the village. The battle went on all night, then subsiding, then growing with renewed vigor. In the morning, the Germans stepped up the onslaught. The commanders decided to retreat. Feeling that the fire was weakening (ammunition approach

end), the enemy tried to cut off the path of the skiers. Laznyuk rushed forward: "Step

back, I'll cover you!"

Together with the commander, senior sergeant Nikolai Khudoleev voluntarily remained. Laznyuk and Khudoleev did not stop shooting until all the skiers had left the village. Now we had to leave. And the Germans continued to press. And then, blocking the noise of the battle, Khudoleyev shouted: - The first and

second companies from the flanks, the third company, follow me! Attack!

Forward! The decisive commanding voice led the Nazis for some time into confusion. That was enough. Laznyuk and Khudoleev jumped out of their hiding place and ran out of the village. Bullets whistled after them. Laznyuk and Khudoleev were already far away, and the danger seemed to have passed. Unexpectedly, the sergeant fell

into the snow... The next day, Laznyuk was already searching near the village of Khludnevo. Having sheltered the fighters in the forest, the senior lieutenant sent Alexei Kruglyakov's squad to reconnaissance. The soldiers returned an hour and a half later. The sergeant reported that there were over four hundred German soldiers in the village. Villagers huddle in dugouts, sheds and cellars. Scouts spotted four tanks and mortars on the streets.

After listening to Laznyuk's report, Colonel Eremin ordered him to go with part of the detachment to the village of Kotor and act on the instructions of the commander of the 1103rd regiment. At dawn, after artillery preparation, Laznyuk's detachment was supposed to strike at Khludnevo from the south, divert the attention of the enemy, and at this time the regiment's units would attack from the other side. At night, the skiers reached the starting line. The village was quiet. Not a single sound came from the other side of Khludnev, separated by a ravine. At the edge of the village, on a small hill, stood a long shed with a high, dilapidated roof. That's where the squad was. It was cold in the barn, but still warmer than in the field. Clinging to each other, the fighters tried to keep warm. As soon as the night sky began to turn gray, the guns hit. A dozen shells exploded in the village, and everything was silent. The Germans mistook this for an ordinary artillery attack and

remained in their homes. At Laznyuk's command, the skiers ran out of the barn and rushed to the houses and the ravine. The hushed village was filled with

Half-dressed German soldiers jumped out of their houses and came under fire from machine guns and carbines. Coming to their senses, the Nazis began to return fire. There were wounded among the skiers. Paramedic Molchanov ran from one fighter to another. Lazniuk was also wounded. The paramedic bandaged him, and the commander again rushed into the heat of battle. But then the frosty fog began to dissipate, and the Germans saw that they were being attacked by a small detachment of Red Army soldiers. Machine guns began to work more furiously, mines began to burst more often. Between the houses, in the ravines and gardens, the half-bent backs of soldiers in green overcoats flashed: the Nazis bypassed the skiers from the flanks. Through the explosions of mines and the crackle of machine guns, Lazniuk tried to catch the sounds of battle on the other side of the village. But it was quiet there. Units of

the 1103rd regiment did not start the attack.

Meanwhile, the skiers were already running out of ammunition. "We must withdraw," the senior lieutenant decided. He signaled to retreat towards the large shed. At that moment, Lazniuk was wounded a second time, he fell. Commissar M.T. Egortsev took command of the detachment. He ordered Lazniuk to be taken out of the battlefield. The commander was carried by Alexei Kruglyakov, who was also wounded. Jumping and crawling, the skiers retreated to a large barn with hay. Sergeant Yevgeny Anufriev also withdrew. To his left, he noticed a fighter who quickly and deftly crawled through the snow. Suddenly, a haze of tracer bullets flashed around him, and the soldier's legs, pierced by machine-gun fire, stretched out lifelessly. But the fighter was alive. He pulled out a grenade and, when the Germans ran up to him, waved his hand. The explosion scattered the soldiers to the sides. Everything happened so quickly that Anoufrieiev did not have time to see who it was. In the bushes Yevgeny noticed Kruglyakov and crawled up to him. Laznyuk lay next to Alexei. Together they lifted the commander and led him

away. Lazniuk trod heavily on the snow, often hanging entirely on the arms of his companions. What happened in Khludpeve later we learned from the stories of local residents and two wounded soldiers, Boris Perlin and Ivan Korolkov, who managed to get out of the village. The Germans surrounded the barn where the remnants of the detachment had gathered. One by one, the fighters dropped out. But no one gave up and asked for mercy. Fought to the end. The last was the deputy political instructor Lazar Papernik. In a

pistol in hand, he rose to meet the enemies. This is how Boris Perlin remembered him, lying wounded on the hay in the barn. Papernik also noticed Perlin. —

Boris! he shouted. "Tell the boys that I died honestly. He managed to fire several shots before the enemies attacked him. And when the Nazis surrounded him, intending to capture him alive, there was a dull explosion of a grenade. Together with the hero, about a dozen fascists died. When it was all over, the Nazis attacked the corpses. They tore off felt boots, short fur coats, earflaps, stabbed the dead with bayonets, discharged machine guns into lifeless bodies.

On February 14, 1942, the whole country learned about the feat of Laznyuk's skiers. Pravda published an article by a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army, Divisional Commissar A. A. Lobachev, "Heroes of skiers". All twenty-two dead fighters and commanders were forever enlisted in the lists of the 2nd regiment of the OMSBON. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

USSR of June 21, 1942, L. Kh. Papernik was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Detachment commander K. 3. Laznyuk and commissar M. T. Egortsev, junior lieutenant P. N. Slavtsky, foreman I. E. Boychenko, military assistant who died in battle

A. P. Molchanov, Sergeant G. V. Seryakov, Red Army soldiers V. P. Averkin, M. A. Aulov, P. I. Bocharov, A. A. Birman, M. V. Golovakha, E. V. Deshin, V. Ya. Zakharov, A. I. Kishkel, I. G. Kopytov, N. F. Lebedev, I. I. Lyagushev, V. F. Moskalenko, A. N. Alesik, M. V. Solovyov, A. P. Khrapin, M. M. Yastrebov were awarded the Order of Lenin. On the same night of January 23, another battle took place on the highway between the villages of Shvanovo and Bryn, short, but no less fierce ... But in this short battle, Colonel Orlov (as reported in the report), Captain Gorbachev and fourteen skiers.

... In April 1942, I went to the headquarters of the 16th Army. Member of the Military Council A. A. Lobachev went with me to the places of recent battles. We visited Kisheevka, Khludnev and Bryni. Political instructor Chernichenko, who, on the instructions of Lobachev, in hot pursuit, collected materials about the skiing heroes, told us many details. We also visited the highway where Gorbachev and his soldiers died. From there we went to Bryn. On the mass grave there was a column with the inscription

on plywood board. Among the names I read: Colonel Orlov M. F. Not everyone has the opportunity to visit their own grave. I even got sweat on my forehead. It turned out that this was my namesake, the head of intelligence, who had recently arrived in the 328th division, and no one knew his name and patronymic. Apparently, one of our fighters decided that the killed colonel was the commander of the OMSBON. Fierce fighting

continued at the front. The Nazis tried with all their might to retain important lines near Moscow and tenaciously held on to Rzhev, Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Lyudinovo, Zhizdra, Bryansk. The OMSBON command decided

to help our troops at the front and focused its attention on the area of Smolensk and the Bryansk forests. The most important communications passed through Smolensk and Bryansk, feeding the Nazi troops near Vyazma and Rzhev, Kirov and Lyudinovo. Our task was to systematically strike at these communications, disable railway lines, blow up trains, bridges, destroy enemy soldiers and military equipment ... In February and March 1942, more than

twenty newly formed detachments under the command of S.

A. Vaupshasov, A. I. Voropaev, F. F. Ozmitel, S. A.

Kaminsky, P. G. Lopatin, M. G. Khvostov, A. G. Mironov, M. K. Bazhanova, N. S. Artamonova, N. A. Balashova, P. Ya. Popova, G. F. Shevchenko, A. P. Shestakova, P. G. Shemyakina M. S. Prudnikova, I. M. Kuzina, V L. Neklyudov, E. I. Mirkovsky, P. A. Korovin and others ... I skimmed through the list of Vasin's detachment, given to me by the typist. If this list fell into the hands of an experienced fan, he would consider that this is the composition of the Soviet team at some international sports competition. There were Nikolai Shatov - a famous weightlifter, eight-time champion of the USSR and world record holder, Mikhail Ivankovich, who, together with the Znamensky brothers, went to Paris to cross-country "Humanite", rower Alexander Dolgushin, discus throwers Leonid Mitrovolsky and Ali Isaev, cyclist Viktor Zaipold, gymnast Sergei Korzhuev, swimmer Konstantin Madey - you can't count everyone. Many of the soldiers of this detachment were no longer alive. Junior Lieutenant Grigory Pylnov, a famous wrestler, died.

The list was missing both Captain Vasin himself and the commissar of the detachment Utyashev. The commander and commissar died, the detachment thinned out, but the combat mission remained, and it must be completed.

Who should be put in charge of the detachment? We stopped at the senior adjutant of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment, Captain Anatoly Petrovich Shestakov. He had already distinguished himself in battles near Moscow and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Political instructor V.S. Pegov was appointed commissar of the detachment, and V.V. Rykin was appointed head of

intelligence. The unit was given the code name "Glorious". In early February, Anatoly Petrovich Shestakov and his assistants left for Kozelsk, where the detachment was located. At the headquarters of the 16th Army, Shestakov was warmly welcomed. Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky in a short time resolved all issues related to the crossing of the front line.

"These are the soldiers who helped us near Moscow," he explained to his officers and ordered the head of the intelligence department to send the detachment across the front line. I must say that from that moment we established constant contact with the command of the 16th Army - K. K. Rokossovsky, A. A. Lobachev and M. S. Malinin; they helped us whenever needed. Yes, and they themselves were able to assess the possibilities of our work and more than once turned to the OMSBON with a request to send special detachments to the deep rear of the Nazi troops operating on their front. A few days later, Shestakov went on the air. The radiogram reported that the Glorious detachment had successfully penetrated behind enemy

lines. The details of how the locals met the detachment were told to me much later by the detachment's doctor, Ilya Davydov. In difficult conditions, having crossed the front line, the fighters wandered in snow-covered forests for about three days in severe frost. Almost in all villages there were German garrisons, but people needed at least a little rest. Finally, the scouts reported to Shestakov that there were no fascists in the forest village of Dum-lovo, and fighters were waiting there. The entire population came out to meet the detachment. Women, seeing the red stars on their hats, wept with joy: the Red Army has come! The headman, who turned out to be an honest Soviet man, did everything possible to keep the fighters warm, rested, and slept. Om-Sbonovtsy told residents about the November parade in Moscow, and in the surrounding

The news spread to the villages that the fighters had come straight from Red Square. A few

days after the departure of the detachment, the Germans broke into Dumlovo and, threatening the headman with execution, demanded to see the partisan camp. The headman led the punishers through the forest for a long time and finally led them to the old camp, built by the Med-Vedevs. Seeing the abandoned dugouts, the Nazis brutally dealt with the patriot ...

ON THE PATH OF BETRAYAL

The Germans did not complete the command of the eastern parts of the Slavs. However, several independent Russian units with Russian commanders were still formed in 1941-1945. RUSSIAN NATIONAL ARMY The

first of these formations was the 1st Russian

National Army (RNA) under the command of B. Holmston Smyslovsky, a former Russian army officer who rose to the rank of major in the Wehrmacht troops. The basis of the RNA was the Russian battalion, formed in the Baltic states in July 1941. In 1945, this unit, called "Special Division" K ", already had 20 thousand people, reduced to 12 infantry battalions.

In December 1943, the German command ordered the division to be disbanded; in April 1944, it was restored, but in the form of separate battalions and companies scattered along the Eastern and Western fronts. In January 1945, the

Germans agreed to the creation of a single unit under the command of Holmston-Smyslovsky, which this time was called the 1st Russian National Army. The personnel of the army was recruited mainly from prisoners of war and defectors, but among the senior officers there was a significant number of emigrants of the first wave.

The army consisted of 6,000 men, divided into two regiments. IN April 1945, when the position of Germany was already without

reliably, Holmston-Smyslovsky gave the order to retreat to the west. At the beginning of May, the Smyslovsky group, reduced to this

time to 2000 people, reached the Austrian city of Feldkirch, and then crossed the border of Liechtenstein, where she was interned. The Liechtenstein government refused to hand over the internees to the Soviet representatives and allowed anyone who did not want to return to the Soviet Union to emigrate. This opportunity was used by about 400 people, including Smyslovsky himself. He went to Argentina, where he became a government counterterrorism adviser. The Russian People's National Army (RNNA), under

the command of first Colonel Ivanov, then Colonel Boyarsky, and finally Colonel Riel, began to form in February 1942 in the village of Osintorf in Belarus. Its personnel was recruited mainly from camp prisoners of war. The total number of RNNA reached 4000 people. She did not take part in hostilities, apart from several expeditions against partisans. In February 1943, the RNNA was included in the Wehrmacht as the 700th Special Purpose Regiment, which was located in the Minsk region until the end of the year. At the end of 1941, engineer K. Voskoboynikov created a military unit in the Bryansk region from local residents and

prisoners of war, later called the Russian Liberation People's Army (RONA). B. Kaminsky became its commander. By 1942, the RONA numbered about 10 thousand people and consisted of 5 infantry regiments, 1 tank and 1 anti-aircraft battalion. In the area controlled by RONA (in the Lokt area), a kind of Russian self-government was established. The Germans almost did not appear in those places. RONA soldiers actively acted against the Bryansk partisans. At the end of 1943, they were evacuated to Belarus, to the Polotsk region. In the summer of 1944, after a successful anti-partisan operation in the Lepel-Polotsk region, the Kaminsky brigade was reassigned to the SS and became known as the 29th SS Grenadier Division. Kaminsky, who received an audience with the Reichsführer SS Himmler, received the rank of SS brigdeführer.

A black page in the history of the Kaminsky division was its participation in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising. The 1,700 soldiers of the brigade brought into the city literally flooded the Okhota region with blood. On August 5, 1944, Kaminsky's soldiers staged a terrible and comp

causeless massacre (in the areas of Okhota and in the neighboring area - Volya - there were practically no rebels), killing more than 15 thousand people in less than a day. Among the victims of Kaminsky were many Germans, including relatives of German officers. On August 8, the commander of the 9th German army, parts of which occupied Warsaw, General von Foremann, sent a protest against the actions of the soldiers of the 29th SS division, responsible for suppressing the uprising, SS Obergruppenführer Erich von den Bach-

Zelevsky. After 20 days, Kaminsky's fighters were withdrawn from Warsaw, and he himself was brought to a military court and shot. Until mid-October 1944, the 29th SS division was located in the Kampinosky forest near Warsaw, after which it was disarmed, and its personnel were sent to recruit the 1st infantry division of the ROA. **THE**

RUSSIAN CORPS

The Russian diaspora in Yugoslavia has always had right-wing political views, which is not surprising, given that a significant number of Wrangel's army officers settled there. They regarded the German invasion of the USSR as the beginning of a "liberation campaign against Bolshevism." And on September 12, 1941, an order appeared, signed by General Skorodumov, on the formation of the Russian Corps. A recruitment of volunteers began, the gathering place of which was the Topchider barracks in Belgrade. Already on September

14, the first corps commander Skorodumov, who quarreled with the Germans, was arrested by the Gestapo, but General Shteifon, the former chief of staff of Kutepov's army, continued his work. He managed to create a fairly large and well-trained formation. Those who joined the corps sought to Russia in order to personally take part in the liberation of their homeland from the communist yoke. But the Germans had other plans in this regard. As we have already said, they were afraid to send a large Russian formation to the east, and even led by Russian officers. In addition, they needed forces to fight the growing partisan movement in Yugoslavia. As a result, the Russian Corps (at various times also called the Russian Security Corps and the Russian Security Group) fought in Yugoslavia against the partisans until 1945, and at the end of the war against the Red Army and its newfound allies, the Bulgarians.

During the war, the Germans increasingly began to attract units formed from Soviet prisoners of war and defectors to directly participate in hostilities. The so-called eastern troops appeared in the Wehrmacht.

The Eastern troops are often understood as all volunteer units of the German army, recruited from Soviet citizens, which is not true. The Germans themselves used this term in relation only to the national (Turkestan and Caucasian) legions, Slavic and Baltic field battalions. SS troops, police, Cossacks, in the strict sense, are not

were.

As noted above, in the German divisions, entire units were manned by Russians. Replenished by prisoners of war and the civilian population, they grew to the size of battalions that wore the numbers of their divisions. In the spring of 1943, these battalions were withdrawn from the divisions and thus became independent units under the command of German officers. In total, in 1942-1943, 54 Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian field battalions were created, which had

the following numbers: 263, 308, 601-626, 627-650, 653, 661-666, 674. Some of these battalions were used against partisans, and some fought at the front as ordinary combat units.

The formation of national battalions began a little earlier - in November-December 1941. In November, one Estonian (No. 658) and two Latvian battalions (No. 659-660) were formed. Initially, they operated as part of the German, and later were included in the formed Estonian and Latvian SS units.

In December 1941, Turkish General Erkilet visited Hitler's headquarters, who, among other things, petitioned for the release of prisoners of war - Caucasians and Asians. Hitler not only agreed with the general, but also authorized the formation of national legions. On December 30, the corresponding OKW directive was signed. The personnel of the legions being created were concentrated in Poland: Turkestan - in Legionov; (later renamed the Muslim Caucasian Azerbaijan) and the Volga-Tatar legions - in Eldns;

Sverokavkazsky - in Vezola; Georgian - in Kruzhina; Armenian - in Pulawy. The Legion

also housed a school for national non-commissioned officers. officers and officers.

It should be clarified that the term "legion" served only to refer to all formations of one nationality. The main operational-tactical unit of the Eastern troops was the battalion. National battalions were formed from the spring of 1942 in several stages, or, in German terminology, "waves". The first wave was in the spring of 1942, when two Turkestan battalions (No. 450 and 452) were formed. The second wave falls on the autumn of 1942: Turkestan battalions No. 781-784; Georgian Nos. 795 and 796; North Caucasian Nos. 800-802; Azerbaijani Nos. 804 and 805; Armenian Nos. 808 and 809. In the spring of 1943, Turkestan battalions No. 785-789 were formed;

Georgian Nos. 797-799 and 822; North Caucasian No. 803; Azerbaijani Nos. 806, 807, 817, 818; Armenian #810-813 and Volga Tatar #825-827. Finally, the last wave refers to the summer-autumn of 1943. Then the

Turkestan battalions No. 790-792 were created; Armenian #814-816; Azerbaijani Nos. 819 and 820; Georgian Nos. 823 and 824; Tatar Nos. 828-831; North Caucasian battalions No. 835-837. In total, 108 field eastern battalions were created, of which about one third fought at the front, and the rest were sent to fight the partisans, and also guarded the German rear and communications. Each battalion consisted of about a thousand people, of whom there were no more than 40-50 Germans (mainly officers and non-commissioned officers). In addition to the listed battalions, larger units were formed: the 1st Eastern Reserve Regiment "Center", located in Bobruisk;

volunteer regiment "Desna" - in Bryansk. The 709th Special Purpose Regiment operated in the Bryansk forests; The 45th Eastern Jaeger Regiment guarded the rear of Army Group North.

In early 1944, the British and Americans who fought in Italy were surprised to find that some of the German soldiers they captured had far from Aryan slanted eyes and a typically Asian type of face. With no small surprise, they learned that against them

there is a whole division recruited by the Germans from the inhabitants of Soviet

Central Asia. The Turkestan 162nd Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht was formed from the summer of 1943 at the Neuhammer training ground, in Silesia, from the soldiers of the national legions transferred to the west. In October, the formation of the division was completed, and it was sent to Italy, where

it operated until the end of the war. In August 1942, the German officer Otto Doll, accompanied only by a driver and a radio operator, went by car to the Kalmyk steppes to establish contacts with anti-Soviet Kalmyks. Doll promised them "after the war" the creation of an independent Kalmykia under the tutelage of Germany. The main result of Doll's trip was the appearance of Kalmyk formations in the German army. Separate Kalmyk cavalry formations were attached to the German divisions operating on the southern sector of the front, where they were used for reconnaissance and security services. In August 1943, the Kalmyk

Cavalry Corps (KKK) was created on the basis of seven cavalry squadrons. Soon the corps was replenished with a significant number of volunteers from among the Kalmyks who left along with the retreating Germans. The corps was subordinated to the rear units of the Wehrmacht, operating on the southern sector of the front (the Caucasus, and then Ukraine). The corps then retreated to Poland, where it first participated in a major battle near Radom in January 1945 and suffered heavy losses. After that, he was withdrawn for reorganization to Bavaria. In March 1945, the Kalmyk formations were included in the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps as a separate dismounted cavalry regiment.

COLLABORATIONISTS "Against us stands a

hundred and eighty million

people - a mixture of races whose names are impossible to pronounce and whose appearance is such that they must be killed without mercy and mercy. These are beasts ... they cannot be treated like decent soldiers," SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler said about the Soviet people in his speech on July 13, 1944. However, much earlier, the same Himmler authorized the recruitment of volunteers from among the SS troops.

representatives of the peoples of the USSR. By the time the said speech was delivered, their number had reached about 300,000

people. **BALTIC UNITS** The first eastern

SS unit was the Estonian battalion "Narva", included in the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking". He participated in the Battle of Kursk, and in 1944 he almost completely died in the Cherkasy (Korsun-Shemenkovsky) "boiler".

August 28, 1942 Himmler signs the directive on the creation of the Estonian SS legion. On October 13, the first group of Estonians leaves for Germany, to the Heide training camp, where the formation of the 3rd Estonian SS Volunteer Brigade begins. Already on November 17, 1943, the Estonian brigade arrived at the front in the Nevel region, at the site of Army Group North. In January 1944, the Estonian brigade was deployed to the 20th SS Grenadier Division, which had the unofficial name "Estland". The German authorities carried out three conscriptions in the SS unit - in December 1943, in August 1944 and in January 1945. In the spring and summer of 1944, the Estonian SS division fought in the Narva region. After the Russian troops occupied Narva, "Estland" retreated to Tallinn. Until September 22, she defended the approaches to the Tallinn harbor, and then joined the retreating units of the Wehrmacht. In the stubborn

summer and autumn battles of 1944, the 20th SS division lost up to half of its personnel. The German command decided to withdraw the bloodless division to the rear for rest and reorganization. Until the spring of 1945, the soldiers

of the Estonian division were on vacation in Silesia. At the end of April, some of them were able to fight their way into Western Bohemia, where they capitulated to the Americans. The rest of the soldiers and officers either died in battles with the Soviet troops, or were captured by them. The order on the creation of

the Latvian SS units was signed on November 4, 1942,

on February 23 of the following year, the mobilization of draft-age Latvians began, as a result of which 2,200 people were recruited into the SS troops. At the same time, 6,000 people evaded the draft. At the same time, the formation of the Latvian SS volunteer brigade began, which in the fall of 1943 was sent to the front in the Ostrov region, as well as to the section of the group

armies "North", where it was until February 1944. The Latvians did not conduct major military operations there.

In the spring of 1944, the Latvian SS brigade was deployed to the 19th Grenadier Division. At the same time, the second, the 15th Latvian SS division, was also formed. In July of

the same year, both divisions were included in the 6th SS Volunteer Corps and sent to the front along the Latvian-Russian border. Ironically, the Latvian 13th Rifle Corps was operating on the same sector of the front from the Soviet side. As a result, a temporary truce was established there, which lasted until the Soviet command replaced the 133rd Corps with other troops. By August 1944, the German defense was broken through, and henceforth the two Latvian divisions acted

separately, the 15th SS division was withdrawn to East Prussia, where it was temporarily disarmed. In January 1945, the Latvians were sent to Pomerania, where they fought hard battles against the Soviet troops. In March of the same year, the 15th SS division was again withdrawn to the rear. In April, part of it retreated to the mouth of the Elbe, where it was captured by the Americans, a small group of Latvians from the 15th division participated in the defense of Berlin, and the bulk ended up in the Neu-Ruppin area, where on May 7, 1945, surrendered to the Red Army. The 19th SS Grenadier Division retreated to Courland in the fall of 1944. There she fought continuous heavy

battles with the Soviet troops and on May 10, 1945, capitulated along with the entire German group.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS AGAINST FRENCH PATRIOTS

The recruitment of Ukrainians into the SS began in April 1943, when 40,000 people came to the assembly points, of which 30,000 were declared fit for service. Approximately two-thirds of the Ukrainian contingent was sent to a training camp in Neuhammer, in Silesia, where the formation of the 14th SS division "Galicia" (1st Galician) began. Of the remaining 10,000, "Dead Head" units were formed, designed to guard concentration camps.

The history of the Ukrainian parts of the "Dead Head" is still almost unknown. In the autumn of 1943, Ukrainians, numbering about a regiment, guarded Buchenwald. Several Ukrainian companies guarded the Auschwitz camp. Information about this is contained in the memoirs of the surviving prisoners of these camps.

But back to the history of the 14th SS division. In May 1944, she was sent to the Carpathians, where she fought with the few pro-communist partisan detachments in those places. There were also clashes with formations of the Ukrainian rebel army. In 1989, a monument was erected in the Lviv region to 29 UPA soldiers who were shot by SS men from the Galicia division. Soon the division, renamed by that time from "Galician" to

"Ukrainian", was included in the German 13th Army Corps. On July 13, the Soviet offensive began in the Carpathians, and already on the 18th, "Galicia", not having time to cross the Western Bug, was surrounded, from which it emerged with colossal losses: out of 18 thousand people, only three thousand remained in the ranks.

In August 1944, the remnants of the division were withdrawn to Slovakia. After a long rest and reorganization, separate parts of the division participated in the suppression of the Slovak national uprisings.

In the winter-spring of 1945, on the basis of the Galicia division, the formation of the Ukrainian national army began under the command of Pavlo Shandruk. The 14th SS division was henceforth referred to as the 1st division of the UNA. Until the end of the war, she acted in Northern Yugoslavia against Tito's partisans and on May 5 capitulated to the British. Shandruk was able to save his soldiers from being deported to the Soviet Union by telling the British that they were all Polish citizens.

In 1944, together with the German troops, the Siegling police brigade recruited from local residents, named after the commander, also retreated. The 30th SS division "Weissrutenia" was formed from the rest. In German documents and literature, it is referred to differently - either the "1st Belarusian" or the "2nd Russian" division. In August 1944, Weissrutenia was sent to France, to the Belfort region, where she fought for a short time with

French partisans "poppies". In November, she was withdrawn to Germany and disbanded. Its soldiers were sent to the units of the Russian Liberation Army that were being created, and the German officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to the 25th and 38th SS divisions.

COSSACKS July 22, 1941 to the commander of the German Army Group "Center" von Schenkendorff was a truce from the Soviet 436th Infantry Regiment of the 155th Division with a proposal to surrender. Having received assurances of safety from the Germans, the regimental commander gathered the fighters and outlined his intentions to them. He ended with the words: "Those who want to go with me (go over to the Germans) let them stand on the right, those who want to stay on the left." All as one stood on the right.

This was the first mass transfer of Soviet soldiers to the side of the enemy. The commander of the 436th regiment was Major Ivan Nikitich Kononov, who later commanded the 3rd Plastun division of the 15th Cossack cavalry corps of the Wehrmacht. It was to him that von Schenkendorf offered to form the first Cossack unit in the Wehrmacht - the Cossack squadron No. 102, created from prisoners of war in the Mogilev region. Later, with the active participation of Kononov, six more Cossack squadrons appeared, the main task of which was to fight the partisans.

On November 16, 1941, a directive was issued by the main command of the Wehrmacht ground forces on the formation of Cossack hundreds with each of the 10 security divisions of the Eastern Front. Cossack units were also created at the headquarters of German tank divisions. There their task was reconnaissance and protection. As part of the 40th tank corps, the 82nd Cossack squadron fought under the command of Zagorodny. In the summer of 1942, the formation of the Platov and Jungshultz regiments began - the first Cossack units to receive their own uniform, reminiscent of the uniform of the Russian imperial army. Both regiments operated on the southern sector of the Eastern Front and were constantly replenished with volunteers from among defectors and prisoners of war. On June 18, 1942, an order was issued to establish a center for the formation of Cossack units in Slavuta (Ukraine). All the Cossacks from the POW camps were taken there. During the year, seven Cossack regiments were created from them. At the end of the same year, a department for

the formation of Cossack troops led by the former Colonel of the Red Army Sarkisyan, whose efforts recruited another 15 regiments numbering from 800 to 1300 people. For the training of Cossack officers, the 1st Cossack named after Count Platov, the cadet school in Slavuta and the non-commissioned officer school in Vitebsk, were opened. The teachers of both educational institutions were mainly Germans, and the students were Cossacks who already had combat experience. A new stage in

the creation of Cossack units begins in the autumn of 1942, when the German army occupied the regions of the Don, Kuban and Terek. In September, the headquarters of the Don army was created, headed by Ataman Pavlov, and on November 15 of the same year, the declaration of the Don army was published, which proclaimed the restoration of the constitution of 1918 and the establishment of "Cossack power" on the Don. The Germans, whose situation in southern Russia was deteriorating every day, reacted to the proclaimed declaration

without visible hostility. April 21, 1943 the German command issues an order to create the first Cossack division. The formation took place at the training ground in Milau (currently Mlava), where Cossack units from the Eastern Front were gathered, including the Platov and Yungshults regiments, as well as the Kononov regiment. By the autumn of 1943, the division, commanded by Helmut von Pannwitz - "a German with the soul of a Cossack", consisted of 18,555 people, consolidated into six regiments. The Cossack division was originally intended for operations on the Soviet-German front, but the sharply increased activity of Tito's partisans forced the Germans to send it to the Balkans. She stayed there until the

very end of the war. In the fall of 1943, the Nazi army began to retreat from southern Russia. Together with the Germans, at least 100 thousand refugees departed - Cossacks who did not want to remain "under Soviet rule." A significant part of them crossed from the Taman Peninsula to the Crimea, from where they were transferred to the Kherson region. On November 10, the German government adopted a declaration in which the Cossacks were proclaimed "allies of the Reich." It said that Germany takes the Cossacks under its protection and undertakes to provide them with territory for temporary resettlement.

At the end of 1943, the Cossack refugees formed the so-called Cossack camp, headed by S. Pavlov. The district was determined as a place for the settlement

Peremyshl. However, the rapid advance of the Red Army forced the Cossacks to retreat further west. In the end, they were able to settle only in the Tolmezzo Friuli region in northern Italy.

At the end of 1944, the Cossack camp, commanded by T. Domanov by that time, numbered 24 thousand people, of which at least 16 thousand were old people, women and children. Cossacks subordinated to Domanov did not conduct active hostilities, but they constantly had to repel the attacks of Italian partisans. In early May 1945, the German command demanded that Domanov launch an offensive against the British troops, but he refused to obey the order and took his people north to Austria.

In February 1945, on the basis of the Cossack division of von Pannwitz, the formation of the 15th Cossack cavalry corps began, nominally included in the SS troops. The corps consisted of two cavalry and one foot (plastun) division. Its number reached 25 thousand people. Until the end of the war, the Cossack Corps was in Yugoslavia, where it fought with local partisans and Soviet troops.

In May 1945, almost all the Cossack formations of the Wehrmacht concentrated in Austria, where they capitulated to the British. The latter, punctually fulfilling the terms of the Yalta Treaty, deported all the Cossacks who fell into their hands to the USSR. Cossack generals and senior officers - Krasnov, Domanov, von Pannwitz, Shkuro and others - were sentenced to death by a Soviet court, and most ordinary Cossacks ended their life in Siberian and polar camps.

* * *

<i>DID STALIN PREPARE THE SURRENDER OF MOSCOW?..</i>

It's impossible to say for sure yet. However, some unknown facts have recently been discovered that allow us to take a slightly different look at the events that took place in 1941 in Moscow. The capital, of course,

did not want to give up without a fight. Barricades were built from sandbags in dangerous directions. close

the cannonade of enemy guns urged the Muscovites to do this work day and night. The lines of refugees stretching along the roads carried rumors that the Germans had allegedly already approached Khimki. And yet, none of the Muscovites admits the thought that Moscow will bow to conqueror.

Cheerful marches on the radio only confirm the defenders of the capital and residents in their hopes. Meanwhile, as the documents show, Stalin was not completely sure that Moscow could be defended. Here is what state security officer Mikhailov (this is his pseudonym) told on the pages of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper about how Moscow was preparing for a secret war that was to unfold if the Germans entered the capital: "An underground was created in Moscow. Hundreds

and hundreds of volunteers had to renounce their names and biographies. At a time when air battles were going on over the city, in offices behind darkened windows, people of various professions received new passports, passwords, appearances. Their fictitious surnames were inscribed in the house books. So no check could find fakes. I, too, was ordered to stay underground. The apartment in the artistic house, in which I was placed, was supposed to be one of the appearances for the main resident in Moscow - Fedotov. I was given new documents - I was listed as an employee of the People's Commissariat of Railways. I remember such an episode. In the city of Chekhov near Moscow, a new stream of "patients" suddenly entered the psychiatric hospital. They were also underground. Each of them got a "case history", as they say, you can't dig. Then came to this hospital and the new deputy chief physician for economic affairs - it was officer Gennady Nikolaevich Kalinin. So one of the large combat detachments took refuge in Chekhov ...

In Moscow in October 1941, some buildings, factory shops, and railway stations were mined. The threat looming over Moscow was too great... Everyone who laid mines had a soul torn with grief. However, they were preparing to blow up buildings if they housed German units, and factory workshops in which the Germans could establish military production. Just one example. In those days, officer V. A. Arapov, an electrical engineer by education, was sent to a car factory. He became a foreman in the shop. Meanwhile, Arapov received

the task is to blow up the workshop as soon as the Germans appear in it. One of our officers, V.A. Drozdov, became the head of the pharmacy department of the capital. It was assumed that he could gain confidence in the Germans when they came for medicines. Meanwhile, in his apartment, cluttered with bookshelves, a remote control was equipped, to which the wires from the land mines were pulled. He had to wait for the order - when to press the buttons ...

If the Muscovites who went to the east could look into some apartments in the center of Moscow in those days, the case could turn into lynching. After the end of air raids, the apartments were hastily polished: chandeliers and carpets were cleaned, volumes of books in German were placed on the shelves.

Among those who had to remain underground were people who could give him a completely respectable cover. In Vladivostok in 1941, the forgotten characters of our history were found and brought to Moscow. These were former deputies of the People's Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic Vrublevsky and Myachina. They also agreed to become underground workers. Well-known scientists, artists, priests, members of religious sects were supposed to enter the Moscow underground. ... The situation at the

front near Moscow was too serious. However, the country's top leadership remained in the Kremlin. As you know, the plane for Stalin was at the ready at the Central Aerodrome. At the same time, in Nizhny Novgorod and Samara, spare premises were hastily built for the Headquarters, in case the country's top leadership had to leave Moscow. Everyone knows about the November 7, 1941 parade in Moscow. Meanwhile, there were other events that have remained unforgettable in the memory. The snow-covered streets are deserted, only rare passers-by. And in the Hall of Columns there is a concert in which the best artists participate. We believed in victory, but in war, as in war. They were also preparing for the worst turn of events ... In a word, was the fate of Napoleon prepared for Hitler in Moscow? Fires, blown up buildings? A special operation was developed to physically eliminate Hitler. The Germans then trumpeted to the whole world that they would hold a parade on Red Square. And Hitler will greet his soldiers. Among those who were going to stay in the Moscow underground, there was a man who

prepared to carry out an assassination attempt on Hitler. This is the famous composer L. K. Knipper. He wrote a wonderful song "On the Lyushko-field", the author of symphonies, musical poems. In those troubled days, this talented man volunteered to put his life on the line. He was the nephew of the famous Moscow Art Theater actress O. L. Knipper-Chekhova and a relative of the artist Olga Chekhova, who lived in Berlin. At concerts and receptions, she often appeared next to Hitler. Lev Konstantinovich Knipper proposed the following assassination plan: he could, using family ties, be introduced to Hitler in Moscow, say, during a concert. And then... In fact, preparing to commit an act of retribution, L. K. Knipper left himself almost no chance to survive.

... In Moscow, caches with weapons were created. On the appointed day, the battle groups were to act at once in the rear of the Germans at a single signal. In the car of the "caretaker" from the city of Chekhov, G. N. Kalinin, there was a radio station. It was he who, having received the order, should notify the underground: "The time has come for" H ". Thousands of people were preparing to conduct reconnaissance in the city, so that later, taking weapons from shelters, they would attack

German military installations. All this, of course, was classified. And after more than half a century, this is almost unknown. But, as they say, thank God that none of this happened. In the snow-covered trenches near Dubosekovo, political instructor Klochkov said then: "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat. Behind - Moscow!

HOW THE SON OF KHRUSHCHEV WAS SHOT

(Version)

One of the secrets of the "Stalin era" is the tragic fate of Dmitry Khrushchev's eldest son Nikita Sergeevich (from his first marriage). But he finally became the property of the press. And pass it on! him for the press, the old Chekist, Major General Vadim Udi, yuv. During the war, - said V.

Udilov, - Dmitry Khrushchev, a mobilization soldier of the Red Army, was captured by

Germans. Of course, not alone, but as part of a surrounded unit. He became the second offspring of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (the first was Stalin's son Yakov Dzhugashvili, a senior lieutenant, commander of an artillery battery), who was captured by the Nazis.

The enemy decided to use Khrushchev's son for propaganda purposes. Stalin ordered - at all costs to steal the prisoner. This difficult task was entrusted to Lieutenant General Pavel Sudoplatov. "The first saboteur of the Land of Soviets" brilliantly coped with Stalin's task. Through the partisan airfield, Khrushchev's son was taken

to Moscow. Counterintelligence collected testimonies and documents "irrefutably proving the betrayal of the son of Politburo member N. S. Khrushchev. On the basis of these false documents, the military tribunal of the Moscow Military District sentenced him to capital punishment - execution. Nikita Sergeevich, before the war the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, during the war a member of the military council of a number of fronts, lieutenant general, appealed to the Politburo of the CPSU (b) with a request to review the decision of the tribunal. Stalin invited everyone to speak.

The first to take the floor was Alexander Shcherbakov, who held high posts during the war years: Secretary of the Central Committee, Head of the Heads of the political department of the Red Army and the Military Marine Fleet, head of the Soviet Information Bureau.

Much depended on his opinion. Shcherbakov recalled Lenin's words about the need for a uniform understanding of the law for everyone. He suggested that the verdict be upheld. Beria, Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov supported him. In conclusion, Stalin spoke. He must have had the hardest time of all. He remembered Jacob. By his decision, as if in advance, he signed the verdict for his son. As you know, according to archival documents (Abwehr - Hitler's military intelligence)

discovered in Germany, Yakov Dzhugashvili behaved with dignity in captivity, but, realizing the hopelessness of his situation (he was kept in a special officer camp), committed suicide, threw himself on barbed wires under high voltage. "We certainly treat our comrade in the Politburo with respect," Stalin said. - Nikita Sergeevich needs to fasten himself and

agree with the views of comrades. If the same happens to my son, I will accept this harsh but fair sentence."

After the death of Stalin and the coming to power of Khrushchev in life The participants in the described events have undergone fundamental changes. On the second day, Nikita Sergeevich issued an order to rename one of the districts of Moscow and a large department store bearing the name of Shcherbakov. The stone laid in the foundation of the future monument to Shcherbakov, who died at the end of the war, was uprooted, and the place was asphalted. Lieutenant-

General P. A. Sudoplatov was charged with the fact that he, as the head of foreign intelligence of the KGB, allegedly took part in the Beria plot, which had the goal of destroying the Soviet government. The general was sentenced to 15 years and completely served his sentence in the Vladimir prison.

"THE SPY WHO POSSESSED HITLER, OR THE QUEEN OF NAZI SOCIETY"

In October 1945, the English newspaper The People published an article entitled "The Spy Who Possessed Hitler." The events of the Second World War continued

the peoples of the world, but the information reported by "Pete" was downright sensational. The article told about the fate of a Russian actress who moved from Russia to Germany in the early 1920s, managed to gain confidence in the Nazi elite and become Hitler's favorite. The author of the publication, Willy Frischauer, called this lady "the queen of Nazi society."

Her name is Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova. English readers were familiar with the work of the great Russian writer, so the name of Chekhov aroused additional interest. Frischauer expressed the opinion that Olga Chekhova provided Gauleiters (governors of the conquered territories), generals and major German industrialists with assistance in their contacts with

Hitler, and she transmitted the information received during such meetings to Moscow through

her driver. Half a century later, one of Olga Chekhova's close relatives, Vladimir Knipper, returned to this story in the book *The Time for Hallucinations*. True, Vladimir Knipper immediately made a reservation: "Making an attempt to achieve the truth, we will end up in such an intricate labyrinth that it will become completely dark." However, it is interesting to follow the intricacies of events associated with Olga Chekhova, with this amazing and in many ways mysterious female fate, since the course of world history left an

imprint on her. So, Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova, nee - Knipper, born in 1897. Her father held quite important positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy of St. Petersburg. The girl could get any education, but she became interested in theater early and dreamed of becoming an actress.

Stanislavsky invited Olya to his theater: on the stage of the Art Theater, she played in such famous productions as Dickens' *Cricket on the Stove*, *The Cherry Orchard* and Chekhov's *Three Sisters*. In

September 1914, Olga Knipper married a famous actor, Anton Chekhov's nephew Mikhail Chekhov. Since that time, she had a double surname - Knip-per-Chekhova. The happy husband wrote to one of his friends: "My wife is beautiful! .. My wife is not up to tobacco ... Yes, I think it's not easy for you to imagine me next to a beautiful wife, a seventeen-year-old amazing wife." But this happiness did not last long. Olga met

the former Austro-Hungarian prisoner Friedrich Yaroshi. According to Mikhail Chekhov, "He was an adventurer... graceful, handsome, charming and talented. He posed as a writer and often presented us with fascinating themes of his future stories. Olga left with him. The scene of parting with his wife was remembered by Chekhov forever, in addition, she expressively characterizes this person: "I remember how, leaving, already dressed, she, seeing how hard I was going through separation, caressed me and said: "How ugly you are. Well, goodbye. You will soon forget. And, having kissed me in a friendly way, she left.

Olga Knipper-Chekhova left Moscow in 1921. She received an invitation from the German director Friedrich Murnau to star in the film *Vogeld Castle*. Following a successful film debut

other film work followed, quickly making her a celebrity. The actress is invited by such masters as Douglas Fairbanks, Harold Lloyd, Adolf Man-ju. The famous director Alfred Hitchcock offered her the lead role in one of his films, the detective Marie. Some of the films with the participation of Chekhova were at

our box office after the war. Today it is not easy to see them. As an actress, Knipper Chekhova is now almost forgotten, but in the early 30s she really was one of the most popular actresses in Germany. Her name was well known in other European countries and in Hollywood.

In 1936, Chekhova's creative activity was noted by the German government: she received the title of "state actress". Somewhat later, the Fuhrer himself gave her his photo with such an expressive inscription: "Frau Olga Chekhova - frankly delighted and surprised." And shortly before the war, there was a rumor in Moscow that at one of the receptions in the Imperial Chancellery in Berlin, Hitler presented Frau Chekhov as almost the hostess of the evening.

The actress really felt in the Reichstag, as in her own villa, she could afford very independent judgments. She wrote about this in her memoirs entitled "My watch goes differently", published in Munich in 1971 and not translated into Russian. And if you believe them, Olga Chekhova even in the distance understood Russia better than the leaders of the Reich: "At this moment, Goebbels addresses me directly:

"Don't you think, madam, that this war will be over before winter and that we will celebrate Christmas in

Moscow?" "No," I answer

calmly. Goebbels

coldly: - Why

not? "Napoleon was convinced of what Russian spaces are

like. "There is a huge difference between the French and us,"

Goebbels smiles condescendingly. We came to Russia as liberators.

The Bolshevik clique will be overthrown by a new revolution! I'm trying

to calm my nerves. It works out badly. "A new

revolution will not take place, Herr Minister, in the face of danger,

the Russians will be in solidarity as never before!"

Of course, this passage may be reminiscent of the movie "The Feat of the Scout", where Pavel Kadochnikov, who played the leading role of the Soviet intelligence officer, proclaimed a toast "To our victory!" among drunken and jubilant Germans for the time being. But Olga Chekhova's

relationship with the leadership of the Third Reich remains a big mystery even after many decades. Even in her memoirs, she remained an actress and theatricalized events that were not at all safe for her. Vladimir Knipper, according to Olga Konstantinovna herself, told such an episode in the book "It's time for hallucinations *". Already at the very end of the war, in the spring of 1945, the threat of arrest loomed over Chekhova. This action was to be carried out by Himmler. With the help of cunning, she managed to delay the arrest from the evening of the previous day to the morning of the next. When the SS, led by Himmler, entered Chekhova's house, they saw that she was drinking morning coffee with Hitler. Arrest never

took place.

By the way, she does not name the reasons why Himmler wanted - and more than once - to deal with the actress. However, the persistence of the chief SS man, who tried to get the movie star out of the Fuhrer's custody, speaks volumes in itself. Moreover, according to Chekhova's stories, Hitler informed her of his favor in such terms: "I take patronage over you, Frau Chekhova, otherwise Himmler will hide you in his cellars. I can imagine what kind of dossier he has on you.

The history of the failed arrest, like much in the fate of Chekhova, is shrouded in mystery. Did Hitler know about Chekhova's intelligence activities, and if he did, why didn't he interfere? Or was he self-confident and did not allow the thought that this defenseless woman could deceive him? Information that Chekhova was a scout, in

addition to the old article by Willy Frischauer in the English newspaper "Pety", can be found from fairly authoritative sources. In particular, in 1993, one of the oldest security officers, "master of Russian espionage" Pavel Sudoplatov, called Olga Knipper-Chekhova "one of the most top-secret agents of Beria and Stalin." He was echoed by Sergo Beria, who in the book "Father's Personal Agents" called Chekhova the most experienced Soviet intelligence officer.

According to some reports, it was Chekhova who told our command the time of the German tank attack near Kursk. They also say that shortly after the war, Olga Chekhova was secretly taken to Moscow. For several days she negotiated with Beria's people, after which she was again transported to Berlin. What these negotiations were about remains a mystery.

Olga Konstantinovna Knipper-Chskhova's life clock stopped in 1980: at the age of 83, she died of brain cancer. After that, a version was expressed that the famous Amber Room was hidden in Hitler's bunker in Thuringia with the code name "Olga".

* * *

THE ORDER TO LET HITLER ALIVE IS HELD FROM THE KREMLIN

Among those who were preparing an assassination attempt on Gippius in Berlin was the son of Augusta Miklashevskaya, one of Sergei Yesenin's lovers, Igor Miklashevsky. This became known only recently. His name was first mentioned in P. A. Sudoplatov's book Intelligence and the Kremlin. Igor Lvovich Miklashevsky - the famous Soviet boxer - has been dead for several years. Two veterans of OMSBON, Yuri Vladimirovich Kalashnikov and Fedor Petrovich Soldatov, who were friends with I. L. Miklashevsky, shared their memories. Here is their story: "The name of Igor Miklashevsky is little known.

Meanwhile, he can be put on a par with such intelligence officers as Nikolai Kuznetsov and Lev Manevich. He did not think that he would be a scout. Before the war, he was the boxing champion of the Leningrad Military District. When the war began, he became an anti-aircraft gunner. So, probably, he would have fought, defending the Leningrad sky, if not for a special case.

In 1941, his uncle, the actor Vsevolod Blumenthal-Tamarin, surrendered to the Germans near Moscow. He was used as a provocateur. Under the dictation of the Germans, he began to call on the Red Army soldiers to surrender through the radio installation, which were placed in front of our trenches.

Igor's acquaintance with the theatrical "bohemia", his relationship with Blumenthal-Tamarin unexpectedly for him unfold his fate. After the war, we often heard

the story of Igor Miklashevsky about how once in Leningrad he was called to the air defense headquarters.

"In front of me," he said, "was sitting one of the intelligence officers who had arrived from Moscow. He asked me in detail about the family, the service. It must be

assumed that Igor made a proper impression on the officer, since he said to him: "How do you look at it if we send you behind enemy lines?" Soon Miklashevsky arrived in Moscow. His articles prepare for a difficult task ... "At night, a

shootout broke out in the forest," I. L. Miklashevsky once told one of the episodes of his combat life. - Away from the crossfire from the trench, as it was planned, I jumped out with a German leaflet-pass raised in my hand. There were many of these on the front line. Bullets whistled over my head, but I didn't notice them. I jumped into a German trench..."

Thus began a new life for I. L. Miklashevsky. Under interrogation by the Germans, he said that from the very beginning of the war he had been looking for an opportunity to surrender to captivity.

By that time, his relative Vsevolod Blumenthal-Tamarin settled in Berlin. His name became famous. He was broadcasting in Russian. In addition, he became one of the organizers of the "Russian Committee", which gathered among the prisoners those who were ready to fight against their own. The news that Igor became

a defector reached Blumenthal-Tamarin. He undertakes to help his nephew, gives him all kinds of support. The first part of the operation, conceived by our intelligence, was carried out. Miklashevsky - in Berlin under the tutelage of the "famous" uncle. First of all, he joins the "Russian Committee". However, pretty soon Igor disappointed his uncle. Most of all, he is fond of sports, he is not up to the political struggle.

In this story, another big artistic name emerges in Berlin: Olga Chekhova. The "star" of the cinema, in the Nazi circle she makes friends with the bosses of the Reich. She is seen entering

auditorium arm in arm with Hitler. Then she is at the receptions of diplomats, military men, industrialists. Then she spends the weekend in the circle of Goering. Meanwhile, Olga Chekhova passes through loyal people to our intelligence important

information. But back to Igor Miklashevsky. The extremely difficult and dangerous task with which Miklashevsky got to Berlin was connected precisely with Olga Chekhova, with her art of impersonation not only on stage, but also in life.

\ It is difficult to say until it has been made public what kind of information Olga Chekhova transmitted to Moscow, what kind of people risked their lives to carry them through the war-torn countries.

"There was, for example, nothing surprising in the fact that I," said Igor Miklashevsky, "approached the car with a bouquet of flowers, in which Olga Chekhova came to the theater. My mother knew her in Moscow. But we didn't manage to talk about the case for a long time. "

That's when Igor asks "Uncle Seva" to take him with him to one of the receptions, where Olga Chekhova will be, to express her admiration. During the reception, to the sound of music, Miklashevsky, approaching Olga Chekhova, utters a meaningless phrase, which is a password ... And he becomes

one step closer to the goal for which he traveled to Berlin. P. A. Sudoplatov reports in his book "Intelligence and the Kremlin": "We had a plan to assassinate Hitler, according to which Radziwill (Polish prince) and Olga Chekhova, with the help of their friends among the German aristocracy, were to provide our people with access to Hitler . A group of agents, abandoned in Germany and underground in Berlin, was completely subordinate to the militant Igor Miklashevsky.

I also recall another story by Miklashevsky about how once on the street an old man, having collided, stepped on his foot and gave the password. But who this man was, he did not know. And this was a messenger who did his job well, and at that moment it didn't matter at all to him whether they knew him by sight ...

In a word, while the "couriers" transmit messages from Berlin to Moscow, Igor Miklashevsky, speaking in the ring, receives an unexpected gift.

"Igor showed us a photograph that the German boxer, world champion Max Schmeling gave him, his fighting friends said. — That's how it was. Igor competed in the ring paired with a Frenchman, also a prisoner of war. Miklashevsky won. And suddenly he is called to the podium. Max Schmeling liked this fight. He gives Igor his photo with an inscription. Max Schmeling, the Fuhrer's favorite, was known throughout Germany. Meanwhile, while he was getting to Berlin, then waiting for an order from Moscow, events

were taking place in the diplomatic world of Europe that could change the course of the war. Information about secret talks in Ankara, where the possibility of signing a separate peace between Great Britain, the United States and Germany, were discussed on the table of intelligence leaders in Moscow. Miklashevsky's group in Berlin does not know about this. Readiness for a desperate step and caution, the need for retribution and

strategic interest in this story are intertwined into one ball. Igor Miklashevsky studies the plan of the theater where Hitler visits. And the Kremlin is weighing all the consequences of the assassination attempt. Will the Miklashevsky group, having accomplished the feat of self-sacrifice, help the enemies to leave the Soviet Union isolated? The Soviet leadership cannot accept such

an outcome. "In 1943, Stalin abandoned his original plan to assassinate Hitler, because he was afraid that as soon as Hitler was eliminated, Nazi circles and the military would try to conclude a separate peace

treaty with the allies without the participation of the Soviet Union," writes P. A. Sudoplatov.

Igor Miklashevsky unexpectedly receives an order from Moscow: there will be no assassination attempt on Hitler. Subsequently, he had to flee to France. He, together with the underground, staged an explosion at an underground factory. He was seriously wounded in the neck. Couldn't speak. In German uniform, with other people's documents, the underground left Igor on the road to be taken to the hospital. He needed urgent surgery. He returned to Moscow in 1947, wounded, emaciated,

with hidden sadness in his eyes. He did not feel like a hero, and it was difficult for him to experience all that happened to him.

* * *

HOW STALIN AND HITLER PREPARED ATTEMPT ON EACH OTHER

The German magazine Stern carried out a journalistic investigation with the aim of establishing whether assassination attempts on Stalin and Hitler were really being prepared during the Second World War. It used declassified materials from the archives of the NKVD-KGB, memoirs of the chief of Hitler's intelligence PGellenberg, conversations with participants in covert operations. This is the conclusion the German journalists came to.

Autumn 1944. Aachen has already fallen, the Red Army is in East Prussia. Adolf Hitler is losing faith in "historical providence" and final victory. The Fuhrer wants to get rid of his Soviet adversary, Joseph Stalin, using a "miracle weapon". A revolver disguised as a fountain pen

change the difficult military situation.

The last head of Nazi foreign intelligence, Walter Schellenberg, who died in 1952, tells in his memoirs that appeared after his death that, around November 1944, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in the Fuschl Palace in the Salzkammergut initiated him into "an extremely important matter." Only Hitler, Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann knew about him. Ribbentrop developed an absurd plan. We must try to get Stalin to the

negotiating table. "He will be killed there with a fountain pen, which actually hides the barrel of a revolver and can shoot a normal-caliber bullet right at the target from a distance of six to eight meters." The head of espionage is amazed: "The plan seemed to me more than confused." Stalin would hardly have negotiated with the Nazis, who had already been defeated in principle, Schellenberg argued. The assassination attempt was abandoned.

The German plan was, however, not the only plan to assassinate the dictator. In turn, there were Soviet attempts to remove Hitler. This is evidenced by the statements of the participants and documents from the Russian archives, with which the Moscow historian Lev Bezymensky acquainted the editors of the Stern magazine.

Schellenberg's own killers developed a bold plan: the agents who penetrated Moscow should plant a bomb in one of the cars driven by Stalin. "Two prisoners of war officers of the Red Army, who spent many years in exile in Siberia and hated Stalin, undertook to complete the task," writes Schellenberg. "In the winter of 1944/45, they were landed from an airplane near Moscow." The NKVD documents that Stern possesses

show how this plan was to be carried out and what happened to the killers. Schellenberg's recollections of them are not accurate.

On September 5, 1944, employees of the Soviet counterintelligence SMERSH near the city of Rzhev arrested a man and a woman in Russian military uniforms, who were landed from an airplane in an open field along with a motorcycle. They posed as Major Pyotr Ivanovich Tavrín and Second Lieutenant Lidia Shilova. Both stated that they were SMERSH officers of the 1st Baltic Front.

The check showed that their documents were forged. Both were taken to Moscow. During interrogations - Stern has the protocols - they admitted that their task was to kill. Tavrín, born in

1909, by profession a technician of the geological party, in May 1942 was the commander of a machine-gun company, wounded was captured by the Germans. In the summer of

1943, he said in Moscow, he was recruited and trained by German intelligence for use behind the front lines. A year later, from the eastern department of the sixth department of the main department of imperial security in Berlin, he received the task, as he testified, "to organize a terrorist act against the leader of the Soviet state, I. V. Stalin." Many months of preparation for it was carried

out by the head of the SD Nord sector in Riga, Sturmbannführer Otto Kraus. Both agents were supposed to make their way to Moscow and carry out a terrorist act on the street during the passage of a government vehicle. They were heavily armed for the assassination: they had a portable anti-tank missile called a "panzerknacke", incendiary anti-tank grenades, and pistols that fired poisoned explosive bullets.

Operation failed straightaway after landing of a four-engine aircraft that took off from an airfield near Riga on the night of September 4-5, 1944. Despite the special chassis, the car could no longer take off. Agents and crew were captured. The

recognition gave agents the ability to extend their lives. Until April 1945, they were used in a radio game to deceive their masters: under the control of the Soviet secret service, they now and then report that they have not yet managed to get close enough to the leaders, and ask to help them by sending more agents. They arrive and immediately fall into the hands of the Soviet counterintelligence.

After the end of the war for treason, they are brought to trial and on February 1, 1952 in Moscow they are sentenced to death. A few weeks later, the sentence is carried out.

Soviet attempts to assassinate Hitler were equally unsuccessful. Two weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union on July 5, 1941, the head of the secret service, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, created the Special Tasks Department and appointed General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov as its head. In the event of the capture of Moscow, he had to develop a plan to kill Hitler in it. The Soviets were convinced that the Fuhrer, like Napoleon in his time, would want to see the defeated capital for himself. But at the end of 1941, the Wehrmacht was stopped

a few kilometers from Moscow. Sudoplatov had to look for other opportunities to hunt Hitler. The case presented itself near the Ukrainian city of Vinnitsa. There, in the second half of June 1942, the Germans began the construction of a military headquarters, code-named "Werwolf". Hitler was expected to visit.

But when the Fuhrer actually arrived in Vinnitsa, the Russians were not yet ready. Only later did they receive the testimony of a captured German pilot about the conditions at headquarters. Between February 19 and March 13, 1943, Hitler appears there again. But even this turned out

to be too early for the task force under the command of Dmitry Medvedev, later Hero of the Soviet Union, who was able to penetrate Vinnitsa only in the fall of 1943.

After that, the hopes of the Sudoplatov department were pinned on Igor Miklashevsky. In December 1941, the young agent, under the guise of a defector, was transferred to the Germans. His mission was to remove his uncle, the popular actor Vsevolod Blumentat-Tamarshga, who in German propaganda broadcasts urged Russian soldiers to desert. Now he received a new order: to try through the actress Olga Konstantinovna Chekhova to approach Hitler and blow him up

with a bomb. The actress Chekhova moved from Russia to Germany in 1921, where she made a career in cinema. She was highly regarded by Hermann Goering. According to General Sudoplatov, she was a reliable employee and an important source of the Soviet secret service, she was personally "led" by Beria. In 1943 there is a sharp turn in the situation. According to Sudoplatov, Stalin unexpectedly abandoned the idea of assassinating Hitler. He summoned him and the People's Commissar of State Security

Vsevolod Merkulov to his dacha and, unexpectedly for both, announced: "We will not do this." Why? .. Then none of them dared to ask such a question.

In 1944, Merkulov and Sudoplatov finally decided to ask a question about the assassination attempt. Stalin explained to them the course of his thoughts: as long as Hitler was alive, there would be no separate peace between Germany and the Western powers. But if, after the violent death of Hitler, Goering or the rebels take power, then an agreement could be reached behind the back of the Soviet Union between

Germans and our Western allies.

Igor Miklashevsky never receives an order to assassinate Hitler. Until the end of 1944, he will remain in Germany, following the original plan, kill his uncle and go to the Resistance fighters in liberated France. In 1947 he returned to Moscow and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

* * *

IN THE FIGHT AGAINST UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

From the description of the military operations of border guards to eliminate gangs on the territory of the Ukrainian district on August 28-30, 1944

Not earlier than August 30,

1944' According to data from August 28, 1944, the border detachment became aware that the UPA gang was concentrated in the Karuv forest in the Karuv-Rypinska Rava strip of the Russky district. The bandit group had a goal: to attack and destroy the bodies of Soviet power, the NKVD, the NKGB and the garrison of the border troops in the city of Rava

Russkaya ... By 13.00 on August 29, 1944, all search groups were drawn into the

battle with the gang ... During the daytime battle on August 29 and According to the testimonies of the prisoners, it was established that starting from August 25, a gang consisting of two kurens, Emma and Zheleznyak, had concentrated in the Karuvsky Forest.

The composition of the kurens includes hundreds: 1) in the kuren "Emma" - a hundred "Peremoga" (up to 160 people), a hundred "Berkut" (up to 170 people), a hundred "Kulesh" (up to 150 people); 2) in the Zheleznyak hut - a hundred "Skol" (up to 150 people), a hundred "Thunder" (up to 160 people), a hundred "Zheleznyak" (about 140 people). In addition to these kurens, the gang included two training hundreds led by "Bogdanov". Each kuren had one machine-gun platoon and a group of scouts of 20-30 people. Each hundred, which is part of the kuren, is armed with from 12 to 20 machine guns, and the entire personnel - with machine guns and rifles, some hundreds had several heavy machine guns. During their stay in the Karuv Forest (from August 25 to August 29, 1944), the gang camps and training hundreds were located

well...

After the shelling of the Karuvsky Forest began, the Emma and Zheleznyak kurens assigned the following task to the personnel of the kurens: in the event of an encirclement or a collision with units of the Red Army, take up defense and hold out until dark; with the onset of darkness, break up into small groups and, without throwing weapons, leave the encirclement of the day for further concentration in the village. Bridges Malay (Poland). However, the bandits failed to complete the task. As a result of the daytime battle on

August 29, as well as the active actions of small

groups of our units on the night of August 30 and combing the entire Karuvsky Forest on August 30, the gang suffered heavy losses ...

Conclusions The operation was carried out successfully. The gang of up to 1,400 people in the Karuvsky forest has been largely eliminated, from encirclement rings fled only loners and small groups ...

Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Department of Troops
NKVD of the Ukrainian District Captain **Melnikov**

* * *

From the report of the chief of the border troops of the Ukrainian district on the actions of the border guards to defeat the bands from August 10 to

October 1, 1944

October 5, 1944 ... With the exit of the district units to the border line, the situation in the border strip and adjacent areas developed extremely tense: OUN organizations intensified their activities, UPA armed gangs openly fought against local authorities, sought to disrupt government events and attacked the rear and communications of the army with sudden actions. The situation demanded decisive measures, and the border units of the district, on your instructions, conducted military operations to defeat the UPA gangs and OUN organizations ... As a result of the operations, large Bandera gangs were defeated: Emma, Zheleznyak, Dniester, Bogdan ", "Kulesh" and the rest of the hundreds -

"Berkut", "Roman", "Dove", "Peremoga", "Skola", "Thunder" ... Head of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian District, Major General **Burmak**

* * *

Information from the Chief of Staff of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Carpathian District on the deployment and activities of the training center of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist formations. Lipa, a UPA school

is deployed for training²

swarms³ and fours⁴ with the number of trainees up to 220 Ukrainian cadets aged 18 to 30 with

at least 8 grade education. The school is subordinate to the main headquarters of the UPA, and is headed by a lieutenant of the Polish army under the pseudonym "Pol*" (last name not established) at the age of 34-35, Ukrainian by nationality.

The school consists of two hundred, each hundred has three couples. The cadets study: tactics, chemistry, topography, the charter of the guard service; undergo fire training. Particular attention is paid to the indoctrination of bandits in the nationalist spirit of "independent Ukraine", the training period is three months.

From weapons in the school there are: 6 company mortars, 8 light machine guns of different systems, 15 machine guns, rifles of the Magyar, German and Russian systems, grenades, three for each cadet, ammunition - 300-400 rounds per machine gun and 50-60 rounds per rifle. The staff of the school is housed in huts built of brushwood;

the leadership is in tents. It is guarded by three round-the-clock field guards of 10-12 people each. The area around the school camp is mined, leaving only four passages. The school has a gendarmerie detachment of 50 people, led by a cornet under the pseudonym Shaleny, whose task is to conduct reconnaissance and collect food

to feed the staff of the school ...

Chief of Staff of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Carpathian District Colonel **Chugunov**
* * *

From the description of the military operations of the 218th border regiment against bandit formations

Not earlier than December 24, ⁵

1944 Vidly and Turnitsa, 12 km north-west of Dobromi-la, a UPA gang was hiding for a long time under the leadership of the hundred "Homa". This gang systematically attacked small groups of Red Army soldiers and destroyed them, often carried out terrorist acts against Soviet and party activists.

On August 20, 1944, a combined group of officers of the administration, a maneuver group, the 1st and 2nd border commandant's offices under the command of the head of the detachment, Colonel Ageev, carried out an operation to search for and eliminate this gang.

At 12.00, after a collision between the guards of the gang and the group of the 1st border commandant's office under the command of Major Semenov, the bandits retreated deep into the forest to a line prepared in advance for defense. At 2.00 a group of the 1st border commandant's office again stumbled upon dug-in bandits, who, having organized an all-round defense, entered the battle. The bandits, seeing the superiority of the forces of the border guards and heavy losses on their part, concentrate the main effort in two directions - in the north and southeast in order to break through the blockaded area, get out of the encirclement and, having dispersed in small groups, escape from the blow of the border guards to "big forest" The bandits, breaking through the cordon to the north, came out of the forest to a clearing in a prepared "bag" ... As a result of the operation, 49 bandits were killed and taken alive. The rest of the bandits of the southeastern group, taking advantage of the gaps formed between the flanks of the 1st border commandant's office during the movement and the sharply rugged terrain overgrown with dense bushes, fought out of the cordon and, having dispersed, left with impunity. The battle

with the bandits took place in very difficult conditions for five hours, the bandits defended themselves at a line prepared in advance for defense, equipped on the heights. In this battle, they

especially distinguished themselves: Sergeant Gunin Akim Ilyich, commander of the 3rd outpost, member of the CPSU (b), ensured the advance of a group of border guards with light machine gun fire, carried two seriously wounded officers from the battlefield and provided them with medical care, after which he returned again into the department and joined the battle, where he also destroyed several bandits. For courage and courage in this battle, Sergeant Gunin was awarded the Order of the Red Star by the government; guards st. Sergeant Baburin Pavel Trofimovich, the commander of the squad, skillfully led the battle of his squad, being wounded, continued to lead the squad, established contact with the neighbors and gave them an important order from the commandant of the section, thereby ensuring the quickest liquidation of the gang. For the courage and bravery shown in battle, the guards of Art. Sergeant Baburin was awarded the medal "For Courage". In this battle, the death of the brave fell: party organizer of the 1st border commandant's office, lieutenant Gakhimyarov, assistant chief of staff of the 1st border commandant's office, lieutenant P

October 18, 1944 in the area with. Yamna-Gurna, a gang was established that had left the Carpathians, consisting of three hundred: "Osip", "Krysova" and "Gromenko", reduced to the "Evgena" hut. At dawn on October 19, the personnel of the 5th, 6th and 7th outposts entered into battle with the outposts of bandits thrown forward by the defending hundred. After the outposts withdrew under the onslaught of the outposts, maneuver groups were active from the flanks. Bandits

introduced

dispersed in groups, they organized a withdrawal in different directions deep into the territory of Poland. As a result of a four-day

pursuit and successive battles in the area of the villages of Opushnitsa, Yamna-Gurna and Kopy-stno, on October 23, the gang was defeated. Among the dead were found: the leader of the gang, the hundredth "Evgen", his deputy "Bayrak" and the hundredth "Osip".

In this battle, the commander of the department, ml. sergeant Ashchutov, who with his well-aimed fire destroyed 10 bandits and, bleeding, fought until the last minute of his life.

In the area with Staro-Pochaev of the Ternopil region, the search group, acting on November 30, 1944 to eliminate the gang, entered the battle. 2 shooters of this group - Corporal Nechaev and Corporal Muzyka - unexpectedly encountered 4 bandits. Corporal Nechaev, in hand-to-hand combat, killed one bandit with the butt of a machine gun, at which time a second bandit, whom Nechaev did not see, attacked him. The duel lasted about 30 minutes, until Nechaev found himself on top of the bandit. The bandit was stronger than Nechaev and held his hands. Then Nechaev pulled himself up to the head of the bandit, strained all his strength, and destroyed the bandit. At this time, Corporal Music in hand-to-hand combat finished off the second bandit ... Both heroes were awarded the Order of Glory III degree. UPA bandits concentrated in ur. The Isaevites also

controlled the settlements of Koblo-Stare, Volya Koblyan-ska, Zvur, Volya Blazhevskia, Blazhev and Gurne ... At dawn on December 6, 1944, the area where the gang was located was blocked by

the forces of the attached battalion of the Red Army, a platoon of sappers, a platoon of anti-tank rifles. Operational groups of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd border commandant's offices and

mangroup. The reserve leadership of the operation consisted of a platoon of machine gunners, a platoon of 82-mm mortars.

As a result of the operation, a hundred "Baida", a platoon of a hundred "Karmelyuk" were defeated, among the killed were a representative of the OUN district wire "Kobzar" and his deputy "Cherny". Captured and wounded 146 people. Among them, the hundredth "Bear" and the hundredth doctor "Ash" ... In the second half of December 1944, it

was established that they were in dugouts ur. Vidly headquarters of the 6th Ukrainian district of the UPA. The operation carried out on December 23 by the forces of the 1st and 2nd commandant's offices

completely destroyed the headquarters. Killed 9 important bandits, including the head of the UPA district ...

The measures systematically carried out by the detachment to clear the border areas, a number of successfully carried out operations during 1944 to eliminate bandit formations led to a change in the tactical actions of the bands. In order to save personnel, the

remaining bandits dispersed into small groups and went underground. Now all the activity of the bandits is to carry out terrorist acts against the party and Soviet activists, as well as against the Red Army. These bandits, hiding in caches in settlements, carry out counter-revolutionary work among the local population, relying on family and other ties and support among the kulak element. At the same time, the OUN underground is conducting active agitation aimed at disrupting the activities of the party and government, carried out in the countryside by party and Soviet bodies in the western regions of Ukraine.

In connection with the changed tactics of the UPA and OUN gangs, the border guards intensified the fight against Ukrainian nationalists, haunting them in caches and various types of shelters ...

Bavditov, November 10, 1944 with three border guards went into an ambush. Knowing that at night the bandits go to the village, he determined the probable direction of the bandits' movement and, placing the outfit, began to monitor the forest and bushes approaching the village. At about 17.00, 4 bandits came out of the forest. Finding no ambush, the bandits approached

border guards at a distance of 300 m and, after standing for a while, began to leave for the forest. Then Nabiev gave the command: "Fire!" At first, automatic and rifle fire returned, and soon subsided. The situation became unclear, and Nabiev decided to send two border guards to clarify it. After Nabiev additionally sent one border guard to the left

and right of the whereabouts of the bandits, he himself went along the road. As soon as Nabiev left the bush and began to approach the forest, he suddenly ran into a bandit who was coming out from behind the bush onto the road. The bandit, having a light machine gun with him, swung it, intending to strike at Nabiev, but the latter, with a deft movement, set up the butt of the machine gun and attacked the bandit. In hand-to-hand combat, the bandit and Nabiev struck each other with their fists until Nabiev, being under the bandit, choosing a convenient moment, grabbed the Finnish knife he had with him and stabbed the bandit with a backstab ... Nabiev for his bravery and courage in this operation was awarded the Order of the Red Star ... On December 24, 1944, the head of the 2nd reserve outpost, Lieutenant Nabiev, having information about the

presence in one of the houses in the village. Krostsenko bandits, decided to destroy this gang. Lieutenant Nabiev,

together with a cavalryman of the 6th outpost, Red Army soldier Rzhanukhin (a member of the Komsomol), burst into the house, and were suddenly attacked by 4 bandits. One of the bandits attacked

Lieutenant Nabiev, knocked him to the floor and began to choke him. The Red Army soldier Rzhanukhin did not lose his head: while dealing with one bandit who attacked him, he hit him with a strong blow from the butt of his machine gun, and with a second swing of the butt hit the bandit on the head, clinging to Nabiev's throat, which saved Nabiev's life. The remaining 2 bandits were also destroyed in hand-to-hand combat...

* * *

From the memorandum of the Directorate of Border Troops of the Ukrainian Border District on the activities of gangs in the Stanislav region on May 12, 1945 ...
The leadership of the UPA
and OUN
gangs at the end of 1944 and the beginning

1945 launched in the Stanislav region, and especially in its southern regions, extensive work on the formation and training of reserve hundreds of the UPA, with the aim of preparing a contingent to replenish the defeated bandit formations in the Lvov, Drohobych, Tarnopol, Rivne, Volyn and Stanislav regions of Western Ukraine. To cover the formation and training of spare hundreds, the leadership of the UPA

and OUN concentrated six kurens in the Stanislav region, in addition to the existing wide network of local bandits and self-defense booths, especially in the southern regions (Zhabyevsky, Kosovsky, Kutekom, Yablonovsky, Pechenezhsky and Solotvinsky) ... In the process operation, it was established that in the Bolekhovsky, Dolinsky, Ioreginsky and Kalushsky districts, UPA, Zhuravli, aka Snegiri kurens,

numbering over 300 people each, as well as a separate hundred Dovbush, operated up to 140 people. In the area of the Black Forest forest, in the Bogorodchansky, Solotvinsky and Lisetsky districts, the Prug hut (the former Rzina hut) with a total number of 250-270 people operated. In the southern districts of the region, the kurens of the leaders "Unfinished", "Knysh", "Skuba" and "Maniv" operated ... The listed gangs acted in the communications of the army and at the same time covered in the southern, Zhabyevsky, Kosovsky, Yablonovsky, Kutekom, Kolomysky and Pechenezhsky districts, the formation and training of 12 training and

reserve hundreds of leaders "Kvitko", "Grushko", "Gai", on "Verkhovynets", "Kukol", "Gamaley", "Prutsky", "Yavir", "Bogun", "Drusha", "Boyarinov" and "Galaida" ... With weapons of all systems, ammunition and uniforms, by agreement of the leaders of the UPA, the gangs were supplied with Hungarian and German troops, which is confirmed by the testimony of the captured hundreds and other persons of the leadership of the UPA. During the operations, it

was also established that there was a UPA school for training the command staff of gangs. The presence of a school for commanding officers and training and reserve hundreds of UPA gangs in the Stanislav region contributed to the survivability of the OUN underground and gang formations ...

Head of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian District, Lieutenant General
Burmak Deputy Head of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian District, Colonel
Yakhimovich
* * *

From the summary of the headquarters of the 92nd border Carpathian Red Banner
Regiment of troops for the protection of the rear of the 4th Ukrainian Front about the identified
fascist

intelligence schools and about detention by border guards
groups of German soldiers and officers May 10,
1945 20:00. 00 min. Recently, German

intelligence agencies have begun to intensively send their agents to the rear of the active
Red Army ... It has been established that in the village. Sekule, which is 50 km north of
Bratislava,

there was a German reconnaissance school for training saboteurs for espionage and
sabotage operations in the rear of the active Red Army.

The second school of scouts-saboteurs during the occupation by the Germans was first
organized on the territory of Poland in the village. Sul, and later, during the retreat of the
Germans, relocated to the city of Lukel Walde, which is 70 km south of Berlin ...

The same school trained the leaders of the UPA and OUN gangs and transferred them
to the western regions of Ukraine to fight against Soviet power. The third intelligence school
existed in the city of

Kerhain (Germany) and trained saboteurs and radio operators for subversive activities in
the rear of the active Red Army ... At 7 o'clock. 00 min. May 7, 1945 service outfit consisting of
7 people. under the command of Sergeant Shornikov, acting along the

Frenshtat-Rozhnov route, he met a large group of armed enemy soldiers coming out of
the forest. Sergeant Shornikov ordered the squad to lie down, and he himself met the soldiers
with one soldier and offered to lay down their arms. The soldiers complied with the order of
duty and laid down their arms without resistance.

As a result, 102 people were disarmed. soldiers and officers of the enemy. Of these:
officers - 3, junior commanders - 5, soldiers - 94. Weapons selected: light machine guns - 6,
rifles

foreign-style - 69, pistols - 4. The soldiers were transferred to the prisoner-of-war station No. 66, and the weapons were handed over to the military commandant of the city of Valash

Mezhirichi. Commander of the 92nd Red Banner Carpathian Border Regiment Lieutenant Colonel **Blyumin** Chief of Staff of the Regiment Lieutenant Colonel **Smirnov**

¹ Dated by content.

² Dated according to the content of the omitted part of the

³ document. Roy is a UPA gang consisting of several dozen people.

⁴ Cheta - UPA gang consisting of several people. 5

Dated by content.

OUN - ON THE WAY OF SHAME AND TREASON

Below, the reader is offered a story about Bandera as such and the so-called "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) organized by it. Unfortunately, until that time, there were practically no documents published that would expose the legend that the supposedly Bandera OUN, after the dispersal of the "government" of Stetsk-Karbovich, "divorced" from its masters from the Abwehr and, having formed the UPA, fought against the Nazi invaders. In our opinion, the role of the Gestapo in the formation of the UPA and in using it to fight the

partisan movement, and after the expulsion of the Nazi occupiers from the USSR, for espionage and subversive activities in the western regions of Soviet Ukraine is also not sufficiently open. In addition, in the published documents, Metropolitan Sheptytsky, who played in the history of the formation and activities of the UPA, did not find adequate coverage of the rhyme. In

the meantime, the documents received irrefutably prove that the UPA is a provocative formation of the Gestapo, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky, to the same extent as in relation to the Melnyk OUN, is a scourge of the shepherd and mentors of the Bandera murderers until his last breath.

So, a word to the

document. After the Nazi masters forbade Bandera to play in the "Ukrainian government", Bandera did not break ties with the Abwehr-N. Gently appearing on the appointed days for the next appearance to his bosses and explaining to them what harm the Germans had done to themselves by dispersing the "Ukrainian government" he had formed, Bandera filed a new denunciation to the Nazis. It pointed out that the dispersal of the Stetsk government was called by a significant part of his supporters a "tragic mistake." Therefore, there was disappointment not only in the Germans, but also in the OUN itself. There are symptoms of direct disobedience to him, Bandera, and therefore to German government officials, that is, the Abwehr. In other words, sedition appeared. The Gestapo, together with the SD security service, undertook to eradicate sedition. First of all, the Gestapo checked the real mood of the Bandera OUN. It turned out that sedition among the "undisciplined part" of Bandera not only appeared, but was even more threatening than their loyal agent told about it: among the grassroots Bandera there is a significant group of deceived youth who believed the promises of their leaders that, having returned to Ukraine, will build "their own conciliar independent power." Faced with reality in the occupied territory, that is, with the terrible hatred of the unconquered Soviet people for the Nazi invaders and their accomplices from the nationalist gangs, these young people are preparing to start a real rebellion against the Germans, against Bandera and Stetsk himself. The Gestapo and the SD decided to exterminate the sedition among the Banderaites so

that it would not even remain in the bud. The Nazis acted quickly, with their inherent cruelty and meanness. The OUN "leader" received the following order from the Gestapo: to stage his transition to an illegal position. Having led the opposition, be constantly aware of its actions, while identifying all its participants. Bandera and this time will obediently fulfill the instructions of his masters. At the same time, a legend is being fabricated that supposedly Bandera and his "wire" (leadership) broke with the Germans. In support of this, "underground leaflets" and other "illegal literature" are being distributed, which contain the usual nationalist propaganda allowed by the Gestapo, diluted with criticism of the sommelier type at

"perfidious ally". At the same time, the provocateur Bandera and his "wire" in the same leaflets pounce not on the invaders, but on Ukrainian Soviet patriots who defend their homeland at the front and in the rear, on the indestructible fraternal unity of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, pour dirt on the symbol of hope for victory over fascism of all enslaved peoples and all progressive mankind - Moscow, they indicate to the "Ukrainian people" the Nazi horde not to be interpreted as an enemy and not to put any obstacles on it, they call to go to Moscow, "Moscow is our enemy No. 1". Not the last role was played by the desire to deal

with their competitors in order to receive the greatest handouts from the Germans. In some "illegal" leaflets, Bandera and his "wire", rejecting the accusation of the Melnikovites in the intelligence service of the Banderaites in the Abwehr, completely and very sharply, in turn, shifted this accusation to Melnik and his residency. And again, with the permission of the Gestapo. The Banderaites competently assert that it is not they, but namely Melnik and his "wire" who are in the undercover service of German intelligence. Many facts were cited to prove it. One of them testified that at the beginning of 1942 the Nazis selected the most reliable Melnikovites to replenish the counterintelligence service in Ukraine. In turn, fighting off these accusations, the Melnikovites did not remain in debt and, calling the Bandera

"German mercenaries", exposed their activities either as agents of German intelligence, or as fascist landsknechts. In the heat of this internecine war, the Melnikovites even discovered the content of the last task of their rivals. Melnyk, for example, officially informed the members of his "wire" that the Banderaites were instructed to play the role of provocateurs, and a member of this "wire" Martinets, speaking in Snyatyn, openly informed a wider circle of nationalists about this.

A clear oversight in the controversy allowed by the Gestapo only accelerated the implementation of the pre-planned staging of the arrest of the OUN leader. With the help of this trick, the Gestapo was going to refute serious accusations against Bandera, and most importantly, save their agent from complete failure, since further measures planned by the Gestapo against the OUN

"seditious" would inevitably lead to the disclosure of him as a provocateur.

The fact is that for a short time in an allegedly illegal position, Bandera managed to do a lot in this direction. Having created an auxiliary agent network at the appropriate points on the instructions of the Gestapo, he was able to identify the main OUN "seditious". Most of them were found in Eastern Ukraine and in the "Bolshevik Dnieper region". It was there that not one of the OUN youths, faced with the fierce hatred of the Ukrainian people for the Nazi occupiers, who tortured and destroyed Soviet people with unprecedented cruelty, came to his senses from the poisonous action of nationalist propaganda.

"These traitors have violated the Decalogue of the Nationalist and deserve death," Bandera pronounced his sentence on them, passing the list to the Gestapo. After clarification through auxiliary agents, the Gestapo identified almost all the OUN "seditious", as well as their central figure - the head of the regional "wire" in Eastern Ukraine "Dmitr" (aka "Miron" and "Andrey").

Having identified all the "unsafe" OUN members, the Gestapo began to liquidate them. Arrests were made simultaneously throughout the occupied territory of Ukraine. It is characteristic that Bandera and his associates were able to make the most of the moment, throwing people they did not want into the Gestapo nets. The Gestapo machine worked according to a monotonous scheme. The "seditious" were hastily interrogated, the pliable ones were recruited, and the persistent ones were destroyed. True, at first the head of the "seditious" "Dmitro", in the words of Stepan Bandera and Mikola Lebed, "a very clever conspirator", escaped the Gestapo raids. The Nazis organized a real hunt for him. This was demanded all the time by provocateurs Bandera and

Stetsko. Despite the fact that the hunt for him was quite solid, it was unsuccessful for a long time. And only on July 25, 1942, the Gestapo finally managed to attack his trail in Kyiv. The Gestapo rushed to take the leader of the OUN "seditious" alive. But he knew very well with whom he would have to deal, and put up a desperate armed resistance. In this skirmish

"Dmitro-Miron" was killed. They took alive only one of his contacts, who acted under the pseudonym "Zrub". During interrogation by the Gestapo, the arrested OUN member stated that Dmitro-Miron knew about the hunt arranged for him and had accurate evidence of the provocative activities of Bandera, Stetsk and Lebed. There is no doubt that the Gestapo introduced these confessions to their henchmen. However, they reacted to this in a provocative way. At their request, the Gestapo allowed them to publish an announcement about the murder of "Dmitr-Miron" in the "underground" Bandera-OUN leaflets "in the interests of the cause." Unbelievable, but true: the victims of the provocative

activities of Bandera, Stetsk and Lebed by Bandera bandits abroad are still presented today as evidence of the invented struggle of the OUN against the German occupiers. Among the OUN "seditious" a special position was occupied by the brother of

Stepan Bandera Vasil. The Gestapo was forced to arrest him for especially malicious calls to fight against the perfidious "allies of the Germans." Everything shows that, having recruited such a valuable agent as Stepan Bandera, both the Abwehr and the Gestapo did not consider it necessary to recruit his brother, especially since he did not represent any value. But the Gestapo underestimated the popovich Vasil Bandera. After the dispersal of the puppet government, and most importantly, after the staged arrest of Stepan Bandera, his brother Vasil simply went wild. "How did the Germans disperse the government? Arrested the leader? What about promises? To arms! It is necessary to repay the deceivers, not the mothers! - Popovich Vasil was broadcasting, not even suspecting that the OUN leader and the self-made prime minister were sitting, waiting for their time, not in prison, but in comfortable villas. "Give me the opportunity to meet with my brother," Stepan Bandera asked his Gestapo chiefs.

"I'll get this nonsense out of his head. - And soon the Gestapo brought the priest Vasil Bandera to the villa to his brother.

"What did you do there, brother, that you were sent to prison?" — with such words the OUN leader met him.

"But what kind of prison is yours," Popovich Vasil said, as if not having heard the words of his brother, looking around his workroom.

The Gestapo left them alone. Stepan Bandera explained the situation to his brother in detail, but he only listened stunned and seemed to understand nothing. After much begging and instructions, the Gestapo provocateur was convinced that all his efforts were in vain. Then he warned Vasil: "You will have big troubles. You don't have to joke with them." And finally, already at the end of the conversation, the priest Vasil seemed to see the light.

"You know, brother," he turned to Stepan, "after my work in Sat Abel will not come out of me. But see that you do not become Cain.

After this meeting, Vasil Bandera became even more rabid and did not agree to any proposals of Himmler's schemers. The Gestapo had to tame the offended in their "best feelings" priest Vasil Bandera. He was forced to shut up - just killed.

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129075,**

Moscow, Zvezdny Boulevard, 23 but I had not learned to contain
my emotions, I was overjoyed and could hardly believe that

the head of the country wanted to meet with an ordinary operative worker. After Stalin shook my hand, I couldn't bring myself to answer his questions clearly. Smiling, Stalin remarked:

- Don't worry, young man. Report the main data. We have only twenty minutes at our disposal." *Pavel Sudoplatov* "...

Two weeks after the German attack on the Soviet Union on July 5, 1941, the head of the secret service, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, created the Special Tasks Department and appointed General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov as its head. In the event of the capture of Moscow, he had to develop a plan to kill Hitler in it. The Soviets were convinced that the Fuhrer, like Napoleon in his time, would want to see the defeated capital."

From the German magazine "Stern"

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notes

1

The note was written on the letterhead of the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. There is a resolution on the note: "To the members of G1B. Comrade Stalin's walking around Moscow must be stopped. V. Molotov" and signed by L. Kaganovich, M. Kalinin, V. Kuibyshev and A.

Rykov. 'ROVS - "Russian All-Military Union *. Formed in 1924 in emigration.

2

Guk asov P. O. (1858-?) - a major Baku industrialist, engineer, since 1916 chairman of the board of the Russian Trade and Industrial Bank

3

ka. After the October Revolution, he emigrated to France, where in the 20s.

4

took an active part in the activities of the anti-Soviet organization "Tor

5

State Industrial Committee (Torgprom).